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1. Introduction
1.1 An overview of the thesis
Convergence or regional per capita incomes has been a frequent object of study in
recent years. Two different lines of research can be usefully distinguished: The first of
these has been traced by macroeconomists, who, while studying the growth process,
have become interested in applying to the interregional scale of analysis tools originally
developed for the international one: Cross-section regressions, Panel data regressions
and Markov Chain models (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1990,1991,1992,1995, Sala-i-
Martín 1994,1996, Canova and Marcet 1995, Tondl 1997, 1999, Quah 1986, Fingleton
1997,1999, Magrini 1999). The interest in regional convergence would seem to be an
offshoot of international convergence (Blanchard 1991). As a consequence, the same
schema originally proposed for the analysis of international convergence has been
applied to the regional level, with the only difference that the mobility of capital and
labour has been introduced, which according to the neo-classical model should
accelerate the process of convergence. In this way the essential role of spatial factors in
the regional convergence process has been neglected (Cheshire and Carbonaro, 1995).
The second line of research on regional convergence includes that carried out by
regional scientists, who have been challenged by the wave of divergence that has
touched different countries during 80s (Amos 1988, Fan and Casetti 1994, Hansen
1995, Maxwell and Hite 1992 and Suarez Villa and Cuadrado Roura 1993). In this case
regional convergence has been the exclusive focus of attention and the connection with
3
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a long tradition of regional studies is more clearly evident. The common point of
reference in these contributions is the classic article by Williamson (1965), in which the
process of regional convergence was related to that of national development. According
to the so-called inverted U hypothesis, regional inequality is expected to grow during
the early stages of development, to reach a maximum level during intermediate stages
and finally to diminish during mature stages. The asymmetry of the migration of labour
and capital during the early stages of development, as well as the different degrees of
spatial integration and the different weights of equity objectives in central government
policy, were recognized as the principal factors behind the regional divergence-
convergence process (Fish, 1984). Although Williamson's study has been extensively
discussed in the literature (Gilbert and Goodman, 1976, Krebs, 1982, Therkildsen,
1981), the appearance during the 80's of regional divergence in countries that were in
mature stages of development, like the United States, has led regional scientists to
reconsider the final tract of the inverted U and to introduce among the casual factors of
regional convergence-divergence the adjustment process of an economy to the evolution
of technologies, sectors and markets.
Bearing in mind these two strands of regional convergence literature, our goal is to use
them in order to study the process of regional convergence in the European Union.
For a better understanding of regional convergence in the EU, the second chapter
analyses the spatial structure of Europe using the technique of the "gravity models".
Population potentials have been computed for the European Union and for the whole of
Europe. These computations show that there is a process whereby the population and
4
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GDP at the core of European space become agglomerated, the area defined by Greater
Manchester, London, Paris and the Rhur Valley; Further, the population potentials
highlight the important effects enlargement will provoke with respect to the different
parts of the spatial structure of Europe. More specifically, Potential contours reflect a
displacement of the gravity center of Europe towards the East.
We use alternative measures of regional analysis such as the Gini coefficient to
corroborate the spatial concentration of population and GDP over the period 1982-1999.
In the last section of chapter two, we analyse regional convergence using the Theil
index of concentration. The choice of this index presents the advantage of being
weighted, independent of the number of regions and may be broken down into two
components, the first of these gives a figure for the inequality between groups as a
proportion of total inequality. The second provides us with the within-groups or inter-
group inequality as a proportion of the whole. Our findings are, first: Population
potentials indicate a displacement of the gravity center of Europe towards the East, and
second, population and GDP are concentrated at the "core" of the European territory
and this has been a long term tendency, and third, there is a catching-up or convergence
process in the income levels among objective 1 regions which has been bringing them
closer to the European average since 1988.
A growth model must be able to project correct spatial structure in order to capture the
essential features of the convergence process, we show that distance to consumer
markets is an influential factor for the income development of a region. We analyse the
capacity that population potentials have in determining the levels of development of the
5
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European Union regions. Using a logarithm specification for the relationship between
population potentials and levels of development and estimating cross-section
regressions for different time periods we assess whether or not the explanatory power of
the population potentials maintains constant over time or whether it varies as we move
towards 1999, the year in which the most recent data was available.
The results show that population potentials can explain an important portion of the
variation in the levels of development in the European Union. Moreover the explanatory
power of population potentials in determining the levels of development decreases over
time, indicating a certain delocalisation of economic activity. Thus, dynamic income
regions have also emerged on the periphery, and need not necessarily be close to rich
regions.
Chapter three, analyses the regional convergence in the European Union through cross-
section and panel data regressions. We have tested the non/existence of ^3 -convergence
for different sub samples of NUTS 2 regions and for different sub periods. More
specifically, we estimate /.3 -convergence for the periods 1982-1997, 1982-1986, 1987-
1992, 1993-1997 based on the Eurostat and Regio database (ESA79) and for the period
1995-1999 based on the Eurostat and Regio database (ESA95). The results support the
hypothesis of absolute ^3 -convergence from 1987 onwards for the regions in EU12 and
EU15.
The purpose of chapter four is to look at the effects of regiónal policy on the growth
process of objective 1 regions and to evaluate the challenge involved in the successful
extension of EU Regional Policy to Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs).
•
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We provide evidence which reflects the nature and the extent of the catching-up process
experienced by the objective 1.regions, right from the implantation of the regional
development programmes. The analysis of this catching-up process was carried out by
regressing the gap between the income per capita of objective 1 regions and the average
income per capita of the EU15 on a trend variable using a panel data model with fixed
effects.
The main results of this chapter underline the positive performance of the objective 1
regions in a period of deepened, intensified competition through the completion of the
internal market, liberalization of monetary and capital movements in the EU and within
the context of more global competition in the world economy. The reform of the EU
Regional Policy has certainly had a key role in the outcome of these results. There are
three factors which have been involved in this process:l) The coordination of planning
and programming of Structural Funds within the Community Support Frameworks
(CSF) 2) an increased focus of its efforts in the regions whose development is lagging
behind (objective 1 regions) and 3) an increase in the funding allocated to regional
structural interventions. With respect to the Agenda 2000 reforms, the very real success
of regional policy for the objective 1 regions will lead to a significant reduction in the
proportion of the population receiving assistance.
Simple calculations from the resources foreseen for objective 1 regions, future acceding
countries and the Cohesion Fund, show that, maintaining concentration in objective 1
regions and giving the average level of assistance to 90% of the population in the 10
CEEC is compatible with financial balance and the own resources ceiling.
7
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1.2 Resumen en castellano/Spanish summary
La Convergencia de las rentas regionales per capita ha sido objeto frecuente de estudio
en los últimos años. Generalmente, se distinguen dos líneas distintas de investigación.
La primera de ellas fue la desarrollada por los macroeconomistas, quienes interesados
en el estudio de los procesos de crecimiento, intentaron aplicar a los análisis a escala
interregional las herramientas originalmente desarrolladas para análisis a escala
internacional: Regresiones de sección cruzada, regresiones con datos de panel y
modelos da cadenas de Markov (Barro y Sala-i-Martin 1990,1991,1992,1995, Sala-i-
Martín 1994,1996, Canova y Marcet 1995,Tondl, 1997, 1999, Quah, 1986, Fingleton
1997,1999, Magrini 1999). El interés en la convergencia regional se deriva de su interés
principal, es decir, la convergencia internacional (Blanchard 1991).Como consecuencia,
el mismo esquema originalmente propuesto para el análisis de la convergencia
internacional se aplicó a nivel regional, con la única diferencia de que se introduce la
movilidad de personas y capitales, lo que, de acuerdo con el modelo neoclásico de
crecimiento debe acelerar el proceso de convergencia. De esta manera, el papel de
factores espaciales no se han tenido en cuenta (Cheshire and Carbonaro, 1995)
La segunda línea de investigación sobre convergencia regional incluye a los
economistas regionales, quienes fueron desafiados por la ola de divergencia que tocó a
distintos países en la década de los ochenta (Amos 1988, Fan and Casetti 1994, Hansen
1995, Maxwell and Hite 1992 and Suarez Villa and Cuadrado Roura 1993). En este
caso la convergencia regional ha sido el único interés y la conexión con la larga
tradición de estudios regionales es más evidente. La referencia común en estas últimas
8
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contribuciones es el clásico artículo de Williamson (1965), según el cual el proceso de
convergencia regional se relaciona con el desarrollo nacional. De acuerdo con la
conocida hipótesis de la "U" invertida, la desigualdad regional se espera que crezca
durante las etapas iniciales del desarrollo, hasta alcanzar un nivel máximo durante
etapas intermedias y finalmente disminuya en las etapas finales de desarrollo. La
asimetría de los movimientos migratorios de capital y trabajo durante las etapas
iniciales del desarrollo, así como los diferentes grados de integración espacial y el
distinto peso dados a los objetivos de equidad por las políticas de los gobiernos
centrales, han sido reconocidos como los principales factores que están detrás de los
procesos de divergencia-convergencia regional. (Fish, 1984). Aunque el estudio de
Williamson se ha discutido mucho en la literatura (Gilbert and Goodman, 1976, Krebs,
1982, Therkildsen, 1981), el surgimiento durante los años ochenta de divergencia
regional en países que estaban en etapas finales de desarrollo, como por ejemplo el caso
de los EEULT) había llevado a los economistas regionales a reconsiderar el camino final
de la U invertida e introducir entre los factores causales de la convergencia-divergencia
regional el proceso de ajuste de la economía a la evolución de las tecnologías, sectores y
mercados.
Teniendo en mente estas dos líneas de investigación en la literatura de la convergencia
regional, nuestro objetivo es usarlas para estudiar el proceso de convergencia en la
Unión Europea. Creemos que la estructura espacial ha jugado un papel muy importante
en el proceso de convergencia regional en la Unión Europea de ahí que con el objetivo
de alcanzar una mejor comprensión de ésta, el capítulo 2 analiza la estructura espacial
•
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de Europa usando la técnica de los modelos de gravedad. Se han calculado los
potenciales de población para la Unión Europea y también para Europa. Estos cálculos
demuestran que existe un proceso de concentración de la población y del PIB en el
centro de la Unión Europea (el área definida por Gran Manchester, Londres, Paris y el
Valle del Rhur). Por otro lado, los potenciales de población resaltan lo efectos que la
ampliación provocará en las diferentes partes de la estructura espacial de Europa.
Concretamente los contornos de potenciales muestran un desplazamiento del centro de
gravedad de la Unión Europea hacia el este. Hemos usado medidas alternativas dentro
del análisis regional como son el índice de concentración de Gini para corroborar la
concentración de la población y del GDP en el período 1982-1999. En la parte final del
capítulo 2, se analiza la convergencia regional usando el índice de concentración de
Theil. La elección de este índice tiene la ventaja de que pondera, es independiente del
número de regiones y se puede descomponer en dos componentes, uno que nos da la
contribución de la desigualdad entre grupos a la desigualdad total y el otro da la
contribución de la desigualdad dentro de cada grupo a la desigualdad total. Las
conclusiones mas relevantes de este capítulo son las siguientes:
Los potenciales de población demuestran, primero, que existe un desplazamiento del
centro de gravedad de Europa hacia el este, segundo, que la población y el P1B están
concentrados en el centro del territorio europeo y esta tendencia continua en el largo
plazo y tercero que estamos asistiendo a un proceso de catching-up o convergencia
entre los niveles de renta de las regiones objetivo 1 y el resto de regiones de la Unión
Europea desde 1988 hasta la actualidad.
•
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Por otro lado y tendiendo en cuenta que un modelo de crecimiento debe de tener en
cuenta factores espaciales con el objetivo de capturar los rasgos esenciales del proceso
de convergencia, demostramos que la distancia a los mercados de consumidores es un
factor relevante en la determinación de los niveles de renta de una región. Para ello,
analizamos los efectos que los potenciales de población tienen en la determinación de
los niveles de desarrollo de una región.
Usando una expresión logarítmica para la relación entre potenciales de población y
niveles de desarrollo y estimando regresiones de sección cruzada, evaluamos si el poder
explicativo de los potenciales de población se mantienen constantes a lo largo del
tiempo o si por el contrario disminuyen a medida que estimamos nuestro modelo con
los últimos datos disponibles que son los del año 1999.
Los resultados demuestran que los potenciales de población explican una parte
importante de los niveles de renta de las regiones de la Unión Europea. Además, el
poder explicativo de los potenciales de población disminuye a lo largo del tiempo,
indicándonos una cierta deslocalización de las actividades económicas. Así, han surgido
regiones dinámicas en términos de renta en la periferia y éstas no necesitan
necesariamente estar cerca de regiones ricas.
El capítulo 3 analiza por un lado la convergencia regional en la Unión Europea a través
de regresiones de sección cruzada y regresiones con datos de panel. Hemos comprobado
la existencia/inexistencia de convergencia ^3 , para diferentes submuestras y para
diferentes subperiodos de las regiones NUTS II de la Unión Europea. De una forma
mas concreta, se estimó la convergencia ^3 para los períodos 1982-1997, 1982-1986,
•
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1987-1992 y 1993-1997 basándonos en la base de datos de Eurostat-Regio (ESA79) y
para el período 1995-1999 se usaron los datos de Eurostat-Regio basados en el nuevo
sistema de contabilidad (ESA95). Los resultados encontrados apoyan las hipótesis de
convergencia ^3 desde 1987 hasta la actualidad tanto para las regiones de EU12 como
para las regiones de EUl 5.
El objetivo del capítulo 4 es estudiar los efectos de la política regional en el proceso de
crecimiento de las regiones objetivo 1 y el de evaluar el desa^o que supone para la
política regional europea la ampliación de la Unión Europea a los países de Europa
Central y Oriental (PECOs).
En este capítulo aportamos evidencia acerca del proceso de catching-up llevado a cabo
por las regiones objetivo 1 de la Unión Europea desde la puesta en marcha de los
programas de desarrollo regional. E1 análisis de este proceso de catching-up se llevó a
cabo regresando el gap entre la renta per capita de las regiones objetivo 1 y la renta
media de la Unión Europea (EU15) sobre una variable de tendencia usando un modelo
de datos de panel con efectos fijos.
Los principales resultados de este capítulo destacan la buena actuación desarrollada por
las regiones objetivo 1 en un período especialmente complicado de profundización e
intensificación de la competencia con la culminación del mercado interior,
liberalización de los movimientos de capitales y financieros y en un contesto de
competencia global en la economía mundial.
La reforma de la política regional de la Unión Europea ha estado involucrada en estos
resultados debido a:
•
12
Chapter 1
1) La coordinación de la planificación y programación de los fondos estructurales
dentro de los marcos comunitarios de apoyo (CSF), 2)Aumentando el esfuerzo de sus
actuaciones en las regiones atrasadas (regiones objetivo 1) y 3) aumentando la
financiación asignada a las acciones estructurales regionales. En relación a las reformas
llevadas a cabo con la Agenda 2000, el éxito alcanzado por la política regional en las
actuales regiones objetivo 1 provocará una reducción muy importante de la población
asistida. Cálculos realizados a partir de los recursos previstos para las regiones objetivo
1, futuros países miembros de la Unión Europea (Perspectivas financieras y Marco
Financiero EU21- Cumbre de Berlín 1999) y Fondo de Cohesión demuestran que es
posible mantener la concentración de la ayuda en las actuales regiones objetivol y dar
el nivel de ayuda per capita medio que actualmente reciben las regiones objetivo 1 al
90% de la población de los países del centro y este de Europa dentro del presupuesto
financiero y del techo de recursos propios.
13
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2.1 Introduction
In this chapter^ we deal with the issue of the spatial structure of Europe. In order to
carry out our study, we use the technique of gravity models to compute population
potentials, and then plot potential maps, which allow us to represent geographically the
main lines of force in terms of population distribution and consequently the main
economic activity in the area as well.
We also use the data which corresponds to the future acceding countries in order to
better analyse the effects of European Union enlargement from a spatial perspective.
The concept of population potentials allows us to construct a"macroscopic
cartography" and gives us a weighted representation of the influence of population on
territory, and further enables us to highlight the structural characteristics of the
European Union. The potential maps clearly illustrate the nature of the spatial structure
of the European Union and its large central agglomeration area: Greater Manchester-
London-Paris-Cologne-Rhur Valley. Moreover population potential contours allow us
to highlight some policy guidelines for the European Spatial Development Perspective
and for the future of the European Regional Policy.
This chapter is organized into eight sections: Firstly, in sections 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 we
take an overview of the gravity models, focusing on their theoretical basis as systemic
models inspired by the Newtonian theory of the interaction between masses and forces.
^An initial version of this chapter has been presented to the Fifth ECSA-World conference. Brussels 2000,
http://www.ecsanet.org/fifth_ecsaworld/index.htm and to the eighth international conference of the
Regional Studies Association in Gdansk, Poland on 15th-18th September 2001,
http://secure. rogerbooth. co. uk/rsa/gdansk/defau lt. html.
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We go on to comment on their use as a technique which enables us to represent the
influence that different human settlements exert within a physical geographical space.
Specifically we create a plastic image of the distribution and territorial structure of the
population, the largest centers of population and the spatial links between the main areas
of influence and the activity taking place therein.
Secondly, in section 2.5 potentials of population within the European Union and the
whole of Europe are calculated and the corresponding potential maps are drawn up.
These maps describe the spatial structure of the European Union and together with the
rest of Europe.
Thirdly, in section 2.6 we explore the implications of our computations of population
potentials and how they relate to European Union Regional Policy and the broader
perspective of European Spatial Development. Potential contours reflect a displacement
of the gravity center of Europe towards the East. This phenomenon, means that certain
Eastern areas within current EU countries as well as the Central and Eastern European
Countries (CEECs) will enjoy important competitive advantages. This dynamic,
however, will act to the detriment of the Atlantic periphery whose population potentials
will decrease. This trend must be corrected by developing new measures within the
context of future European Regional Policy and within the Perspective of European
Spatial Development.
Fourthly, in section 2.7 we analyze, on the one hand, the spatial concentration of the
population and GDP in the European space using the Gini coefficient of concentration,
and on the other, the pattern of disparities in regional income within the European
18
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Union using a decomposable index such as the Theil index. Fifthly, in section 2.8 we
analyze the relationship between population potentials and levels of development and
finally section 2.9 concludes with the main findings and their interpretations.
2.2 Gravity models and economic theory
Gravity models, as the name suggests, are based on a physical analogy and utilize the
formal outline of classical mechanics. Theoretically, the importance of the interrelations
between two population centers is proportional to their size and consequently their
incomes, or in Newtonian terms their combined mass. Similarly the further away from
each other they are, the less important will be the said interrelations. This is roughly
analogous to the theory of gravity introduced by Isaac Newton in 1686. Newton
postulated that the gravitational force which acts between two bodies in space was in
direct proportion to the mass of the two bodies and in inverse proportion to the square of
the distance between the bodies.
It was not until the first half of the 19`^ century that the theory of gravity was applied to
human interaction. At that time, Carey (1858-59) theorized "Gravitation is here, as
everywhere, in the direct ratio of the mass and the inverse of the distance". Work by
Ravenstein (1885-1889) and later by Young (1924) confirmed the belief that
gravitational function does apply to the migration of people from one area to another.
A key effort in this field is associated with Reilly (1931) in his study of the retail trade
areas of moderately sized American towns. Reilly came to the conclusion that: "Under
normal conditions two cities draw retail trade from a smaller intermediate city or town
19
The spatial structure of Europe
in direct proportion to some power of the population of these two large cities and in an
inverse proportion to some power of the distance of each of the cities from the smaller
intermediate city". Further examples of the use of the gravity model are available in the
works of Stewart (1947-48-50) who presented three primary concepts based on
Newtonian physics, demographic force, demographic energy and demographic potential.
Zipf (1946-49) examined for pairs of cities interaction phenomena such as bus passenger
P; P; 2trips, airline passenger trips, telephone calls etc and the factor , finding a straight-
D;^
line relationship between this factor and those phenomena where the entire factor is raised
to some power. Isaard and Whitney (1949), Cavanaugh (1950) and Dod (1950) deal with
demand and location according to product. Artle (1959) carried out an study on income
groups and the interaction among them in the city of Stockholm. Finally the gravity model
has been used widely as a model for estimating international trade flows and as a baseline
model for estimating the impact of a variety of policy issues, such as regional trading
groups, political blocs, patent rights, and various trade distortions3.
Z The differences between Stewart and Zipfs uses of the gravity model is that Zipf consider the entire
P; P^
factor raised to some power and not only D; ^ as it is considered by Stewart. Thus Zipfs findings
D;^
do not directly test the validity of Stewart's concepts except in the nontypical case when the power of the
P; P^ P; P^
factor is unity. In this case Zipfs use of his so-called relationship becomes identical with
D^,.i D^,i
Stewart's use of demographic energy.
3 See Tinbergen (1962), Póyhtinen (1963), Aitken (1973), Brada and Mendez (I983), Bikker (1987),
Sanso, Cuairan and Sanz (1993) Oguledo and Macphee ( I994), McCallum (1995), Helliwell (1996), Wei
and Frankel (1997), Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997), Mátyás (1997), Frakel and Wei (1998), Garman et
aL (1998), Evenett and Keller (1998), Frankel et al. (1998), Fitzsimons et al. (1999), Fontagne et al.
(1999), Smith (1999),Xu (2000) and Kalirajan (2000).
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From a microeconomic perspective, gravity models deal with the question of their
theoretical foundations for optimizing the decisions of economic agents. The question is
complex, because of the fact that there are connections that have yet to be analyzed in
detail. These include the generic and formal minimal action principle associated with
Hamilton's formulation of movement equations.
Anderson (1979) and Bergstrand (1985) derived gravity models from models of
monopolistic competition
From a perspective of International trade, Deardorff (1998) demonstrated that the
gravity model can be derived within Ricardian and Hecksher- Ohlin frameworks. Other
authors who works in the theoretical foundations of the gravity models are Feenstra et
al. (1998) and Egger (2000).
Leaving aside these theoretical questions, the gravity formulations are basically
empirical models, and their intrinsic value lies fundamentally in their ability, either to
predict the interactions among the system's components, or to represent the
relationships and structures of the said components. The explanations that follow
attempt to do the latter and focus on the treatment of spatial information through the
construction of potential maps, based logically on the calculation of potentials of
population.
Two further important characteristics of this type of model are that they have a clearly
defined structural perspective and are macroscopic in outlook.
21
The spatial structure of Europe
n As far as structural perspective is concerned, potential maps constitute a common
technique in the social sciences, and this technique assumes that the relationships
between the components of a system are influenced by the arrangement of the
permanent elements.
n The fact that the models are macroscopic in outlook really means that the gravity
models are capable of providing us with a representation made up of aggregate of
equipotential population contours of and differing grades or strengths of the
potential field, so that they produce a macroscopic representation of populations
within a territorial structure.
2.3 The formulation and significance of population
potentials
The formal expression of the gravity models is of the type:
A,." .A^
F^ = K a
D;^
(2.1)
where F^ represents the frequency, intensity or force of the interaction between the
places i and j to which are given, respectively, the masses (population, income, etc)
A; and A^ respectively.
D^ refers to the distance (physical, economic etc..) between the points i and j, while
K is a constant specific to the phenomena being studied; and alpha and beta are the
•
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corresponding exponentials of the variables, all of which are parameters, which are
empirically estimated.
To obtain a"macroscopic cartography" of the economic territorial structure we can turn
to the analogy of gravity models. In order to simplify the analogy and at the same time
increase the model's efficiency, we assume the exponential for the "mass" to be 1 and
the exponential for the distance to be 2. In this way the general expression in figure I is
transformed into the following expression:
A; .A^
zD^
(2.2)
which can be interpreted as the Stewart's definition of demographic force. Later,
Stewart also developed the concept of demographic energy, E; ^ corresponding to the
Newtonian gravitational energy, defining it as:
A; A^
E;^ = K
D;^
and demographic potential, ;V^ corresponding to the gravitational potential as:
A^
;V^ = K
D;^
(2.3)
(2.4)
It can be seen immediately from equation (2.4) that ;V^ only defines the potential
created upon city i by one single city, j. It is very easy, however, to measure the total
potential of i by merely summing over all different j's ; i.e.
;V = K A^ + K Az
D;, D;Z
." A
+...........+K " = K^ ^ (2.5)
D^," i=^ D;,.i
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As ;V can be computed for every single place, it becomes possible to use iso-lines for
mapping the potentials. (as can be seen from Equation (2.5), the demographic potential
;V, is expressed as population per distance)
The concept of potential of population must be understood as the force or attraction
which the population centre A^ would exert on an inhabitant located at the point i in
geographical space and conditioned according to the distance between them, D;^ .
Therefore, potential maps show the influence each place exerts on all other places and
that in this sense they measure the proximity of a place to other places. Intuitively the
concept of population potential can be understood as a measure of the demand potential
that the whole population exerts over every location in the space. There is a natural link
with the concept of demand cones first suggested by Ldsch (1954). Population
potentials at a given location represent an index of the aggregate market potential from
the whole structure of population weighing the number of inhabitants by their distance
from this location.
2.4 The construction of potential maps
Population potentials, according to current formulas and formal interpretation, are
indices of the influence or relative force that all the centres and population settlements
exert at each of the points within the space being considered. In other words, the
potential of population at a point may be regarded as a measure of the proximity of the
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people to that point. In computing the population potential we assume that every person
makes a contribution which is positively correlated to his proximity to the point. As we
move from rural areas towards a large city there is a rise in the potential value because
of the concentration of people there.
The outcome of the computation of population potentials can be represented on a map
of the surface by using equipotential contours. The contours which represent altitude
above sea level on topographical maps are analogous to population potential maps.
Potential maps are generated through a graphic representation of the various contours of
equipotential, and they provide an overall view of the territorial structure of the
population and human settlements within a given geographical space.
They provide us with a macroscopic cartography of the big population centres and a
classification of territorial areas based on the influence and distribution of the principal
conurbations.
Because of this, it is not possible to consider all the points within a given territory, the
practical computation of the indices and potential mapping is carried out by using a dot
or grid "net".
This net which, is placed over a specific space, defines a finite and manageable set of
nodes for the A;,;V calculations. The potential indices are calculated by going
25
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through each node on the net and assigning to it a corresponding "potential" value, that
is, the value of its own population weighed against each and every other node and its
corresponding population, and divided by the distance separating each node.
The calculations were carried out in the following way: for each "i" node in the net we
add the population of each center divided by:
• The distance D;^ (measured in kilometers), if it is more than 1, or
n One, if the distance is less than 1.
To this end, an algorithm or "loop" which goes through the whole of the net { i} is
designed to complete the whole of the space and is :computed in order to be able to
compile the indices. By joining the points with the same potential index we obtain the
population potential contours which form the potential maps, where the strong force
lines and agglomeration areas which compose the spatial structure of the economy are
reflected.
The population data we used was obtained from the statistics information service of the
European Commission, EUROSTAT, and the cartographic data from GISCO.
Nowadays, the possibility of enlarging the European Union in order to take in the
countries of Eastern Europe is one of the most important European issues and has far
reaching implications for this type of study.
The potential indices were calculated and the corresponding maps were made for Russia
and for the fifteen present-day members of the European Union. From the group of
urban centers in Europe with more than twenty thousand inhabitants the potential index
of each point of the net was calculated in ARC/Il^iFO and then, by means of
26
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interpolation, the potential population contours were computed in ARC VIEW, by using
the SPATIAL ANALYST modulus.
2.5 Spatial structure in the European Union
2.5.1 Population contours in an enlarged European Union
There are striking disparities in economic performance between different parts of
Europe, particularly between the central and peripheral regions. GDP per head
(measured in terms of purchasing power standards, PPS, to take account of differences
in price levels) is typically half to two-thirds of the EU average in the Southern
periphery (Greece, Southern Italy to Southern and Western Spain and Portugal, and
around 60% of the EU average in most of Eastern Germany).
There are also clusters of poorer regions in the Northern periphery, particularly in
Northern and Eastern Finland and the North and West of the UK. By contrast, GDP per
head is well above average in the more central area extending from the North of Italy
through Southern Germany to Austria as well as in the BENELUX countries and
Northern Germany. This central area of the EU including the metropolises of London,
Paris, Milan, Munich and Hamburg shows an important concentration of the population.
This situation can be seen with clarity in the territorial structural maps of Europe that
has been plotted with the technique of gravity models.
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The following maps reveal the spatial structure of ^the present-day fifteen-member-
European Union plus the ten CEECs and were drawn up by using EUROSTAT data
which deals with those centres of population with more than twenty thousand
inhabitants. In these maps the value given to each point, i.e. its population potential
index, represents the relationship expressed by its distance between the remaining urban
centres and their populations.
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The spatial structure of Europe
Maps of the territorial structure of Europe and those of its fifteen member states are
drawn up by joining together the equi-potentials with the same values in order to form
equipotential contours or level curves. Over the blue, background of the maps, the
highest population potentials are drawn in red and the darker the shade, the higher the
value of the population potential contours and visa-versa. The very lowest population
potential contours are drawn in white.
In the first map, which represents the European territorial structure, we find that the big
conurbations of Leningrad, Moscow and Gorkij are to be found in the East. Perhaps the
map's most striking feature however is the relatively compact nature of the big central
settlements of the European Union around which there are a concentric series of
population potential contours with decreasing levels of potential. In order to test the
validity of the resultant shape of this central concentration of the spatial structure of the
European Union, the lines with the highest potential values are extended over sea-areas,
particularly the English Channel and the North sea, as well as the Baltic sea and the
Mediterranean sea.
The center of the European area, in terms of its population, is located among the three
large central conurbations of London, Paris and Cologne-Diisseldorf-Rhur Valley,
which have contour-lines with potential indices which are greater than 660.000 inh/Km,
and form an area which we define as "the Central European triangle". This area fits into
a zone of high population potentials whose nearest population potential contour has a
value of 480.000 inh/Km. This population potential contour takes in the region of
Greater Manchester and London in the North and then drops towards the region of Paris
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in the South. From Paris the contour traces a line North East to enclose the region of the
Rhur Valley before turning North West to cut the North Coast of Holland, taking in
Amsterdam and Rotterdam and then joining up with the contour which embraces the
conurbation of Greater Manchester.
A population potential contour with a value of (390.000 inh/Km) begins in the North
West of England, taking in the cities of Liverpool, Leeds and Greater Manchester, traces
a line to the East round Hamburg and Copenhagen, where it becomes a gentle arc which
falls in a North-South direction to take in Berlin, Prague and Viena and the North of
Italy (Milan and Turin). After this the contour turns again, to the Northwest to Lyon
(without taking in the Rhóne Valley) and then absorbs the areas of influence of Paris
and London, before linking up with Northwest England.
The largest central population potential contour i.e. the one which takes in the greatest
geographical area, corresponds to that with a value of 330.000 inh/Km, and starts in the
Northeast in the English area of Grand Manchester-London. From here the contour goes
towards the East, taking in Copenhagen before turning in a North-South direction along
the Varsovie-Budapest axis. After this, the contour crosses the Adriatic sea, taking in
Naples, turns to the Northeast to take in Rome, the North of the Italian Peninsula and
the Rhóne and Marseille Valley. From here it turns again towards the Northeast before
going on to enclose the region of Paris and the coast of Normandy before finally linking
up with the southwest of the large English agglomeration area of London-Greater
Manchester.
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The population potential with a value of 290.000 inh/Km constitutes the widest
catchment's area in terms of population space. The contour traces a band which takes in
the Northwest of England, goes East to take in Copenhagen, before dropping to the
Southwest to Warsaw, from where it moves in a Westerly direction to Budapest before
turning sharply towards the West to reach the Adriatic coast. After absorbing the
conurbations of Rome and Naples it continues to the West, roughly following the coast
and the Gulf of Lion up to Catalonia, and then turns back to the north of England after
bordering on the conurbations of the Basque country and Cantabria.
In a similar way, the heavy structural lines of the European territory can be seen on the
following nocturnal-light map. This map presents us with a satellite view of the
nighttime light emissions from cities, houses, industries and other light sources. The
light emissions were captured and recorded using high sensitivity equipment.
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Map 2.2: MAPPING CITY LIGHTS WITH NIGHTTIME DATA FROM THE
DMSP OPERATIONAL LINESCAN SYSTEM
Although high sensitivity reception techniques make it difficult to distinguish between
the distinct intensities of light emissions, there is still a broad similarity between the
light emission images and the shape of a central European area based on population
potential contours. The similarity is even greater when lower sensitivity nighttime light
data are used. Low sensitivity light data do not reflect the variations in the strength of
light emissions and as a consequence the characteristic shape of the Central European
Area becomes more prominent. The population potential contours around the area that
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we define as, the "Central European Triangle" are clearly visible in the image below,
and were provided by the Earth Viewer4 system.
Map 2.3: NIGHTTIME LIGHT DIFUSION "EARTH VIEWER"
4 Nighttimes lights diffusion "Earth Viewer, Nighttimes images composition system
from "Earth Viewer" 100 Km. high on 50° North, 5° East. The light diffusion allows to
appreciate the intensity differences.
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2.5.2 The effect of Enlargement on Population Potentials
The fourth map illustrates the territorial structure of the European Community and was
plotted using the same database as that used for map 2.1 "European territorial structure"
but in this case was restricted to its fifteen present-day members.
The reduction in the size of the area, through excluding the countries of the east,
produces a reduction in the levels of the potential indices. This reduction is derived
from the contraction in the size of the spatial field and reinforces the accuracy of the
description and the compactness of the areas included within the equipotential contours.
Map 2.4 therefore, shows on the one hand, the inner structure of the central areas of
population within the European Union, and on the other hand it provides us with the
most characteristic features of the peripheral areas. Interestingly in map 2.4, Galicia and
the North of Portugal stand out in the Atlantic area as a single homogeneous region.
This region forms the southern extreme of an area that includes the west of Ireland,
Cornwall and Brittany, spreads over to the Gulf of Biscay and joins the Atlantic side of
the Iberian Peninsula.
Although the enlargement of the European Union to the Central and Eastern European
Countries is a complex question, it is very interesting to do a first proof through the
comparison of population potentials. To this end, the following table (table 2.1) shows
the relative increased in the population potentials when we enlarge the potential field
from the European Union countries to the whole countries of Europe.
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The comparison between column a and column b reflects the quite surprising
differences in population potentials among the different European Union areas.
Galicia together with Portugal, alongwith London, have augmented increased their
population potentials very little, an increase around 6%, while the population potentials
of Madrid, Bilbao, Barcelona and Valencia increased by between 6-7%, as did central
cities in the Western part of the continent such as París, Brussels, Amsterdam and Kñln.
Table 2.1: POTENTIALS OF POPULATION (measured in Inh/Km)
European Union
(a)
Europe
(b)
Incr. (d)
(b-a)/a
A Coruña^ 295 313 5.93%
Vigo 328 347 5.89%
Porto 525 556 5.91 %
Lisbon 1.229 1.301 5.87%
Madrid 5.269 5.597 6.22%
Barcelona 3.967 4.238 6.82%
Bilbao 783 832 6.23%
Valencia 1.230 1.313 6.73%
Milan 2.414 2.634 9.12%
Rome 3.989 4.449 11.54%
London 13.207 13.978 5.84%
Venice 496 555 11.92%
Amsterdam 1.321 1.410 6.79%
Hamburg 2.553 2.829 10.82%
Copenhagen 1.906 2.170 13.84%
Estockholm 1.284 1.500 16.79%
Helsinki 646 763 18.26%
Munich 2.012.6 2.258 12.2%
Berlin 4.439.7 5.162 16.27%
Dresden 750.3 884 17.77%
Vienna 2.054.8 2.512 22.25%
París 13.990 14.963 6.95%
Brussels 2.327 2.486 6.86%
Kóln 2.162 2.299 6.34%
Amsterdam 1.321 1.410 6.79%
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Quite the reverse is true however, in the Italian cities such as Rome and Venice, whose
population potentials increased by around 11 %. In the Eastern cities of Germany and
Austria, this increase was even more dramatic. In Berlin the increase was over 16%,
while in Vienna the increases was a stunning 22%.
•
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Map 2.4e Spaitial Structure in the European Union
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2.6 Spatial structure and regional policy
2.6.1 The European Spatial Development Perspective
The European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP) is a suitable framework for the
coordination of the sectorial policies and the interventions between the different levels
of government (communitarian, national, regional, local, etc.). The aim is to work
towards a more balanced competitiveness of the European territory and for sustainable
development, by strengthening economic and social cohesion, preserving and
managing natural resources and maintaining the cultural heritage. The ESDP is the
framework for linking together this triangle of fundamental goals of European policies.
It "provides the possibility of widening the horizon beyond purely sectoral policy
measures, to focus on the overall situation of the European territory and also take into
account the development opportunities which arise for individual regions".
In the context of an open and competitive economy, immersed in the trends of
globalisation and change towards new lines of progress based on the economic
paradigm of the information society, the knowledge and the innovation, it is necessary
to reinforce the factors of regional competitiveness and highlight not only the concepts
of regions whose development is lagging behind, but also a wide range of criteria that
ensure an adequate level of competitiveness. Such factors are, territorial accessibility
and transport, research and innovation, education and vocational training, productive
structure, etc..
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In a very general way these new dimensions and criteria could be introduced through
the ESDP whose guidelines focus on a search for polycentric development spread in an
harmonic and balanced way right throughout the European territory. However, this
range of dimensions and criteria involves a great deal of risk because of dispersion and
enlargement in the areas that may receive assistance. This may damage the effectiveness
that European Regional Policy has achieved because of its concentration, in the personal
and financial sphere, on the regions whose development is lagging behind.
An important point that should be mentioned is the toward concentration in the spatial
structure of Europe. There is no a natural tendency toward an even spread population
and economic potentials, at least in terms of spatial development. This means that
renewed efforts must be carried out within the context of the ESDP in order to reinforce
the initial measures that have been designed to cope with spatial unbalances. Regional
problems involving changes in population, globalisation, the location of economic
activities, technological development and the information society, transport,
telecommunications, energy and the effects of the sectorial policies of the European
Union must be analysed by taking into account the emerging trends and the driving
forces of the medium and long term patterns of spatial development.
This kind of approach has been initiated in the somewhat experimental branches of the
INTERREG programmes, such as the old INTERREG II C and ERDF Pilot Actions
and the new INTERREG III B and C where different spatial areas have been selected as
new cooperation frameworks to conduct spatial analysis and new ways to implement
policy measures.
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2.6.2 Population Potentials and the European Spatial
Development Perspective ( ESDP)
One of the main challenges for the ESDP is to achieve its goals under the conditions of
enlargement. Special circumstances in the Accession Countries will make it more
difficult to solve problems such as clarifying how investments will be implemented by
the public sector, avoiding or reducing the foreseeable conflicts between the different
policy fields and so on. This means that spatial coordination will play a greater role in
the Accession Countries than in the current Member States. This has implications for
issues such us:
a) The planning of the expansion of a trans-national transport infrastructure and
the Community's transport policy.
b) Measures for environmental rennovation, in particular, of old industrial zones.
c) Measures for structural adjustments in rural regions.
d) Cross-border and trans-national cooperation in spatial development.
However, the CEECs will enjoy a competitive advantage due to their central location in
Europe. The calculus of the population potentials for the enlarged European Union
(UE25) show that these countries are not peripheral but central in terms of spatial
structure and population potentials. In the past, and to some extend they remain
peripheral countries because the iron curtain and their central planning economies has
isolated them, but in geographical terms and according to the spatial structure of
population potentials the CEECs are located in a large central area which is enclosed
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within a high population potential contour i.e. the one which corresponds with a value
of 330.000 inh/Km (see map 2.1). This area forms part of the large cooperation area in
the INTERREG II C call Central European, Adriatic, Danubian and South-Eastern
European Space (CADSES). However they will be border regions on the Eastern
frontier that will probably need special policy measures.
The enlargement of the European Union will imply a movement of the Europe's center
of gravity towards the East that can be clearly shown by the tool of population
potentials. Table 2.1, provides a clear example of the asymmetric increase in the
population potentials: the more we move towards the East the higher the increase in
population potentials. For instance enlargement will increase the population potential of
Vienna and Berlin by around 22% and 16% while London, Paris, Lisbon and Madrid
will see their population potentials increase by less than 6.5%.
This displacement effect will have an important impact on Western peripheral areas.
The main area to be affected will be case is the Atlantic periphery whose core is made
up by the regions lying beyond of the 250.000 inh/Km potential contour: The area of
Portugal, Galicia and other regions in Western part of Spain, Western Ireland and
North-Western Scotland. This area may be linked to other regions (lying in the border
of the 330.000-390.000 inh/km) to enclose the Atlantic arc formed by Wales, South
Western England, Bretagne, Poiteau, Aquitaine, the Gulf of Biscay and the North of
Spain. This area has been called the Atlantic space and has been selected as a cross-
border and interregional area for cooperation of regional and local^ authorities in the
framework of the new INTERREG programmes (see map 2.5).
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Map2.5: Interreg IIIC, Trans-national cooperation programmes
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New policy measures must be addressed to reinforce the position of this Atlantic space
(and particularly its most peripheral areas) in order to face the displacement effect that
will be caused by the enlargement.
Other peripheral areas from the old Pilot Actions (map 2.6) like the Northern periphery
and low density areas in Sweden and Finland will also deserve special attention but the
enlargement will be more beneficial for these areas due to their Eastern location.
The Southern Mediterranean regions are also clearly peripheral areas. In spite of their
inclusion in new Interreg III C cooperation spaces. They required specific measures that
will be well identified and dealt with within the spatial frameworks defined by the pilot
interventions of the ERDF: the West Mediterranean Gateway and the Central and
Eastern Mediterranean Space (Archi-med). The Alpine Space is also clearly an area
requiring specific measures .
Map 2.6: Spatial Areas in Pilot Actions
(Old art.10 of ERDF Regulation)
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2.7 Spatial concentration of population and GDP and
regional convergence
2.7.1 Concentration of population and income in the
European Space
In the sections prior to this chapter (Sections 2.5 and 2.6) the maps of potentials
reflected the concentration and distribution of the European population. The following
map (map 2.7) aims to analyse the regional distribution of the population. To this end,
each of the regions NUTS 25 in the European Union is allocated a specific value
corresponding to its population potential (its average value).
SNomenclature of Statistical Territorial Units is a geographical division of the European Union's Territory
that subdivides each Member State into a whole number of regions at NUTS 1 level. Each of these is
then subdivided into regions at NUTS 2 level and these in turn into regions at NUTS 3 level. For instance
the whole European Union is divided into 78 NUTS 1 regions, 206 NUTS 2 regions and 1093 NUTS 3
regions.
•
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Map 2.7: Population Potentials in EU25
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Map 2.7 displays a classification of five levels or weightings of population potentials
within the EU25. The value of the population potential is reflected in the relative shade
of the colour used, that is, the darker the shade, the higher the population potential and
visa versa. The population potentials reflect a concentric distribution of the population,
which has its centre an area in which the values are the highest, an area that is
commonly known as the Golden triangle (Greater Manchester-London-Paris and the
Rhur Valley). This area is surrounded by successive envelopes of decreasing population
potential values, which eventually reach the Atlantic periphery where the values are
lowest. It is worthwhile reiterating the striking similarity in the distribution of the
illumination intensities shown in the night light maps with the distribution of potential
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values among the NUTS II regions shown in map 2.7. Another striking feature that can
be seen in this map is the core position that the central and Eastern countries have. They
are situated within an envelope of inedium-high population potential values.
The dynamic evolution of the concentration of the population and the GDP in Europe is
traced and studied by means of an statistical analysis which is carried out using the Gini
index (Gini, 1935) and the Lorenz curves in order to measure this evolution over time.
The Gini Concentration index takes the form of the following mathematical expression:
n-1
^ (P; - q; )
•
I - %_ ►
c -- n-1
^ p;
;-^
where, in our case, p; represents the accumulated percentage of area and q; represents
the aggregate percentage of population or GDP in function of the variable we are
analysing.
First, the Gini indices were calculated by comparing the evolution of the concentration
of the population and of the GDP for the regions NUTS 2 in the EU in the years 1984
and 1994 using the data on population and GDP provided by EUROSTAT. In order to
facilitate the comparison of the values of the Gini indices, the same number of NUTS 26
regions were chosen for each of the years in question. The values for GDP were used in
6T'he appendix contains a list of NUTS 2 regions that were used to calculate the Gini indices between the
years 1984 and 1994. In the absence of data for certain NUTS 2 regions between these 2 years, and in the
interests of a more complete comparison of the Gini indices, higher level (NUTS 1) data was used.
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the form of Purchasing Power Parities (PPS) in constant 1985 values as a basis for
regional GDP comparisons and according to ESA79.
Table 2.2 gives the value for the Gini index for the years 1984 and 1994. It can be seen
that there has been little increase in the spatial concentration of GDP within the interim
period since the value of the Gini index has risen from 0.3517 to 0.3597. Similarly,
although this increase is somewhat greater, it can be observed that the index values for
spatial concentration of population went from 0.2187 to 0.2322.
Table 2.2: Values of Gini Index
Spatial Concentration Spatial Concentration
of GDP of Population
1984 0.3517 0.2187
1994 0.3597 0.2322
The relative concentrations of both population and GDP can be represented graphically,
and in so doing we obtain a concentration or "Lorenz" curve (Figure 2.0)
The key to the interpretation of the curve lies in observing its proximity to the diagonal.
The nearer the curve is to the diagonal, the lower the value for the economic variable in
use (in this case the geographical concentration of population and GDP).Thus there is a
relationship between the Lorenz curve and the Gini index in the sense that the Gini
index is approximately equal to the area enclosed by the diagonal OB and the curve
divided by the area of the triangle, that is:
_ AreaOB
I ^ AreaOAB
•
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When the population concentration is minimal the curve coincides with the diagonal
OB , which means that the area of the numerator will be 0, and I^ = 0.
The maximum concentration of population gives a curve formed by the two sides of the
square OA and AB . In this case the two areas will be equal and 1^ =1. Logically,
between these two extreme cases lie intermediate scenarios in which the Lorenz curve is
more pronounced when the distribution is more uneven and the concentration is more
intense. At this stage it should be pointed out that, although the Gini curve has the
advantage that it enables us to express the whole series of complex information that the
Lorenz curve represents in the form of one figure or value, it also has the inherent
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disadvantage that two distribution patterns, which are essentially very different, may in
effect possess two indices of concentration of the same value.
The graphs 2.1 to 2.4 represent the Lorenz curves that correspond to the Gini indices
calculated for 1984 and 1994. A glance at the graphs reveals that the geographical
concentration of the GDP is greater than geographical concentration of the population
since the Lorenz curve is more pronounced and further away from the diagonal when
considering the concentration of GDP rather than the concentration of the population.
Further, as the curve plainly shows, this concentration increases during the period 1984-
1994. The calculations carried out and presented in table 2.2 reconfirm this dynamic.
Figure 2.1: Spatial Concentration of Population in 1984
Lorenz Curve
100
80 -
60 -
40
20
0 20 40 60
% of S u rfa ce
80 100
50
Chapter 2
Figure 2.2: Spatial Concentration of GDP in
1984
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Figure 2.3: Spatial Concentration of Population in 1994
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Figure 2.4 : Spatial Concentration of GDP in 1994
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Tables 2.4 and 2.5 give the relative distribution in percentages of population, physical
geographical space, and GDP for the 50% of the EU population with the highest income
levels in the years 1984 and 1994.
Table 2.4: Spatial Concentration Table 2.5: Spatial Concentration
1984 ( Population- Space-GDP) 1994 (Population- Space-GDP)
% of % of % of
Population % of surface % of GDP Population surface % of GDP
4.29 0.68 7.39 5.23 0.99 8.78
10.08 2.39 15.69 10.27 2.40 15.93
15.60 4.73 22.80 14.94 4.81 21.88
20.34 7.78 28.47 20.35 7.80 28.34
25.19 11.68 34.01 26.25 13.01 35.10
30.13 14.94 39.53 30.64 16.69 40.01
33.98 19.28 43.79 34.70 19.55 44.41
39.79 25.26 50.06 40.26 22.69 50.28
45.19 30.75 55.67 45.05 27.13 55.14
49.75 35.68 60.24 49.40 29.72 59.39
50.46 36.69 60.94 50.70 30.47 60.64
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As one can observe from the table, the intense concentration of the first fifth of the
richest population remains constant between the years 1984 and 1994. Specifically,
20.34% of the richest population in 1984 occupied 7.78% of European space and was
responsible for 28.47% of GDP. Ten years later 20.35% of the richest population
occupied 7.80% of this space and generated 28.34% of GDP. In the following fifth of
the population the effects of the increase in the concentration of the population in
geographical space become noticeable.
Where the process of concentration becomes more clearly evident is when we reach the
45-50% population band. The data reflects that in 1984, 50.46% of the richest
population took up 36.69% of the geographical space while ten years later 50.70% of
the population took up 30.47% of the European space, which is to say, approximately
half the population took up 6.22% less space in 1994 than in 1984 thus substantially
augmenting population concentration.
The identification of the regions that correspond to each of the population bands till
reach the 20% of the richest population is given in the following table, table 2.6.
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Table 2.6: Comparison between regions and population
percentages
% Population
up figure 1984
down figure 1994
European Union NUTS II regions
1984
4.29%-5.33%
Groningen
Hamburg
Région Bruxelles
^
Ile de France
Bremen
Darmstadt
5.33%-10.07%
5.22%-10.26%
10.07%-15.60%
10.30%-15.20%
16.33%-20.34%
15.70%-20.34%
20.83%-25.19%
Oberbayern
London
Stuttgart
Antwerpen
Lombardia
Valle d'Aosta
Emilia-Romagna
Diisseldorf
Karlsruhe
Mittelfranken
Trentino-Alto Adige
Noord-Holland
Luxembourg
Liguria
Piemonte
Rheinhessen-Pfalz
Alsace
Haute-Normandie
K^In
Hannover
Túbingen
Rhóne-Alpes
1994
Hamburg
Région Bruxelles
Darmstadt
Luxembourg
ile de France
Oberbayern
Bremen
Outer London
Stuttgart
Antwerpen
Valle d'Aosta
Lombardia
Emilia-Romagna
Karlsruhe
Trentino-Alto Adige
Mittelfranken
Groningen
Diisseldorf
Berkshire, Bucks and
Oxfordshire
Friuli-Venezia Giulia
Hannover
Veneto
West-Vlaanderen
Liguria
Tiibingen
Kassel
KOIn
Noord-Holland
Utrecht
•
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Table 2.6 allows us to see exactly which regions go to make up the percentages in tables
2.4 and 2.5. It may be observed that there is a stable structure for the regions in which
the income levels are highest, that is the 14 regions, which in 1984 represented 15% of
the richest European population. In 1994, 11 of these regions remain the same and the
extent to which they coincide becomes more accentuated in those regions that represent
5-10 % and 10-15% of the richest population.
Secondly the Gini indices were calculated for the years 1995 and 1999. In this case the
values calculated were based on the new accounting system ESA 95 and, in contrast to
the previous evaluation, all the NUTS 2 regions in the EU were used^.
Table 2.3: Values of Gini Index
Spatial Concentration Spatial Concentration
of GDP of Population
1995 0.3345 0.1955
1999 0.3464 0.2119
While the data in the tables 2.2 and 2.3 are not perfectly comparable since the number
of NUTS 2 regions used is different (165 regions in table 2.2 and 205 in table 2.3) and
also because of the fact that the GDP values are computed using different accounting
systems (ESA79 for Table 2.2 and ESA95 for Table 2.3), it remains clear that the
overriding dynamic of a growing concentration, both in terms of population and GDP
remains the same in that the trend which characterized the period 1984-1994 appears to
be continuing. However, the actual concentration of GDP is greater than the
' A list of all of the NUTS 2 regions may be found in the appendix B.
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concentration of population. At the same time the rate at which the population becomes
more concentrated is greater than the rate at which GDP becomes more concentrated.
The graphs 2.5 to 2.8 represent the Lorenz curves that correspond to the Gini indices for
1995 and 1999.
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Figure 2.7: Spatial Concentration of Population in
1999 Lo re nz Cu rve
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Figure 2.8: Spatial Concentration of GDP in 1999
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Graphically it can be observed that the Lorenz curve is more pronounced in 1999 than
in 1995 both with respect to the concentration of population and concentration of GDP a
fact that would seem to suggest that there is a constant process of spatial densification
of the economic variables being analysed. At the same time the distance to the diagonals
is greater in those Lorenz curves that make reference to the concentration of GDP thus
ratifying the values calculated for the Gini indices.
Tables 2.7 and 2.8 offer a more detailed view of the distribution in percentage form of
the population, physical geographical space and GDPg for the 50% of the EU population
with the highest incomes in the years 1995 and 1999.
Table 2.7: Spatial Concentration in Table 2.8: Spatial Concentration in
1995 (Population-Space-GDP) 1999 (Population-Space-GDP)
% of Population % of Surface % of GDP % of Population % of Surface % of GDP
4.89 0.5 8.62 4.49 0.49 7.89
10.85 2.89 17.04 10.23 2.43 16.08
15.25 5.05 22.73 15.06 4.97 22.39
20.6 7.04 29.32 20.83 8.19 29.38
24.92 9.76 34.43 25.69 10.4 35.1
30.36 12.19 40.47 30.19 12.69 40.15
35.77 15.76 46.21 35.08 15.12 45.4
40.49 19.18 51.08 40.53 19.06 51.04
45 30.04 55.65 45.88 23.18 56.42
50.237 37.2 60.71 50.227 27.2 60.98
Tables 2.7 and 2.8 again reflect the inherent stability in the variables population, area or
space and GDP in the first two fifths of the richest members of the EU population, that
8 These percentages of population, space and GDP for the years 1995 and 1999 have been calculated for
all those NUTS 2 EU regions and have been utilized in the calculation of the Gini indices that correspond
to these years.
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is in 1995, 40.49% of this population occupied just 19.18% of the physical geographical
space but accumulated 51.08% of GDP and in 1999 40.53% of the richest part of the
population occupied 19.06% of the space and accumulated 51.04% of GDP.
Again, there seems to be a critical frontier that takes shape for the accumulated
population at around 45-50% where an intense process of concentration in terms of both
population and GDP in spaced appears to taking place. In 1995, 45% of the richest part
of the population is situated in 30.04% of the geographical space and is responsible for
generating 55.65% of the GDP. In 1999 these figures become 45.88%, 23.18% and
56.42% for population, space and GDP respectively. If we focus on the values that are
linked to approximately 50% of the accumulated population we find that the spatial
concentration process with respect to the population and GDP is even more strongly
evident. Almost the same percentage of population and a greater percentage of GDP are
located in approximately 10% less space.
Table 2.9 links the NL1TS 2 regions with the percentages expressed in the tables 2.7 and
2.8.
•
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Table 2.9: Comparison between regions and population
percentages
% Population
up figure 1995
down figure 1999
European Union NUTS II regions
1995
To 4.46%
To 4.49%
4.49%-10.23%
4.46%-10.85%
10.85%-15.25%
10.23%-15.06%
15.25%-20.60%
15.06%-20.83%
Inner London
Reg. Bruxelles-
Luxembourg (Grand-
Duché)
^
Ile de France
Wien
Darmstadt
Oberbayern
Bremen
Valle d'Aosta
Lombardia
Trentino-Alto Adige
Stuttgart
Stuttgart
Emilia-Romagna ^
Antwerpen
Utrecht
Groningen
North Eastern
Scotland
Uusimaa (Suuralue)
Salzburg
Karlsruhe
Stockholm
Noord-Holland
Dŭsseldorf
Mittelfranken
Káln
Veneto
Piemonte
1999
Inner London
Reg. Bruxelles
Luxembourg (Grand-
Duché)
Hamburg
ile de France
Oberbayern
Wien
Darmstadt
Utrecht
Bremen
Uusimaa (Suuralue)
Áland
Lombardia
Trentino-Alto Adige
Noord-Holland
Stockholm
Stuttgart
Emilia-Romagna
Berkshire, Bucks &
Oxfordshire
Valle d'Aosta
Salzburg
Groningen
Mittelfrankene
Antwerpen
Karlsruhe
North Eastern
Scotland
Southern and Eastern
Veneto
Piemonte
Dússeldorf
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From the tables it can be observed that there is a stable structure in the ranking of the
regions that represent 15% of the richest part of the population. Of the 25 regions,
which in 1995 made up this 15%, 23 remain in 1999. On looking at the first 5% of the
population we find that there is absolute coincidence in the regions.
The following map provides a graphic representation of the values given in the tables
2.8 and 2.9. The representation is based on the localization of those regions that, taken
as a whole, accumulate 45% of the richest population. In the map these regions are
drawn as areas in grey. The areas drawn in violet represent the following band of
aggregate population that is those regions that do not form part of the top 45% but are in
the range 45-50%. The rest of the regions are drawn in white.
Map 2.8: Concentration of population 1999
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2.7.2 Regional Convergence
The study of convergence of regional per capita incomes can be approached both from a
macroeconomic point of view (see Barro and Sala-i-Martín 1990,1991,1992,1995; Sala-
i-Martín 1994, 1996, etc. ) or by using the tools of the regional scientists such as Amos
1988, Fan and Casetti, 1994, Hansen 1995, Maxwell and Hite 1992, Suarez-Villa and
Cuadrado Roura 1993, Terrasi 1998, 2002. ^
This section follows the second of these approaches and offers the evolution of
European regional disparities during the 80"s and 90's using a Generalized Entropy
Index such as the Theil index of concentration as the main analytical instrument9. The
Theil coefficient of concentration (Theil, 1967) became a very popular index for
analysing spatial distributions. Different authors (Batty, 1974, 1976, Walsh and
O'Kelly, 1979, Walsh and Webber, 1977) have shown the merits of this index. No only
is it neither scale10 nor mean dependent" and it is not excessively affected by extreme
values, but is also independent of the number of regions12 and can therefore be used to
9The vast theoretical and empirical literature on inequalities has produced a substantial number of
measures. See Cowell (1995) for an excellent survey of ineasures and their potential drawbacks.
10This characteristic is called the income scale independence principle and states that a desirable measure
of inequality should be homogeneous of degree zero, that is if we scale all of incomes by the same
number, our measure of inequality should not change. For instance variance of income does not fit this
principle (if we double the incomes, the variance quadruples).
"This characteristic is called the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle and states that a good inequality measure
should rise in response to a mean preserving redistribution from a poor to a rich person or in other words
the numerical value of an inequality index should increase when there is a transfer of income from
someone lower in the income distribution to someone higher in the income distribution, holding everyone
else's income constant. Most measures satisfy this principle being the main exception the variance of
logarithms.
'ZThis characteristic is called the principle of population or replication invariance and postulates that the
distribution of the cake should not depend on the number of the cake receivers. That is, if we measure
inequality in an economy with N regions and then merge it with another identical economy, inequality in
•
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compare the inequalities that exist between different regional systems. Moreover, the
coefficient is decomposable13 in between-group and within-group inequalities and in
this way it can be used to analyse inequality on different geographical scales
simultaneously (Wash and O'kelly 1979, p.271). Furthermore, Bourguignon (1979),
Shorrocks (1980) and Cowell (1995) showed that the only inequality indeces that
simultaneously satisfy all the principles mentioned are the Generalized Entropy Indeces.
These characteristics made the Theil index particularly suitable for analysis of the
European case, where regional development has a strong geographical component, thus
justifying the adoption of the Theil coefficient. The index is calculated according to the
following formulasla
Defining y; = GDP as the per capita income of region i and y^^ = GDPiu as
Popul; Popul^u
the average per capita income of the Whole European Union, we can express the
regional share of the average European Union per capita income with the x; variable
defined as x; = y' . Therefore the Theil index can be expressed in the following way:
v^^
the larger economy should be the same (Dalton 1920). Indices such as the weighted coefficient of
variation is sensitive to the number of regions and therefore cross-national comparisons of its values are
statistically biased.
13This characteristic is called the principle of decomposability.
14The Theil coefficient can be interpreted as the log of a weighted geometric mean of regional per capita
incomes deflated by the national average, the weights being represented by the income shares. A dual
form also exists, in which the role of population shares and income shares are interchanged, but we have
preferred the original one for its direct relationship with the entropy concept (Theil, 1967,p.127). With
respect to the standard deviation of log per capita income, adopted in the analysis of 6-convergence, the
Theil coefficient presents the advantage of being weighted, independent of the number of regions and
decomposable in between- and within-set shares.
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IC =^ GDP,.
log^x; ^= ICnr + ICwr (2.6)
; GDP^^
GDP,.E rICbr = ^ GDPr log^x;Er ^
IC,^r =
(2.7)
y' log x' (2.8)
y;E r x;E r
^ GDP;E r
, GDPr
GDP
taking into account that y;Er = 'Er stands for the per capita income of region i
Popul;E r
that belongs to the " r" group of regions and
yr = GDPr
is the average per capita
Popul r
income of the "r" group of regions, we can express the regional share of the average
per capita income in the "r" group of regions through the x;Er variable defined as
__ .y;E r
x;e r '
.y r
IC stands for Total Inequality, IChr is between-group inequality and IC,yr is within-
group inequality. Notice that the global inequality index may be broken down into two
components, a between or across-group of regions index and a weighted average of
within-group of regions inequalities. It should be noticed that the weights are in form of
the aggregate incomes rather than population sizes.
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Taking into account the above expressions, we have calculated the Theil Index for the
regions of the European Union over different time periods, using two different
European accounting systems (ESA79 and ESA95) and different numbers of regions.
In all of the computations of the Theil index we have classified the European regions
into two groups: On the one hand we consider the less developed regions or the
"objective 1 group" in the European Union. This group logically takes in the objective 1
regions15. On the other we consider the remaining regions in the European Union, i.e.,
those that fall outside the objective 1 category and that we will call "non-objective 1
group". This classification provides us with a means of ineasuring the dispersion in the
distribution of income between those two groups and thus we are able to assess the
convergence process more accurately.
The GDP variable used in the Theil formula is expressed in terms of purchasing power
standards (PPS) at constant 1985 prices. The data was provided by the European
statistical office (EUROSTAT). As mentioned above, however, our analysis is based on
two series of data that are not perfectly homogeneous for the years they overlap: One
series is for 1982-1997 (ESA79) and the other for 1995-1999 (ESA9516).
The first computations of the Theil Index have been made for the period (1982-1997)
with ESA79. This is our longest Theil series and takes in 131 regions in the EU12. The
'Sln all our computations "objective 1 group" takes in those NUTS II regions that were objective 1 either
in the first programming period ( 1989-1994) (Delor's I Package) or in the second programming period
(1995-1999) (Delor's II Package) and "non-objective 1 group" takes in the remainder of the European
Union NUTS II regions.
16 The move to ESA95 based accounts in 1999 was planned to address a range of inconsistencies and
establish a new Eurostat-compatible and consistent data set from 1995.
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"objective 1 group" comprises 38 regions and the "non-objective 1 group" 93 regions^^.
The results are given in table 2.10.
For each year and for each of the two groups considered table 2.10 gives the population
shares, the income shares, the logarithm of the ratio shares and the contribution to the
Theil index. Finally, the last three columns give the numerical values of the Theil index
for between groups, within groups and the total.
^' Annex C lists the NUTS II regions that belongs to each group considered.
•
•
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Table 2.10: Population and Income Shares for objective 1 and non-objective 1 group of regions and the
1982 obj 1 group
non-objective l
gro up
1983 obj 1 group
non-objective I
group
1984 obj 1 group
non-objective 1
group
1985 obj 1 group
non-objective 1
gro up
1986 obj 1 group
non-objective I
gro up
1987 obj 1 group
non-objective l
group
1988 obj l group
non-objective 1
group
1989 obj 1 group
non-objective 1
group
1990 obj 1 group
non-objective 1
group
1991 obj 1 group
non-objective 1
group
1992 obj 1 group
non-objective 1
gro up
1993 obj 1 group
non-objective 1
group
1994 obj 1 group
non-objective 1
group
1995 obj 1 group
non-objective 1
group
1996 obj 1 group
non-objective l
gro up
1997 obj 1 group
non-objective 1
group
Theil Index (1982-1997)
Pop. Share
Income
Share Log R. Sh.
Cont.Theil
Index Theil Bet.
Theil
Within
Theil
Total
0.3258 O.1839 -0.5720 -0.1052
0.6742 O.8161 0.1911 0.1559 0.0507 0.0137 0.0645
0.3274 0.1865 -0.5627 -0.1050
0.6726 0.8135 0.1902 0.1547 0.0498 0.0180 0.0677
0.3291 0.1868 -0.5664 -0.1058
0.6709 0.8132 0.1923 0.1564 0.0506 0.0185 0.0692
0.3302 0.1863 -0.5725 -0.1066
0.6698 0.8137 0.1947 0.1584 0.0518 0.0192 0.0710
0.3319 0.1852 -0.5834 -0.1080
0.6681 0.8148 0.1985 0.1617 0.0537 0.0182 0.0719
0.3321 0.1878 -0.5704 -0.1071
0.6679 0.8122 0.1957 0.1590 0.0519 0.0179 0.0697
0.3316 0.1919 -0.5471 -0.1050
0.6684 0.8081 0.1898 0.1534 0.0484 0.0174 0.0659
0.3306 0.1923 -0.5420 -0.1042
0.6694 0.8077 0.1879 0.1517 0.0475 0.0169 0.0644
0.3254 O.1896 -0.5404 -0.1024
0.6746 0.8104 0.1835 0.1487 0.0463 0.0186 0.0648
0.3258 0.1924 -0.5266 -O.IOl3
0.6742 0.8076 0.1805 0.1458 0.0444 0.0177 0.0622
0.3248 0.1951 -0.5098 -0.0994
0.6752 0.8049 O.1757 0.1414 0.0420 0.0181 0.0601
0.3230 0.1951 -0.5044 -0.0984
0.6770 0.8049 0.1731 0.1393 0.0410 0.0179 0.0588
0.3236 0.1948 -0.5076 -0.0989
0.6764 0.8052 0.1743 0.1404 0.0415 O.O183 0.0598
0.3203 0.1942 -0.5005 -0.0972
0.6797 0.8058 0.1702 0.1372 0.0400 0.0185 0.0584
0.3200 0.1966 -0.4873 -0.0958
0.6800 0.8034 0.1668 0.1340 0.0382 0.0191 0.0573
0.3198 0.1994 -0.4722 -0.0942
0.6802 0.8006 0.1629 0.1304 0.0363 0.0196 0.0558
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If we focus on the between-group inequality which aims to proxy the catching-up
process of objective 1 regions with respect to the non-objective 1, table 2.10 reflects a
change in the general tendency. Between 82 and 87 the disparity remained relatively
constant rising from a value of 0.0507 in 1982 to 0.0519 in 1987. Between 1988 and
1997 however the income disparities between these two groups shrunk from 0.0484 in
1988 to 0.0363 in 1997. The within-group inequality, on the other hand tended to
increase slightly. The total or overall Theil index displays almost the same pattern as the
Theil index between groups. This would seem to indicate that the increase in the
regional inequalities from 1982 to 1987 was driven by an increase in both the between-
group^ component and the within-group component of the Theil Index. In 1982 the
between-group contribution to European inequality was 0.0507 (as we saw in table
2.10) and by 1987 this figure had risen to 0.0519. With respect to the within-group
contribution to the European inequality the figures rose from 0.0137 in 1982 to 0.0179
in 1987.
The decrease in regional inequality in the European Union from 1987 to 1997 was
driven by a decrease in the between group component of total inequality. The between
group contribution to total inequality was 0.0484 in 1988 and by 1997 this figure had
risen to 0.0363. In this period the within-group inequality follows a relatively stable
path. The graphic representation offered in figures 2.10 and 2.11 provide a vision which
underline the similarities between the patterns traced by between-group inequalities and
total inequality. Figure 2.12 provides a representation of the relative contributions of the
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between-group inequalities and the within-group inequalities to the total inequality and
as such offers a graphic comparison of the three.
Figure 2.9: Theil Between Groups
Comparative Performance Objective 1 Regions
EU12 (1982-1997)
o ; o.os -
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Figure 2.10: Theil Total
Income Inequality among EU regions
EU12 (1982-1997)
o^
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Figure 2.11: Decomposition of Theil Index
EU12 (1982-1997)
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It can be seen from figure 2.12 that between-group inequality contributes proportionally
more to the total inequality than within-group inequality. Moreover, there is a stable
tendency of within-group inequality and a decreasing tendency of the between-group
inequality. The breakdown of the Theil index into between-group and within-group
components helps to highlight the convergence process taking place in the levels of
income across groups and the relative stagnation in terms of within-group inequalities
from 1987-1997 in the EU 12.
Moreover figures 2.10, 2.11 and 2.12 reflect the level of correlation in both the phases
of divergence and convergence for the period 1982-1997 with the reforms of the
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European Union regional policy. The reduction in the disparities between the objective
1 and non-objective 1 groups has been taking place ever since the Delor's I(1989-
1993) and Delor's II (1994-1999) packages come into effect, signalling the reform of
regional policy.
In order to enhance the sample of regions at our disposal we compute the Theil index
for the period 1988-1997 (ESA79). The new sample includes 189 regions^g all of which
belong to the 15 present-day European Union countries. The general conclusions that
may be drawn are similar to those given above for the smaller sample of regions. The
reduction inequalities in income is due to the constant decrease in the gap in the Theil
index between the two groups, which means that there is a convergence process taking
place across groups of regions, in other words between objective 1 and non-objective 1
regions. Table 2.11 gives the results of the computations and can be read in similar
terms to table 2.10.
^$ Annex D lists the NUTS II regions that belongs to each group considered
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Table 2.11: Population and Income Shares for objective 1 and non-objective 1 group of
regions and the Theil Index Between the two groups (1988-1997)
1988 obj 1 group
non-objective 1
group
1989 obj l group
non-objective 1
group
1990 obj 1 group
non-objective 1
group
1991 obj 1 group
non-objective 1
group
1992 obj 1 group
non-objective 1
group
1993 obj 1 group
non-objective 1
group
1994 obj 1 group
non-objective 1
group
1995 obj 1 group
non-objective 1
group
1996 obj 1 group
non-objective 1
group
1997 obj 1 group
non-objective 1
group
Pop. Share
Income
Share Log R. Sh.
Cont.Theil
Index Theil Bet.
0.2072 0.1352 =0.4270 -0.0577
0.7928 0.8648 0.0870 0.0752 0.0175
0.2068 0.1358 -0.4204 -0.0571
0.7932 0.8642 0.0857 0.0741 0.0170
0.2046 0.1346 -0.4190 -0.0564
0.7954 0.8654 0.0844 0.0730 0.0167
0.2045 0.1379 -0.3946 -0.0544
0.7955 0.8621 0.0805 0.0694 0.0150
0.2041 0.1376 -0.3942 -0.0542
0.7959 0.8624 0.0802 0.0692 0.0150
0.2034 0.1391 -0.3801 -0.0529
0.7966 0.8609 0.0776 0.0668 0.0140
0.2039 0.1393 -0.3808 -0.0530
0.7961 0.8607 0.0780 0.0671 0.0141
0.2022 0.1391 -0.3735 -0.0520
0.7978 0.8609 0.0760 0.0654 0.0135
0.2020 0.1395 -0.3701 -0.0516
0.7980 0.8605 0.0754 0.0649 0.0132
0.2019 0.1406 -0.3622 -0.0509
0.7981 0.8594 0.0741 0.0637 0.0127
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Figure 2.13 plots the evolution of the Theil index from 1988 to 1997 in the EU15
between the two groups. The value of the index falls throughout the whole period.
Figure 2.12: Theil Between Groups
Comparative Performance Objective 1 Regions
EU15 ( 1988-1997)
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Finally, in order to bring the study of the regional convergence patterns in the European
Union up to date using the most recent data available, we compute the numerical values
for the Theil index for the period 1995-1999 based on ESA95 accounting. As before we
divide the whole sample of NUTS II regions into two groups corresponding to
objective 1 and non-objective 1 regions19
Table 2.12 provides the main results of the computations for the Theil index and
reflects the reduction in income disparities between the two groups. This should be
19Annex E lists the NUTS II regions that belongs to each group considered
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viewed as a conclusive proof of the catching-up process taking place between objective
1 regions and non-objective 1 regions.
Table 2.12: Population and Income Shares for objective 1 and non-objective 1 group of
regions and the Theil Index Between the two groups (1995-1999)
Income Cont. Theil
Pop. Sh. Share Log R. Sh. Index Theil Bet.
1995
1996
obj 1 group
non-objective 1
group
obj 1 group
non-objective 1
group
ob' 1 group
^
0.24439 0.17259 -0.34786 -0.06004
0.75561 0.82741 0.09078 0.07511 0.01507
0.24413 0.17341 -0.34204 -0.05931
0.75587 0.82659 0.08944 0.07393 0.01462
0.24382 0.17402 -0.33726 -0.05869
0.75618 0.82598 0.08829 0.07293 0.01424
0.24354 0.17311 -0.34134 -0.05909
0.75646 0.82689 0.08902 0.07361 0.01452
0.24317 0.17533 -0.32709 -0.05735
0.75683 0.82467 0.08584 0.07079 0.01344
1997
1998
non-objective 1
group
obj 1 group
non-objective 1
group
obj 1 roug p1999
non-objective 1
group
Figure 2.13 plots the values of the between-group Theil index and gives the
comparative performance of objective 1 regions.
•
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Figure 2.13: Theil Between Groups
Comparative Performance Objective 1 regions
EU15 (1995-1999)
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The general tendency towards a decrease in inequality between the two groups becomes
evident from this figure. There is however a small increase in inequality between 1997
and 1998.
2.8 Population Potentials and Levels of Development
The following section attempts econometrically to test the explanatory power that
population potentials have on the levels of development. Our goal here, is to discover
whether or not the explanatory efficacy of population potentials holds constant over
time or whether it decreases the further we move away from the year in which our
estimates for the cross-sectional regressions began (1982). To this end we use a
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logarithm specification to express the relationship between population potentials and
levels of development in order to estimate the regressions for different time periods.
As we mentioned above, population potential data was computed using a gravity model.
This computation was carried out using a geographical information system which
involves building a net of points for the European space and assigning a value of
potential for each of these points (see section 2.4 for more details about the computation
of the population potentials). The next step in our computations was to assign a value of
population potential to each of the European Union20 NUTS II regions in order to obtain
a comparable relationship between levels of development and these population
potentials based on an identical geographical coverage. We proxy the levels of
development according to (NUTS II) gross domestic product per capita (PPS at 1985
prices). ^
Once the data had been elaborated, we estimated the posited relationship for the years,
1982, 1989, 1994 and 1997 for the EU12 regions and in 1999 for EU15 regions.
Figures on income per capita are based on Eurostat data (ESA79) for the years 1982,
1989, 1994 and 1997 and Eurostat data (ESA95) for 1999.
An initial impression of the relationship between population potentials and levels of
development is shown in figures 2.14 and 2.15.
20 The value of the population potential assigned to each of the NUTS II regions in the European Union
is based on a weighted aggregate of the points" population potential that belong to a particular region.
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Figure 2. 14: Population Potentials and Levels of
Development (UE12 1989)
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Figure 2.15: Population Potentials and Levels of
Development (UE15 1999)
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The above scatter graph, plots the relationship between the levels of development and
population potentials for two points in time, the year 1989 (EU12) and 10 years later
(1999) for EU15. On analyzing the dynamic evolution of the positive relationship
between levels of development and population potentials we find that there is a higher
degree of dispersion in 1999 than in 1989 which indicates that this relationship is
diminishing over time.
ln order to give a more robust interpretation to the relationship between levels of
development and population potentials we estimate the following model:
LnGDPpc; , = a + cLn V; , + u; , (2.9)
GDPpc represents gross domestic product in purchasing power parities at 1985 prices,
V stands for population potentials and u is a random disturbance. This kind of
specification has the advantage that it allows us to interpret the estimated coefficient c
directly as the elasticity of the income per capita with respect to the population
potentials ( in other words the change in per capita income expressed in percentage
terms that takes place when there is a 1% increase in the population potentials).
Tables 2.13, 2.14, 2.15, 2.16, 2.17 contain the cross-section estimations of the model
(2.9) for the years 1982, 1989, 1994, 1997 and 1999.
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Table 2.13: Population Potential and Regional Income
EU12 1982
Dependent Variable: LNY82
Method: Least Squares
Included observations: 131
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C
LNV
-0.136282
0.708395
0.694993 -0.196091
0.052933 13.38296
0.8448
0.0000
R-squared 0.581310 Mean dependent var 9.161970
Adjusted R-squared 0.578064 S.D. dependent var 0.301394
S.E. of regression 0.195775 Akaike info criterion -0.408551
Sum squared resid 4.944296 Schwarz criterion -0.364655
Log likelihood 28.76011 F-statistic 179.1037
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Table 2.14: Population Potential and Regional Income
EU12 1989
Dependent Variable: LNY89
Method: Least Squares
Included observations: 161
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C
LNV
1.944067
0.556469
0.614355 3.164404
0.046651 11.92837
0.0019
0.0000
R-squared 0.472262 Mean dependent var 9.270123
Adjusted R-squared 0.468943 S.D. dependent var 0.261802
S.E. of regression 0.190785 Akaike info criterion -0.463000
Sum squared resid 5.787397 Schwarz criterion -0.424722
Log likelihood 39.27149 F-statistic 142.2860
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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Table 2.15: Population Potential and Regional Income
EU12 1994
Dependent Variable: LNY94
Method: Least Squares
Included observations: 169
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C
LNV
3.364388
0.449592
0.514051 6.544848
0.038998 11.52861
0.0000
0.0000
R-squared 0.443164 Mean dependent var 9.288080
Adjusted R-squared 0.439830 S.D. dependent var 0.264769
S.E. of regression 0.198165 Akaike info criterion -0.387672
Sum squared resid 6.557967 Schwarz criterion -0.350632
Log likelihood 34.75831 F-statistic 132.9089
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Table 2.16: Population Potential and Regional Income
EU12 1997
Dependent Variable: LNY97
Method: Least Squares
Included observations: 169
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 3.502148 0.506481 6.914668 0.0000
LNV 0.444498 0.038424 11.56837 0.0000
R-squared 0.444864 Mean dependent var 9.358730
Adjusted R-squared 0.441540 S.D. dependent var 0.261268
•S.E. of regression 0.195246 Akaike info criterion -0.417345
Sum squared resid 6.366234 Schwarz criterion -0.380305
Log likelihood 37.26565 F-statistic 133.8271
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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Table 2.17: Population Potential and Regional Income
EU15 1999
Dependent Variable: LNY99
Method: Least Squares
Included observations: 204
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C
LNV
5.129120
0.326139
0.477704 10.73701
0.036328 8.977634
0.0000
0.0000
R-squared 0.285204 Mean dependent var 9.415562
Adjusted R-squared 0.281665 S.D. dependent var 0.258615
S.E. of regression 0.219188 Akaike info criterion -0.188014
Sum squared resid 9.704801 Schwarz criterion -0.155484
Log likelihood 21.17746 F-statistic 80.59792
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
From the output of the estimations, it can be seen that the significance of the parameters
is very high (t-statistic) and that the effects of population potentials on the levels of
development are decreasing over time. This fact is reflected in the values that the
coefficient c takes in the different periods of analysis. The coefficient c changes from
0.77 in 1982 to 0.444 in 1997 and to 0.326 in 1999. One possible interpretation of this
result is as follows:
The concept of population potentials may be interpreted in terms of market potential.
One spatial factor that determines regional income is the closeness to large consumer
markets as it is emphasized in demand oriented models of regional growth (Kaldor
1970) and the agglomeration effects of the new economic geography models (NEG).
This effect can be captured by our population potentials.
Therefore, proximity to large consumer markets, or in other words, market potential,
was an important explanatory variable for regional income in the early eighties but has
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been decreasing in significance in determining regional income in the 1990's. Thus
dynamic income regions have also emerged on the periphery, and need not necessarily
be close to rich regions. It would seem logical to assume therefore, that "new"
European Union regional policy has been one of the motors of these effects since the
mid eighties. European Union regional policy has had an important effect in terms of
boosting the growth of peripheral regions and by extension their income levels and the
results given here provide evidence to this effect.
2.9. Conclusions
The heavy "structural" lines of potentials in the European territorial space when studied
through the technique of population potentials, clearly reflects a similarity with the
satellite observations of night-time light emissions from cities, houses, industries, etc.,
captured by the Earth Viewer Satellite. This similarity highlights the usefulness of the
technique of population potentials (based on an analogy with classical mechanics) for
providing a graded image of the population distribution within a particular territory.
Population Potentials offer a means of condensing a large quantity of information by
plotting maps of population contours which expand from the main agglomeration
areas, where the highest peaks of population potentials are located.
When applied to Europe this technique highlights an area in which the European
population is particularly dense. This area is based around the large population centers
of Manchester - London - Paris - Cologne - Diisseldorf - Ruhr Valley, around which
•
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there are further concentric population potential contours of decreasing strength. This
research provides us with a clear-cut alternative to what is commonly known as the
"Blue Banana"-a large growing area which includes most of the regions of Germany,
Austria and the Benelux countries, as well as the more developed urban regions which
form part of the UK, France and the North of Italy.
This technique provides us with an alternative vision of the European population as a
nuclear structure with successive concentric lines of potentials and this vision correlates
quite remarkably with nighttime light diffusion images which depict the population
centered around what we define as the "Central European Triangle" (UK, Manchester,
London, Paris, Cologne, Diisseldorf, Ruhr Valley). Around this area, successive
population potential contours take in Berlin and the Prague and a North Italian axis.
Moreover, population potentials highlight the impact enlargement will have on the
different components of the spatial structure of Europe. Potential contours indicate that
"gravitational" center of Europe will be displaced towards the East.
Eastern areas of the current EU such us East and Central Germany, Austria and Western
of Italy will enjoy significant competitive advantages due to the relatively strong
increases in their population and market potentials which enlargement will provoke.
CEECs will also enjoy important competitive advantages due to the fact that they are
located centrally within a high potential contour (330.000 inh/Km)- but they are
peripheral with respect to the current members of the EU- they are in the Eastern border.
After enlargement they will form part of a large market area and no longer be quite so
83
The spatial structure of Europe
peripheral. The CEECs will also benefit from reinforced regional and local authority
cooperation within the framework of new "cooperative" spaces such us these in the
Central European, Adriatic, Danubian and South Eastern European Space (CADSES).
They will however, probably be border regions in the Eastern frontier that will probably
require special policy measures.
Enlargement will also be beneficial to the central areas of the EU and will probably not
affect the strong tendency toward large-scale agglomeration at the real core of the
European spatial structure: The central triangular area made up of the large
metropolitan areas of Great Manchester-London/Paris/K^ln-Dusseldorf-Rhur Valley
that concentrates more than 40% of the EU population and more than 50% of EU GDP.
The Atlantic periphery, on the other hand, will be affected by an important comparative
decrease in population potentials. This decrease must be countered by the development
and adoption of new European Regional Policy measures which will be carried out
within the framework of the European Spatial Development Perspective. These policy
measures will be needed in order to compensate for the fact that these regions are
"outliers" and in order to promote a more balanced, polycentric kind of development.
The policy measures will also be aimed at improving the efficiency of the small and
medium size agglomerations areas, within the framework of urban networks for the
Atlantic periphery, since, as the ESDP states enlargement will mean that these regions
run the risk of becoming more loosely connected to more developed regions of Europe.
The last part of the chapter uses on the one hand Gini indices to analyze the spatial
concentration of GDP and Population in the European Union. On the one hand we deal
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with the widely dealt with issue of regional convergence in the EU territory. The length
of the period studied is crucial to situating and assessing the nature of convergence since
it is essentially a long-term process. The methodological approach adopter in this
chapter involves the use of the traditional tools of regional scientists rather than
experimenting with the new tools introduced by macroeconomists (chapter three). By
this means we are able to show that the results obtained using older, simpler techniques
are very similar to those achieved using more sophisticated methods. Further, we
addres ŝ some of the factors that have, until now, been somewhat neglected, such as the
problem of the weighting the contribution of different geographical areas.
Our main conclusions highlight the fact that population and GDP are highly
concentrated at the "core" of the European territory. Further, the concentration of GDP
in geographical space is higher than the concentration of population and this is reflected
by a higher value of the Gini Index. From a dynamic point of view there has been a
slight increase in the concentration of GDP and population in space over time and the
increase in the concentration of population has been greater than the increase in the
concentration of GDP. Finally, there is a remarkable level of stability over time with
respect to the proportion of the space that corresponds to the 15-20% of the richest part
of the population in the European Union. 1Vloreover, on assigning this population to its
corresponding regions we again observe the above mentioned stability. Of the 14
regions that represented the top 15% of richest population in 1984, eleven remained the
same in 1994.
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The regional convergence process in the European Union has seen the disparities in
income between the objective 1 and non-objective 1 groups decreasing from 1987/1988
until the present for all of the samples used in our study (EU12 1982-1997, EU15 1988-
1997 both samples analyzed using ESA79 accounting system and EU15 1995-1999
analyzed using the new accounting system ESA95). This indicates that there is indeed,
a catching-up or convergence process underway with respect to the income levels of the
two groups considered. Furthermore, this process has taken place between the years
1988-1999 and coincides with the new regional policy reforms in the Euroepan Union,
the so-called Delor's I and Delor's II packages. This lends itself to the interpretation
that the convergence process taking place between the two groups has been boosted by
the new European Union regional policy. This issue is explored in more detail in
chapter four of this dissertation.
In the last section of the chapter, we analyse the relationship between population
potentials and development levels in the European Union for different periods of time,
enabling us to test whether the relationship holds over time. We find clear evidence to
support the positive effect of population potentials in determining levels of
development.
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The neo-classical model of growth and
the convergence proccess in Europe
••
Chapter 3
•
3.1 Introduction
The issue of convergence, both nominal and real, is very important not only from the
policy perspective but also from the perspective of the theory of economic growth.
From an economic policy point of view in the case of persistently large (or widening)
gaps between poor and rich countries, there could be a need for economic policy
measures (domestic and international) to stimulate a catch-up process. This convergence
issue is also relevant in the political context of west European integration. In fact,
Article 2 of the Treaty of European Union stipulates that "The Community shall have
the task... ... to promote... ... a high degree of convergence of economic performance,
... ... the raising of the standard of living and quality of life, and economic and social
cohesion and solidarity among Member States." In a similar vein, Article 130a
stipulates that "the Community shall aim at reducing disparities between the levels of
development of the various regions, including rural areas". Significant transfers have
been provided for in the framework of the Structural and Cohesion Funds to support the
process of economic convergence in the peripheral regions, i.e. regions with real per
capita GDP significantly below the European Union average. From the perspective of
the economic growth theory, the reduction of existing gaps in developmental and
income levels between countries, in other words the convergence of regional incomes is
postulated by the neo-classical model of growth. The idea of a transitional growth path
to a steady state income, on which growth rates decline, is the fundamental theoretical
ingredient of convergence analyses.
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The rest of the chapter is divided into seven sections. Section 3.2 briefly reviews the
neo-classical growth model. Section 3.3 describes the concepts of convergence, how to
measure it and how long it takes to reach the steady state. Section 3.4 describes the
different methodological approaches in the convergence studies (cross-section analyses
in the tradition of Barro/Sala-i-Martin, panel data analyses and Markov chain models).
Section 3.5 reviews the main empirical findings of convergence in Europe in published
studies. Section 3.6 describes the dataset we will use and on which Section 3.7 contains
the results of our convergence analyses. Section 3.8 gives the conclusions.
3.2 The Neo-Classical Model of Growth and the
Convergence Hypothesis
3.2.1 The Neo-Classical Model of Growth
Since the end of the Second World War the analysis of economic growth has been
dominated by debates which have centred on the neo-classical growth model. The
concept of convergence has had its roots in this model which is generally referred to as
the Solow growth model which was derived from the works of Robert Solow (1956)
and Trevor Swan (1956). This model has provided the basis for the dominant orthodoxy
for most of the period, and has strongly influenced economic policy over the last 20
years. The basic neo-classical model describes a one-sector closed economy with a
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composite, single "Robinson Crusoe" agent (Household/producer) who owns the inputs
and manages the production process.
The following discussion of this model is based on Chapter one of Barro and Sala-i-
Martin's (1995) book titled Economic Growth, chapter one of Sala-i-Martin's (2000)
book entitled Apuntes de Crecimiento Económico, and Romer's (1996) book entitled
Advanced in Macroeconomics.
In the simplest form of the neo-classical model, output Y at time t is a function of the
variables physical capital K(t) and labour L(t), and the level of technology which is
exogenous:
Y(t) = F(A(t), K(t), L(t)) (3.1)
The central characteristics of the neo-classical model are the assumptions that (i) the
level of technology is exogenously determined, (ii) the production factors labour and
capital each have diminishing marginal products, and (iii) the production function
shows constant returns to scale.
The level of technology A(t) is considered as given and is exogenously determined. In
the long term, only an increase in technological development provokes a rise in the
steady state output. The assumption of a given technology to which every economy has
free access is an over-simplification, given that technological progress is largely the
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result of research activities. There is however, some justification for this assumption.
On a world-wide scale, certain technological standards have been reached, which an
economy can access more and more readily (for instance software that one can
download from internet sites). In general, the argument of equal access to available
technology, or fast technology diffusion, can be considered to be valid for highly open
economies with a similar level of basic education of the population. One might expect
this in the case of advanced economies in general, and is therefore the case for EU
regions.
Technology is treated as labour augmenting : Y= f(K, L* A(t)) . It raises output in the
same way as it raises labour. (In this sense an innovation is Harrod neutral, i.e. the
relative inputs shares K* FK / L* F^ are unchanged for a given capital/output ratiol.
The Cobb-Douglas production function2 given in Eq. (3.2) below fulfils the properties
of the neo-classical production function perfectly and is therefore suitable for discussing
the properties of the neo-classical production function. In addition, it has the advantage
of bringing us very close to real-world comtemporary production functions (D. Romer
1996). (For convenience the subscript (t) is dropped in the following).
Y= F(K, A. * L) = K" (AL)'-" , 0< a< 1 (3.2)
' An alternative assumption is that technological progress is Hicks neutral
2 The origin of this function is on the solution given by a mathematician called Charles Cobb to a
question posed by his friend, the politician Paul Douglas about the existence of a production function in
which if the production factors are paid by its marginal products then the proportion of the aggregate
income that goes to each of them is kept constant.
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As before, A is the labour technological progress, and A* L is the effective labour
input3. The exponents a and (1- a) are the output elasticities of capital and effective
labour respectively.
First, F(•) reflects positive, diminishing marginal product with respect to each input:
c^F = (AL)^-a^"-^ > 0
aK
a2F = (AL)"-^ a(a -1)K"-^ < 0
aK2
(3.3)
2
aF - A^-aKa (1 _ a,)L-" > ^ a F=(1- a)(-a)A^-«KaL-"-^ < 0
aL aL
Second, F(•) exhibits constant returns to scale:
F(íiK, í^,AL) _(í^K)" *(íi,AL)^-" = í^,a+^^-"> * K" * AL'-" = í^, * F(K, A* L) for all í^. > 0
(3.4)
Third, the marginal product of capital (or labour) approaches infinity as capital (or
labour) approaches to 0 and approaches 0 as capital (or labour) goes to infinity.
Lim(FK ) = Lim(FL ) _ °°
K^0 L-^0
(3.5)
Lim(FK ) = Lim(FL ) = 0
K^^ L^^
•
3 Effective labour input is employment times its efficiency determined by the level of technology.
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The above properties are known as Inada Conditions, Inada (1963). This means that the
marginal product of capital is positive, but declines when capital increases. Hence, all
other factors being equal, any additional amount of capital yields a decreasing rate of
return in the production function. This assumption is central to the neo-classical model
of growth. Under this condition, capital accumulation does not make a constant
contribution to income growth. The assumption of diminishing returns has been heavily
challenged by recent growth theory, which believes for instance that, human capital
accumulation to yield constant returns, if not increasing ones- a possibility when
considering knowledge spill-overs.
The condition of constant returns to scale implies that we can rewrite the production
function in per capita terms, in its intensive form as it is also called:
K a
.v=f(k)-F AL,1 =k
This is a per unit capital function for effective labour.
3.2.2 Transitional Dynamics
3.2.2.1 Capital Accumulation
(3.6)
If is assumed that capital depreciates at the constant rate 8> 0; that is at each point in
time, a constant proportion of the capital stock is used up and can no longer be used for
production and that the economy saves a constant fraction of output s> 0 which is in
•
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turn invested in new capital, the net increase in the stock of physical capital at a point in
time equals gross investment less depreciation:
K(t) = sY(t) - ^K(t)
K(t) = sF[K(t),L * A(t)]- SK(t) (3.8)
The change in the aggregate capital stock with respect to time K(t) equals investment
minus depreciation of existing capital stock.
Let k(t) = K(t) L* A(t) be the quantity of capital per unit of effective labour and
assume that A(t) is given, then one gets capital accumulation in per capita terms (for
convenience we drop the subscript (t)):
K=s* f(k)-(n+^)*k (3.9)
K=s* f(k)-(n+x+S)*k (3.10)
where n= L and x = A, L is the derivative d[L(t)]l dt with respect to time.
L A
The augmentation of the capital stock per capita equals investment adjusted by the rate
of population growth and the depreciation rate given in (3.9). If technological growth x
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is included, effective depreciation is (n + x+ S) and the equation for capital
accumulation is as in (3.10).
This equation is the fundamental differential equation of the Solow-Swan model.
Figure 3.1 shows the workings of Eq. (3.10). The upper curve is the production
function, f(k) . The term s* f(k) which appears in Eq. (3.10) is the fraction of the per
capita output which is saved, we will call this the savings curve. Note from the figure
that the s* f(k) curve starts from the origin because f(0) = 0, has a positive slope
because f'(k) > 0 and gets flatter as k rises because f"(k) < 0. The Inada conditions
imply that the s* f(k) curve is vertical at k= 0 and becomes flat as k approaches
infinity. The other term in the equation (3.10), (n + x+^) * k that it is called
depreciation curve appears in figure 3.1 as a straight line from the origin with the
positive slope (n + x + S)
Due to the diminishing marginal product of capital, the per capita output available for
savings will become smaller with additional capital. Therefore, investment per effective
labour is non-linear. This decreases with rising capital accumulation. Initially,
investment exceeds the term (n + x+^) and thus the capital share per effective labour
increases. As the share of capital approaches infinity, investment becomes lower than
the term (n + x+^) . Hence there is a point k* where investment is just enough to
balance the second term. At k* the amount of capital per capita is constant , k= 0.
•
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Functions of
k
k*
Figure 3.1. The steady state in the neo-classical model of
Solow-Swan (Adapted from Sala-i-Martin (2000))
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3.2.2.2 The Steady State
In the Solow-Swan model the steady state corresponds to k= 0 in equation (3.10),
that is, to an intersection of the savings curve, s* f(k),with the depreciation curve,
(n + x+^) * k, in figure 3. l 4. The stock of capital k* which satisfies k= 0 is called
the steady state capital stock. Algebraically, k` satisfies the condition:
s* f(k*)=(n+x+^)*k* (3.11)
If the production function is of Cobb- Douglas type with technology being labour
augmenting (Eq. 3.6) the expression for the steady state capital stock is:
k* _
S ^t-a)
n+x+S
(3.12)
Due to the steady state capital stock is constant, per capita income (which is a function
of k) is also constant so its growth rate in the steady state is 0, yy = 0. In the steady
4 The intersection in the range of positive k exists and is unique because f(0) = 0,
n + x + ^ < limk^o [s * f'(k)] _ ^ , n + x + S > limk^^ [s * f'(k)] = 0 , and f"(k) < 0
•
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state all the variables expressed in per capita terms are constants and therefore their
steady state growth rates must be O5.
What one is now interested in, is how income growth behaves on the way to the steady
state. A convenient way to answer this question is to focus on the growth rate of capital
6Yk '
If we divide the Eq. (3.10) by k we obtain the growth rate of the per capita capital
stock:
Yk =s*f(k^-(n+x+8) (3.13)
Equation (3.13) says that yk equals the difference between two terms, s * f(k^ and
(n + x+ 8) . We can use the figure 3.2 to show the dynamics of the growth rate over the
time in the Solow-Swan model. In order to plot figure 3.2 we will give some features of
Eq. (3.13). The first term in the equation is the savings rate multiplied by the average
product of capital f(k^ . In the case of our Cobb- Douglas function this average
5 Note that, at all points in time, the growth rate of the level of a variable equals the per capita growth rate
plus n + x, so in the steady state capital and output grow at the same rhythm than population plus
technological change.
6 If the production function is of Cobb-Douglas type, studying the behaviour of the growth rate of per
capita capital will allow us to know both the growth rates of per capita output and per capita consumption.
This means that the growth rate of per capita output is proportional to the growth rate of per capita
capital. Moreover, per capita consumption is proportional to per capita output so the growth rate of
consumption equals the growth rate of output.
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product equals f(k^ = k"-' and therefore the per capita capital growth rate can be
rewritten as:
yk = ŝ * k-^'-"^ - (n + x + ^) (3.14)
In order to plot the savings curve, s* k-^'-"^ , against k we have to take into account
that:
i) It is a decreasing function for all of k
ii) Tends to infinity when k tends to cero
iii) Tends to zero when k tends to infinity
i.e, the savings curve take on infinity values when k is cero, it decreases all over the
time and it approaches to cero for high values of k. In figure 3.2 we plot the savings
curve and we label it by the initials SC.
The depreciation curve, (n + x+ S) , is independent of k and it is represented by a
horizontal line in the figure 3.2. This curve is label by the initials DC.
•
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k(O) poor k(O)rich k* k
Figure 3.2 Dynamics transition in the neo-classical model of
Solow-Swan (Adapted from Sala-i-Martin (2000))
Figure 3.2 shows that to the left of the steady state, the s * f(k^ curve lies above
(n + x+ 8) . Hence, the growth rate of k is positive, and k rises over time. As k
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increases, yk declines and approaches 0 as k approaches k* . The s* f(k^ curve gets
closer to the (n + x+ S) curve as k gets closer to k* ; hence, yk falls. The economy
tends asymptotically toward the steady state in which k do not change. An analogous
argument demonstrates that if the economy starts with k(0) > k*, then the growth rate
of k is negative, and k falls over time. Note from figure 3.2 that for k(0) > k`, the
(n + x+^) curve lies above the s* f(k^ and hence yk < 0. Thus the steady state
capital per person , k` , is stable.
We can study the behaviour of output throughout the transition. The growth rate of
output per capita is given by:
yy = k * f ^(k) * yk (3.15)
^(k)
,
where k* f(k^(k) is the share of capital, i.e. the share of rental income on capital
[k * f'(k)] in total income y= f(k) .
Equation 3.15 shows that the relation between yy and yk depends on the behaviour of
the share of capital. In the case of the Cobb-Douglas function, the share of capital is the
constant a, and yy is the fraction a of yk . Hence, the growth rate of per capita output
is given by:
•
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yy =a*Yk
so that
(3.16)
yy = a * ^s * k-^^-"^ - (n + x + ^)^ (3.17)
and therefore the prediction made by the Solow-Swan growth model is that the growth
rate of per capita income declines when the economy moves from a low per capita
income level, with a low stock of capital per person, to a higher income level and a
higher stock of capital before reaching its steady state income.
3.3 Convergence in the Neo-Classical Model of
G rowth
3.3.1 Theoretical concept
The neo-classical model of growth postulates the convergence of regional incomes.
Given the dynamics of this model of growth discussed in the previous section, one may
expect that in a set of economies, which have the same steady state per capita income,
and which differ only in their initial capital endowment per person and per capita
income, initially poor economies will grow faster than rich economies to converge
finally to the same per capita income. In the literature, the phenomenon that poorer
economies on average will grow faster than richer ones (over the long term) has been
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termed as ^3 - convergence. Such differential growth is necessary to reduce the
intercountry variation of per capita income levels. A tendency for the dispersion of per
capita incomes (as measured by their standard deviation) across a group of countries to
fall over time has been labelled 6- convergence. Clearly, progress in 6-convergence is
not only a function of the differential rates of growth between poorer and richer
countries but also of the size of the initial income gap.
^3 -convergence is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for 6-convergence'. ^3 -
convergence implies the existence of a longer-term catch-up mechanism, i.e forces
which work towards the narrowing of income differences across countries. These
forces, however, can be offset by temporary shocks which adversely (or, positively)
affect short-run growth performance. This is why the existence of ^3 -convergence may
not be fully reflected in changes of the dispersion of income levels8.
The basic kind of convergence to a common steady state is referred to as absolute
convergence (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1991, 1995; Sala-i-Martin 1996, de la Fuente
1995,Galor 1996, Seidel 1995). The assumption of a unique steady state will be only
satisfied if all economies have the same fundamental parameters with respect to the
saving rate s, population growth n, capital depreciation 8, and above all the same
' For a discussion of these convergence concepts see X. Sala-i-Martin (1996).
8 See R.Barro (199^) and P.Henin and Y.Le Pen (1995).
•
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level of technology A 9, i.e if they all have the same production function. The only
difference is in the endowment of capital.
The view that economic growth is a complex function of a wide range of interrelated
factors, over and above traditional factor inputs, has led some analysts to develop the
idea of conditional convergence. This remains within the neo-classical framework but
describes the tendency of countries to converge on their own long run equilibrium paths
as a function of a number of preconditions or "conditioning variables", i.e richer
economies converge towards a high level of income, whereas poor economies converge
towards a lower level income level (Ben-David 1994). Differential growth rates then
reflect the distance of countries from their own steady states10. This of course is a
concept of convergence which has a completely different meaning from that of
(absolute) ^3 -convergence. In the case of groups of countries with broadly similar long-
run equilibrium positions, there may be a tendency for (absolute) convergence within
such groups (Convergence clubs) but not between them^ ^.
9 It should be remembered that A(t) the level of technology in the neo-classical production function is
often interpreted in the sense of comprising institutional infrastructure and hence the effectiveness of
institutions and government systems as well.
10 G.Mankiw (1995), p.284.
^^ W. Baumol, (1986) comparing income levels in 1870 and 1979, identified a group of 16 advanced
economies in such a convergence club. It is noteworthy that he found also some tentative evidence for
club convergence among a group of the former centrally planned economies. A more restrictive form of
the "club convergence" hypothesis is the requirement that countries are broadly similar both as regards
their fundamental structural characteristics and their initial conditions. O. Galor (1996).
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3.3.2 A Measure of the Speed of Convergence
If an economy revels ^3 -convergence, it is important to know how fast the economy
converges to its steady state. This will be given by the rate of convergence ^(3 that can
be defined as the change in the growth rate when capital increases by one per cent.
Mathematically we can express this speed of convergence in the following way:
__ _ aYk
^ a log(k) (3.18)
To derive the convergence coefficient ^3 , the procedure suggested by Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1991,1992, 1995)12 and Sala-i-Martin (2000) is to consider a Taylor first order
log-linear approximation of the growth rate yk (Eq.3.14) in the neighbourhood of the
steady state k' (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995: 36-37 and Sala-i-Martin 2000: 44-45).
The Taylor approximation to Eq. (3.14) (expressing before yk as a function of log(k) )
yield to:
Yk = -(1- a) * s * e-^^-a^^o^ck•^ * ^log(k) - Log(k" )^ (3.19)
12 For a presentation see also D. Romer (1996), Durlauf and Quah (1998).
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Note that the value of s* e-^'-"^'°g^k^^ in the steady state is (n + x+ S) so substituting we
get:
yk = -(1- a) * (n + x + S) * ^log(k) - Log(k* )^ (3.20)
i.e the capital growth rate in the economy is inversely related with the initial level of
capital. As we have the growth rate yk expressed as a lineal function of log(k) it is
very easy to take the derivative to compute the speed of convergence ^3 :
^3=(1-a)*(n+x+^) (3.21)
One can directly derive the corresponding growth rate of output per capita using the
simple relationship between both growth rates in the case of Cobb-Douglas function:
yy = a * Yk (3.22)
log y * = a * lo
Y
substituting in (3.22) yields:
(k ) (3.23)
Yy _-(1- a) *(n + x+ 8) * log y y, (3.24)
yy _ -^3 * log y y, (3.25)
•
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This means that the convergence coefficient for per capita output y is the same as for
capital per person k. The convergence coefficient indicates how rapidly, at the given
growth rate and the existing income gap, an economy will reach its steady state with
k' and y` .
3.3.3 Convergence Time
To derive the convergence time for a given convergence rate ^3 , one has to consider
that Eq. (3.20) is a differential equation in log(k) with the solution:
log(k, ) _ (1- e-Q^` ) log(k` ) + e-^'' log(ko ) (3.26)
•
where ko denotes per capita capital at the beginning of a time period, k* is the steady
state capital and k, is an observation in between at time t.
The time t where k, is halfway between ko and k* satisfies the condition:
_^., 1
e =- (3.27)2
•
•
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Taking logs and solving with respect to t, the half life13 H is:
H =1og(2^ = 0.69^3
3.4 Methodologies of Convergence Analysis
(3.28)
Convergence studies can be pigeon-holed into three broad categories: Cross-Section
studies for absolute and conditional convergence, panel data analyses and Markov chain
analyses. The characteristics of each are sketched out here.
3.4.1 Cross-section estimation of convergence
3.4.1.1 Cross-section estimation of absolute convergence
Barro and Sala-i-Martin in their prominent paper entitled "Convergence" (Journal of
Political Economy, Vol. 100(2), April 1992, pp.223-249) estimate the absolute ^3
convergence on the basis of a univariate cross-country regression of per capita income
growth between year t and t+ T( log y;,^+^^
Y;,,
) on the initial level of per capita
13 This is a standard result from elementary physics, that the half-life (H) of a radioactive substance
decaying at the constant rate ^ is H= L^g(2) (this is useful because it is often difficult to
Q
establish when a substance has lost practically all of its activity and more easy to ascertain when half the
active material has disappeared).
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income ( y;, ). The steady state income per capita of an economy is y; , and x; is the
steady state growth rate of output, corresponding to the labour augmenting
technological progress. So the specified equation to test Q convergence would be:
./ - T *
1 T* log Y^,^+T
= x+(1- e )* log y^ + u;,,^+T (3.29)Y,,r T Yr,,
In practice, estimation is effected with the reduced form (Barro and Sala-i-Martin
1995:387, Sala-i-Martin 2000:202):
-Q*T
^ * log Y,,^+T y = a + (1- e ) * logLY^, ► ^+ u,r,^+T (3.30)
,,^ T
In this specification one does not find the steady state y* or the steady state growth rate
x. Both are contained in the intercept a:
-^i•T
a = x + (1- e ) * log(Y^ )T (3.31)
We work with this reduced form because neither the steady state of an economy nor its
steady state growth rate are known.
This specification states absolute convergence as it considers a common intercept a for
the set of economies that represents the steady state according to Eq.(3.31).
110
Chapter 3
3.4.1.2 Cross-section estimation of conditional convergence
The available empirical evidence does not support the universal convergence
hypothesis: there is no systematic tendency for poor economies to grow faster than
richer ones. In fact, the dominant feature has been for diverging productivity levels and
real per capita incomes between the group of advanced industrialized economies on the
one hand and the developing countries on the other14. There are, of course, some
significant exceptions, such as the east Asian growth rates. The general conclusion,
however, is that countries do not tend to converge to the same balanced growth path, but
rather settle on different ones. Such differences would lead to steady state differences.
Conditional convergence is estimated on the basis of a multivariate regression analysis,
with initial income and a set of "conditioning variables" X; as proxies for the
determinants of the long-term balanced growth path of the individual economies.
The equation to estimate is the following one:
-Q+T
^ * log Y;,,+T y = a + (I - e ) * 1ogLY;,^ ^+ X; + u;,,r+T (3.32)
,,r T
Conditional convergence exists if the coefficient on the initial income is negative. In
other words, in case of conditional convergence there is a negative partial correlation
between initial income per capita and subsequent growth.
14 For this empirical evidence see L.Pritchett (1997), C.Jones (1997), UNCTAD, Trade and Development
Report, (1997), Sala-i-Martin (2000).
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3.4.2 Panel data estimation of convergence
Region-specific effects can be modelled by employing panel data estimation techniques.
As a panel data estimation technique uses observations for several points in time, it
builds on a richer information set15.
The general econometric specification of a panel data model is the following one:
^ * log y '.r+T
/
,
= a; - 1 (1- e-Q+' ) * logLY;,r ^+ ^r,r+^• + u;r,r+^';,r T (3.33)
However in order to use OLS in the estimation, the coefficient 1(1- e-Q4' ) is changed
T
by a general coefficient b and the equation can be rewriten in the following way.
^ * log Y;,r+^^
/
,
= a; - b * 1ogLY;,r ^+ ^r,r+^' + Zl;r,r+l' (3.34)
;,r
where the expression for the error is made up of a; , an unobserved individual effect
which is constant over time, a time-specific factor yi,,r+,. which equally effects all
individuals, and a random error u;,,,+,. .
15 Islam (1995) and Canova and Marcet (1995) show that cross-section analysis lead to a systematic
downward bias of the convergence coefficient due this technique neglects unobservable factors and hence
suffers an omitted variable bias.
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The average growth rate between t and t+ T should be negatively related to the initial
logarithm of the per capita income level log(y;, ). This relationship is represented by
the common coefficient b. The region-specific fixed effect present over the whole
sample period, is captured by the term a; . The term t/i,,,+T represents the time-specific
effect affecting all individuals in period t , t+ T . This specification of the model means
that we estimate convergence by using a two-way fixed effects model (see Hsiao 1986
and Baltagi 1995).
The speed of convergence ^3 can be obtained from the following relationship between
the coefficients of log(y;, ) in Eq. (3.33) and (3.34):
/3 = - 1 ln(1 - Tb)
T
(3.35)
The region-specific fixed effect a; determines the region's steady state income. This
fixed effect is a concept which is similar to using explanatory variables or country
dummy variables in the conditional convergence analysis. The difference between this
method and the conditional convergence analysis is that panel data estimation allows
for continuous individual conditional effects while the former assumes to identify
groups of individual units.
With the time-specific effect yi, global shocks are captured.
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3.4.3 Markov Chain Models
Markov Chain models constitute a different approach to model convergence issues and
growth dynamics. They have been employed recently by Quah (1993) Magrini (1995),
Fingleton (1997, 1999) Durlauf and Quah (1998). The basic Markov Chain assumes
that, given I income-level states, each region has a probability p; (t) of being in state
i at time t, and given state i at time t, a transition probability m^ (t) of being in state
j at time t+ 1. By making the simplifying assumption that all transition probabilities
are unchanging over time, that is, that m^ (t) = m;^ for all t, ordering these stationary
probabilities as the I- by - I transition matrix M and denoting p; (t) as the time-
dependent elements of the 1- by - I row vector p(t) then
p(t + 1) = p(t) * M= P(0) * M' (3.36)
where M' denotes the product of t identical M matrices. A consequence of Eq. (3.36)
is the existence of an equilibrium probability I- by - I row vector s where
s = s * M (3.37)
•
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This vector s is the ergodic probability vector1ó to which each of the rows of M` tends
as t tends to infinity and thus describes the stochastic equilibrium- in other words, the
different output per capita level (state) probabilities to which the system converges
under a single model for the transition probabilities.
The use of Markov model implies that permanent interregional output per capita
differences may characterize the system of EU regions at equilibrium which is quite
unlike the equilibrium envisaged by basic neo-classical theory.
3.5 A Literature Review of the Convergence in Europe
In this section we summarize the main findings in the empirical income convergence
literature that looks at the European regions and is organized according to the different
methodologies employed in these studies (cross-section regressions, panel data
regressions and Markov chain models).
16 Ergodicity is a property of a Markov Chain in which there is a finite mean recurrence time for each
state, where the recurrence time is the time required for a first return to a state, and return is possible at
any time. The ergodic probability vector is often referred to as the equilibrium distribution for the Markov
chain but is preferred so as to distinguish it from the equilibrium of an economic system
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3.5.1 Cross-Section Studies
The convergence of the European Union regions, in the sense of ^(3 -convergence was
first studied by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991). These authors investigated convergence
since 1950 within seven EU countries, the founding countries and the UK. The authors
found that convergence in EC member states took place at a rate of ^3 =1.78 per cent
per annum from 1950 to 1985. Dividing the whole sample in sub periods they compute
a convergence rate of 2 per cent in the 1950s and 2.4 per cent in the 1960s and since
then a fall to 1.3 per cent in the 1970s and 1.1 per cent in the first half of the 1980s.
These convergence figures are computations of average speeds of convergence in all
European countries, however Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991) and Sala-i-Martin (1996)
found that UK and Spain were the countries with the highest speed of convergence (3
per cent and 2.3 per cent respectively) while in France, Germany and Italy the figures
were much lower (between 1 and 1.6 per cent).
In the above studies there are two points of particular interest:
First, the European countries have experienced ^(3 -convergence which slowed down
considerably in the 1980s compared to the l 960s.
Second, the evidence from selected EU countries suggests that there are different
convergence rates across countries.
The above studies have also show some drawbacks. These studies were confined to the
Northern EU-member states and of the cohesion countries was included only Spain.
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Further, convergence within member states was considered rather than convergence to a
common EU level.
These drawbacks, have been assimilated and a set of studies on regional convergence in
the EU have followed.
Neven and Gouyette (1994, 1995) investigate ^Q -convergence for all NUTS II level
EU-regions for the period 1980-89, regarding the development of the relative per capita
income (income in terms of the EU-average) from the Eurostat-Regio database. They
find a convergence rate for all EU regions for the 1980s of 1.1 per cent. Moreover these
authors observe that there are strong differences in the pattern of convergence across
sub periods (^3 = 2 per cent in the first half of eighties and ^3 = 0.42 per cent in the
second half of eighties) and across subsets of regions (The South of Europe seems to
catch up in the early eighties and it stagnates, at best, in the second part of the eighties.
The regions in the North of Europe on the other hand tend to stagnate or diverge in the
first part of the eighties but converge strongly thereafter). This pattern is consistent with
the view that Northern European countries have adjusted better to the main change in
the policy regime which occured in the mid eighties, namely the implementation of the
internal market programme and the entry of Spain in the Community in 1985. In these
authors'view this evidence also lends support to the view that trade liberalization can
exacerbate disparities. They also point out that the distinction between the North and
South of the European Community is likely to be more relevant in the analysis of
growth patterns than the distinction between the centre and the periphery. Moreover,
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one of the possible reasons for the lack of convergence after 1985 in Southern regions
could be that the population in these regions responds much more slowly to wage and
unemployment differences.
Button and Pentecost (1995) analyse the degree of convergence of Western European
regional economies (NUTS I level regions from the former 9 EC member states) since
the mid-1970s when the larger European Union was established. They found that with
simple model specificátions ^3 -convergence had occurred (more in the 1970s than in
the 1980s). They further showed that, using a more complete model, which included
structural variables, country dummies and an ERM dummy, no significant convergence
had occurred across European Union's regions in the 1980s.
Fagerberg and Verspagen ( 1996) investigate ^l3 -convergence of per capita GDP for a
sample of 70 NUTS I/NUTS II regions covering the six original EU Member States.
They found that there was a slow but steady reduction of differences in GDP per capita
across European Union regions during most of the post-war period (1950-1970 with
^(3 =1.8 per cent ) but, they found that there had been a dramatic slowing down in this
trend in the seventies, eighties and nineties (^(3 = 0.5 per cent from 1970 to 1990). Their
findings support the idea of a"Europe at different speeds" with at lest three different
"Growth clubs" characterized by different dynamics, productivity and unemployment
levels.
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However we have to interpret their findings very cautiously because of the various data
sets employed in their study.
Fingleton et al. (1996) analyse unconditional and conditional convergence rates
between two sub periods 1975-1987 and 1987-1993 for the former EU 12 regions at
level NUTS II. Their unconditional convergence model shows that there has been faster
convergence taking place since 1987 (coinciding with the advent of the Single Market
Programme) with a convergence rate of about 0.5 per cent per annum compared with
about 0.3 per cent per annum prior to 1987 but this rate does not differ significantly
from 0.
In their conditional convergence estimates they use a full set of control and state
variables for which data are available (see pages 107 and 108) and found that the
conditional rate of convergence is slower post-1987 (more precisely /3 =1 per cent per
annum in 1975-1987 and ^= 0.5 per cent per annum in 1987-1993).
Tondl (1997, 1999) provides an assessment of the regional convergence process
between the Western European regions since the 1950s. In particular she studies
whether or not there is sufficient evidence of regional convergence and whether
convergence is a phenomenon which is limited to the core EC regions or rather, if it
encompasses Europe's Southern and Northern regions as well. Her findings showed that
the speed of convergence among the core EC regions was of about 2 per cent per annum
and was particularly pronounced between them from the early 1960s to 1973. From the
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mid sixties until 1973, non EC regions converged strongly with EC member regions.
Since the mid-seventies convergence has slowed down to 1 per cent per annum and
between 1980 and 1986, for the whole group of European regions there has been more
divergence than convergence. During the latter period, club-convergence appeared and
differences in individual steady state income became more pronounced. From 1986,
regional convergence again reappeared on a global scale as the prevalent dynamic and
weakened the evidence for club-convergence. She also found that from 1975 regional
convergence was higher between the Northern EC regions and EFTA regions than
between the Northern EC regions and the Southern regions.
Button and Pentecost (1999) study convergence across EU regions focusing on why
some slower regions within EU countries are catching up with the pace setters while
others are not.
Maurseth (2001) analyses the convergence process in the eighties and nineties showing
that convergence re-emerged at the end on the 1980s and in the 1990s being a
combination of poor regions catching up with richer ones, peripheral regions growing
faster than central ones combined with innovation and technological spillovers.
Moreover convergence was most pronounced between the regions that were localized at
a significant distance from each other and that were dissimilar in terms of innovative
activity, technological specialization and the amount of spillovers received.
120
Chapter 3
Boldrin and Canova (2001), using data for NUTS2 regions for EU15 whenever it was
available and by resorting to the NUTS I level only when carrying out the analysis at
the lower levels was impossible, look for evidence of either divergence or a
convergence process in per capita income, labour productivity and unemployment rates
over the period 1980-1996. Their results are not supportive of ^3 -convergence for
regional per capita income. They have estimated different specifications for the equation
^ log(y; ) = a; +/3 log(yt_T )+ E' along different sub samples and sub periods, using
both per capita GDP (185 regions) and Labour productivity (101 regions), in absolute
value, in logs and scaled by national or European averages with and without national
dummies. When y; is per capita GDP, the point estimate ^3 is always either positive or
statistically insignificant, or both. When, instead, y; is labour productivity, the point
estimate of /3 is both negative and statistically significant.
Giannetti (2002) carries out several cross-section analysis over the period 1980-1992
testing for conditional convergence". The author's sample covers 108 regions, NUTS 0
are represented by Denmark and Ireland, Nuts I by Belgium, Germany, Great Britain
and the Netherlands and NUTS II by Greece, Portugal, Spain and France.
The author estimates conditional convergence first for all of the regions and then for sub
samples of industrialized regions, regions specialized in traditional sectors, objective 1
"This paper is mainly theoretical in which the author explores the effect of integration between two
symmetric countries characterized by strong regional disparities that originate from a lower productivity
in the high-tech sector.
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regions and regions that are not objective 1 finding results supportive of the existence
of convergence clubs based on regional specialization.
With respect to regional convergence within countries, a number of studies testing for
convergence have appeared recently. In Spain, Dolado et al. (1994), Mas et al. (1994)
García-Greciano et al. (1995), Mas et al. (1995), Sala-i-Martín (1996), Cuadrado-
Roura et al. (1998), García-Greciano and Raymond Bara (1999), Lamo (2000), for Italy
Paci and Pigliaru (1995) , Fabiani and Pellegrini (1997), Casini-Benvenuti et al. (1999),
Bianchi and Menegatti (1999),Terrasi (1999)18, for Germany Herz and Rijger (1995),
Seitz (1995), Funke and Strulik (1999), Niebuhr (2001)19 for Austria Hofer and
Wórg^tter (1997), for Great Britain Chaterij and Dewhurst (1996), for Greece
Siriopoulos and Asteriou (1998), Petrakos and Saratsis (2000), Asteriou et al.
(2002)20and for Sewden, Persson (1997).
3.5.2 Panel Data Studies
A number of studies have estimated convergence equations in which conditioning for
the existence of different steady states is taken care of.
18In this paper regional convergence of per capita GDP is analysed using the Theil coefficient of
concentration.
19In this paper the approach to the study of regional income convergence is using spatial econometric
methods
20 In this paper the convergence hypothesis was tested using time series techniques
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Canova and Marcet (1995) studied the issue of income convergence along NUTS II
level regions from 9 member states over the period 1980-1992. For each country and
region and using a Bayesian model a steady state is estimated. The collection of steady
states is regressed against the initial conditions of each country/region. The estimated
value of the slope Q in this second regression should tell us whether inequality will be
reduced or eliminated ( Qi < 1) or if, instead, it will increase ( > 1). Using this
method they found convergence to its own steady-state income level is much faster
than previously estimated (for instance convergence happens at a rate as high as 80 per
cent in the North of Portugal and some Greek regions), but that cross-sectional
differences persist: inequalities will only be reduced to very small degree over time. The
cross-country distribution of the steady state is largely explained by the cross-sectional
distribution of initial incomes, so poor regions have lower steady state incomes than
rich regions.
Fingleton et at. (1996) used a panel data to analyse ^3 - convergence at the level of
member states for EU 12 over the period 1975-1987 and 1987-1993. In the simple
regressions for unconditional /.3 - convergence they found a positive /.3 coefficient for
the first period (1975-1987) and negative coefficient for the second (1987-1993) but
neither was significant. Fingleton et al. also made variations of the basic regression
equation introducing more explanatory variables (dummies for countries, dummy for
the introduction of the Single Market Programme, intensity of R&D, investment ratios,
etc) finding a negative coefficient on the starting level of GVA per capita which is
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consistent with the view that a general process of convergence, conditional on other
elements has been proceeding in the last twenty years among European countries.
Tondl (1997) analysed convergence for the regions of EU 15 in subsequent intervals in
the period 1975-1994. Tondl found a convergence rate ^i of 21 per cent for the whole
period implying that regions would be halfway from their steady income in 3.3 years.
Tondl also investigated convergence in different sub periods on the ground of the
business cycle argument. For the period 1975-1980, estimation showed a convergence
rate ^3 of 21 per cent. Thereafter, in the period 1980-1986 the convergence coefficient
soared to 82 per cent. However as region-specific effects are much more disperse in this
period than before (the standard deviation of steady state incomes triples vis-á-vis its
value in 1975-1980), this indicates that regions showed strong convergence towards
now more dispersed, individual steady state incomes and regions converge very fast to
those different levels. In the period 1986-1992, she showed that convergence dropped to
a still lower level of 60 per cent and the deviation of steady states narrowed again. Her
interpretation was that the structural parameters determining long-term income have
improved with many poorer regions, and general structural changes raised the common
level of long-run income.
Gaulier et aL (1999) applied a modified Evans and Karras (1996) testing procedure to
three samples (Europe, OECD and World). Gaulier et al. proposed a nested test
procedure to characterize various convergence processes absolute or conditional, with
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or without a common speed of convergence. They found evidence supporting the
existence of an absolute and common convergence process for per capita GDP in the
European Union for the period 1960-1990.
Philippe (1999) in his paper revealed the slow convergence process and the disparities
of the catching-up through European space.
Beine et al. ( l 999) also applied Evans and Karras (1996) testing procedure and the
variant proposed by Gaulier et al. (1999). Their empirical results do not support the club
convergence hypothesis. They suggested that the specialization process induced by the
setting up of the European economic and monetary integration takes place more at the
regional rather at the national level.
Bj^rkstén (2000) analysed convergence using a panel data for a sample of 18 European
Countries (EU 15 plus Iceland, Norway and Switzerland) over the period 1971-1997.
The regression was estimated including fixed effects'coefficients that allowed him to
test for the existence of systematic differences across countries. When the countries are
listed according to the sizes of the fixed effects coefficients, they appeared to break into
three groupings which represent three convergence clubs within Europe. However the
author's conclusion is cautionary, warning against over-interpreting the fixed
coefficients. Fixed effects include institutional factors and there is a trend toward
convergence in these as well as Europe becomes an ever closer group of nations.
•
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Boldrin and Canova (2001), using data of NUTS I/ NUTS2 regions for EU 15 and
applying the same procedure than Canova and Marcet (1995) found a value of ^3 of
0.98 when per capita GDP is the variable of interest. Their estimations showed that
the ^3 value varied significantly from zero, but was indistinguishable from one
(estimated standard deviation of ^3 was 0.02). These results showed little or no
convergence in per capita income.
Giannetti (2002) carried out a panel data analysis over the period 1980-1992 and tested
for conditional convergence. The author's sample covers 108 regions among the
NUTS 0, Nuts I and NUTS II levels chosen for her study.
The author estimates conditional convergence for all regions and for sub samples of
industrialized regions, regions specialized in traditional sectors, objective 1 regions and
regions that are not objective 1 finding results supportive of the existence of
convergence clubs based on regional specialization
Studies of convergence using panel data for single countries are those of De la Fuente
(2002) for Spain, Funke and Strulik ( 1999) for Germany, Button and Pentecost (1999)
for UK.
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3.5.3 Studies based on Markov Chains
Some authors addressed the issue of convergence using a different econometric
methodology, i.e. by applying Markov chain analysis to study intra-distribution
dynamics of income and its long-term distribution. Quah (1996), Fingleton (1997,
1999), Magrini (1999), Cheshire and Magrini (2000), applied this concept to investigate
convergence of European regions.
Quah (1996) investigated regional income distribution dynamics of NCTTS II level
regions in the 1980s for 6 member states. Looking at the density functions of the per
capita income (relative to the EU average) he shows that the regional income
distributions fluctuate over time becoming more concentrated around the mean in the
second half of the eighties. The standard deviation of income fell from 0.27 in 1980 to
0.25 in 1989. Quah fitted a Markov chain model to the observed sequence of income
distribution, dividing income into 5 levels. The resulting ergodic probability vector,
i.e. the limiting income distribution is uni-modal around the mean, indicating that
regional incomes would converge towards a tighter income distribution. The transition
probability matrix estimated by Quah suggested that a number of regions changed their
relative income rank. Poor regions moved to a higher income classes and vice versa
(probability to move out of the income class stood at about 10 per cent)
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Fingleton (1996, 1997, 1999) looked at the evidence of convergence and the nature of
that convergence for NUTS II regions in the EU15 over the period 1975-1995 using the
Cambridge Econometrics'European regional databank. Income-level states are divided
into four categories (poor, below mean, above mean and rich).The main focus of his
paper is on the estimation and diagnostic testing of various Markov chain models, and
on the alternative methods for the Markov transition matrix.
Fingleton applies a pure-symmetric model21 and a quasi-symmetric mode122 for the
European regions testing if they fit the distribution dynamics. In the case of the pure-
symmetric model, the ergodic probability vector of this model suggests that the EU
regions would always include a share of 20 per cent of poor regions which have a
relative income of below 75 per cent of the average, 25 per cent would have an income
level of below the mean, 37 per cent would have an income level above the mean and
16 per cent would have an income level above 125 per cent of EU average (Fingleton
1999: 29, Table 5). Moreover, in this model the estimated transition probability matrix
indicates that a region has a 9 per cent chance of becoming rich, and a rich region has a
31 per cent chance of losing income (Fingleton 1997: 397, Table 6). In the case of the
quasi-symmetric model, the equilibrium income distribution has a lower proportion of
poor regions of 4 per cent, and the highest frequency is in the above average income
Z' Pure symmetric model implies that the transition probability p; j= p j ; and the frequencies in
income classes remain constant over time, although switching income classes occurs.
22
uasi-s mmetric model im I^es that but no constant income distributionQ Y P^ P,, j- P j,^ ,
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class at 48 per cent (Fingleton 1999: 29, Table 5). However, it would take more than
300 years until to reach this limiting distribution.
Magrini (1999) Cheshire and Magrini (2000), focussed on the cross-sectional
distribution of per capita income modelling the growth process as a time homogeneous
Markov chain and applying it to the per capita income data for 122 EU functional
regions (FURs) in EU12 over the period 1979-1990. Magrini uses 11 income states to
model the transition behaviour. He derives those number of income states from a
statistical test procedure which aims to determine the appropriate size of an income
class. The results of his analysis suggested that the process of economic growth at work
in the European Union during the 1980s was characterised by a tendency towards
divergence. In particular, six of the FURs, Diisseldorf, Hamburg, Stuttgard, Miinchen,
Paris and Frankfurt showed a tendency to grow away from the rest of the European
regions, with the stationary distribution corresponding to these other regions polarised
into two large groups (with two classes below the mean income class and two classes
above)
Application of Markov chain models to study convergence for single countries are
those of Pekkala (1999) and Kángasharju (1999) for Finland.
Finally, Tables (3.1), (3.2) and (3.3) summarizes the main studies on the convergence of
EU regions taking into account the three methodologies discussed above.
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Table 3.1: Cross-Section Studies of EU regions
Author/s Year Region's Period ^3 Remarks
sam te
Barro/Sala-i-Martin 1991 EC-6 +UK 1950-1985 1.8 Convergence
NUTS I/II Within countries
Neven/Gouyette 1994 EU-12 NUTS 1980-1989 1.1 Conditional
II Convergence
Button/Pentecost 1994 EU-9 NUTS I 1975-1990 2.8 Conditional
Convergence
Fagerberg/Verspagen 1996 EC-6 NUTS 1950-1970 1.8 Conditional
I/NUTS II 1970-1990 0.5 Convergence
Fingleton et al. 1996 EU-12 NUTS 1975-1987 1.8 Considers spatial
II 1987-1993 0.5 autocorrelation
Tondl 1997 EU-9 NUTS I/ 1950-1973 2.7 Conditional
NUTS II Convergence
Tondl 1999 EU-15 NUTS 1975-1980 1.3 EC core vs.
II 1980-1986 0.5 periphery,
1986-1992 1.2 Euro e Total
Boldrin and Canova 2001 EU-15 1980-1996 No convergence
NUTS II
Giannetti 2002 EU-10 NUTS 1980-1992 Conditional
0/NUTS Convergence
I/NUTS II
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Table 3.2: Panel data Studies of EU regions
Author/s Year Region's Period /3 Remarks
sam le
Canova and Marcet 1995 EU-9 1980-1992 Individual
NUTS II convergence
coefficient
Fingleton et al. 1996 EU-12 1975-1987 Conditional
NUTS II 1987-1993 Convergence
Tondl 1997 EU-15 1975-1994 Average
1994 NUTS II convergence
coefficient
Gaulier et al. 1999 Absolute
Convergence
B j ^rkstén 2000 EU-15 +3 1971-1997 Convergence
NUTS II clubs
Boldrin and Canova 2001 EU-15 1980-1996 No convergence
NUTS I/NUTS
II
Giannetti 2002 EU-10 1980-1992 Convergence
NUTS 0/NUTS Clubs
I/NUTS II
Table 3.3: Markov Chain Studies of EU regions
Author/s Year Region's Period Limiting distribution
sam le
Quah 1986 EU-6 1980-1990 Uni-modal
NUTS II
Fingleton et al. 1997 EU-15 1975-1995 Highest frequency
1999 NUTSII equilibrium in middle
income
Magrini 1999 EU-12 1979-1990 Distribution divides: rich
FURs club, rest bi-modal
•
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3.6 The Data Set
We analyse regional convergence in Western Europe by using two different series of
data. These data sets are used separately in order to avoid biases stemming from
differences in the accounting systems employed in each of them (ESA79 and ESA95)23.
Some studies (e.g Barro and Sala-i-Martín 1991,1995; Leonardi 1995) sometimes mix
data from different data sets, which leads to a problem of data inconsistency.
For the investigation of the regional convergence in the period 1980-1997 we use data
provided by the statistical office of the European Commission (EUROSTAT- REGIO)
data base, which gives gross domestic product per capita (GDP p.c.) in different units
(ECUS, EURO and PPS) and at different levels of desegregation (NUTS I, NUTS II,
NUTS III) for the fifteen European Union member states. This data set is based on the
European System of Accounts ESA79. In reference to the availability of data for the
NUTS II regions, commonly used in the studies of European regional convergence,
there is no information for East Germany until 1991 and for some regions such as
Chemnitz, Dresden and Leipzig until 1993. In the case of non-mainland France
(Guadeloupe, Martinique, Guiana and Reunion) the data provides observations for a
single point in time: 1994. In the case of the Netherlands the data does not provide
23 The main differences between ESA95 and ESA79 are the following: the inclusion of balance sheets;
the introduction of a subsectoring of households; the introduction of a new concept of final consumption:
actual final consumption; the introduction of the concepts of economically active population and
unemployment; the clear choice in favour of valuing output at basic prices
•
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observations at NUTS II level for Overijssel, Gelderland and Flevoland. In the case of
Austria, Finland and the Portuguese islands the data provides observations for 1987
onwards. There are data for observations for Sweden from 1985. Finally, in the case of
the United Kingdom, data became available in 1981. As it stated above there are some
missing values, so some changes were necessary in order to have a larger time-series
sample for the regions. In some cases we have to use the data available for a higher
aggregate level as is the case of the data for United Kingdom.
For the convergence analysis for the period 1995-1999 we use data of all the NUTS II
regions in the EU15, data which is also provided by the Eurostat-Regio database but in
this case figures for the GDP are based on the new accounting system (ESA95).
The data sets are only used separately as they are based on different accounting systems.
We checked the comparison of the GDP figures based on ESA79 and ESA95 in the time
periods where the dataset overlap (1995,1996,1997) and for several regions the changes
were very important. In some cases we found values of the GDP based on ESA95 that
were 14.84% lower than the same values based on ESA79 as was the case of
Luxembourg for the year 1995. In other cases the GDP values based on ESA95 were
over 30% higher than these values computed under ESA 79 for Sterea Ellada, the
region of Brussels, for example. This prevents us from forming an aggregate data set in
order to create a larger time series for the regions.
In our analysis we use the GDP data standardized by purchasing power parities at
constant 1985 prices (The use of PPPs, common in international comparison has the
133
The neo-classical model of growth and the convergence process in Europe
effect that poorer countries' per capita incomes becomes higher than with current
exchange rates).
In order to find an appropriate division of the 1980-1997 period covered by the Eurostat
regio database based on ESA79 for the convergence analysis, the time series of growth
rates were examined for turning points. It turned out that the selection of the periods
1980-1988, 1989-1992 and 1994-1997 would best satisfy the criteria to cover a similar
cyclical path across regions in a subperiod. As regional growth rates slipped globally
back in 1993 and during the following period due to a deceleration in the business
cycle, the second subperiod only goes up to 1992. Moreover this division is compatible
with the analysis of the impact that the new European Union regional policy has on the
speed of convergence and the catch up process of the objective 1 regions to the average
levels of European Union. The programming periods24 of the structural funds after their
reform, takes in the years 1989-1994 for the first Delors package and 1995-1999 for
the second Delors package. Due to the goals that the structural funds and the regional
policy pursue in the objective 1 regions the results of our convergence regressions
should be related to this structural policy.
Z4 The most recent programming period takes in the years 2000-2006 and is the so called agenda 2000.
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3.7 European Regional Convergence Process, 1982-
1999
3.7.1 Results from cross-section regression analysis of European
Regional Convergence
For the period 1982-1997 we can find evidence for ^3 -convergence among both the
regions of EU925 and the regions of EU1226. The estimation of the cross-section
regression analysis yielded a speed of convergence, ^3 , for the EU9 regions of 1.15%
and 1.04 % for EU12. The parameters of the regression are highly significant. The
results of the estimation are reported in table 3.4 for EU9 and 3.5 for EU 12. Both
estimates fully explain the relationship reflected by RZ of 0.46 and 0.45. In this period
the relationship between initial per capita income of a region and its growth rate is
negative (figures 3.3 and 3.4).
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show the rather negative performance of the French regions
throughout the period 1982-1997. This fact leads us to include a dummy variable for the
French regions in order to provide a control for differences in steady states. The
negative and highly significant "t" statistic for this dummy variable coefficient
indicates a lower than average steady state income for those regions.
25 EU9 comprises all regions in the first nine EC member states, i.e. the formation of 1973
Z6 EU 12 refers to all regions in the EU9 plus the regions from Greece (EC accession in 1981), Spain and
Portugal (EC accession 1986)
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Table 3.4 Convergence of EU9 regions 1982-1997
Dependent Variable: Average Growth Rate 1982-1997
Method: Least Squares
Included observations: 97
Estimated Equation:
_Q.T
1 ^ * log Y,,^+T
= a + ^1- e - ^ * log^,,^ ^+ X, + u;^,^+T
.v,,t T
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.112327 0.029543 3.802149 0.0003
LNY82 -0.010603 0.003182 -3.331831 0.0012
DFR -0.013632 0.001672 -8.154059 0.0000
R-squared 0.457830 Mean dependent var 0.010799
Adjusted R-squared 0.446295 S.D. dependent var 0.009262
S.E. of regression 0.006892 Akaike info criterion -7.086535
Sum squared resid 0.004465 Schwarz criterion -7.006905
Log likelihood 346.6969 F-statistic 39.68870
Durbin-Watson stat 1.834859 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Dataset: EUROSTAT
ESA79
Estimation in Eviews
0.05
0. 04
0.03
0. 02
0.01
0-
-0.018
-0.02 ^
-0.03
Figure 3.3: Regional Convergence in EU9
1982-1997
5
•
• :
• ; •
•
+
Be
DE
I n
^ R
n -• ^ s ^
n •
• ; ^n ^, `j
9
x pKj
^ F R ^'
• IE ^^
• IT
9.5 10 10.5 + LU
- NL
_ ^
^ ^K
Log of 1982 Per Capita GDP
(PPS at 1985 prices)
136
Chapter 3
Table 3.5 Convergence of EU12 regions 1982-1997
Dependent Variable: Average Growth Rate 1982-1997
Method: Least Squares
Included observations: 133
Estimated Equation:
1 ^ ^ ^og
Va
Yr,^+T
Y,,t
riable
(1- e-
= a +
T
Coefficient
^
T )
* log^,, + uu.r+T
Std. Error t-Statistic r b.
C 0.103407 0.019008 5.440311 0.0000
LNY82 -0.009662 0.002081 -4.643286 0.0000
D F R -0.013454 0.001689 -7.966336 0.0000
R-squared 0.446568 Mean dependent var 0. 012710
Adjusted R-squared 0.438054 S.D. dependent var 0. 009443
S.E. of regression 0.007079 Akaike info criterion -7. 041 052
Sum squared resid 0.006515 Schwarz criterion -6.975857
Log likelihood 471.2300 F-statistic 52 .44898
Durbin-Watson stat
Dataset: EUROSTAT
ESA79
Estimation in Eviews
1.670294 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Figure 3.4: Regional Convergence in EU12
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On analysing the output of the estimation, we find that the group of EU9 regions has on
average a growth rate of around 1% throughout the entire period. However, on
comparing these regions with those of Spain, Greece and Portugal, one notes that the
average growth rates of this group was higher, almost 1.3%. Hence the catching-up of
the Southern European regions, may be deemed to be positive during this period.
The following set of analyses allows us to widen the investigation for regional
convergence in the European Union for the period 1982-1997. First, we divided the
entire period into the following subperiods 1982-1986, 1986-1992 and 1992-1997. This
subdivision facilitates several objectives. On the one hand it best satisfies a similar
cyclical path across regions in a subperiod, while on the other, allow us to analyse
whether or not the "new" European Union regional policy has boosted the convergence
process in the European Union.
A view on figures 3.5 and 3.6 reveals that in the period 1982-1986 the negative
relationship between initial income and growth rates does not hold, thus indicating a
clear non-convergence pattern for all of the regions both in EU9 and EU12 from 1982 to
1986. Moreover, the average growth rates reflect almost total stagnation (close to 0% in
1982-1986). On focusing more closely on certain regions, we find that there are several
points that are worthy of inention: First the French regions are clearly under performers
during this period, and a negative correlation between the initial levels of per capita
GDP and growth rates is not detectable for these regions. This is also true of the
regions of Italy Greece and Portugal. The regions of Spain, the Netherlands and
s
138
Chapter 3
Belgium however reflect a clearly negative correlation between the initial levels of per
capita GDP and subsequent growth rates.
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In our period of regional convergence analysis, the period 1987-1992 is when regional
convergence began. Figure 3.7 reflects this negative relationship between initial income
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and growth rates. This figure suggests that Portugal has set off with high growth rates.
At the same time, the "fit" of the regions of the cohesion countries into the common
convergence path is quite good.
Figure 3.7: Regional Convergence in EU12
1987-1992
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The results of the cross-section regression estimate of absolute ^3 convergence (table
3.6) show that convergence among the EU 12 regions has taken place at a rate of 1.8%
per annum. However the low RZ could be due to the fact that the European Union
economies converge to different steady states, associated with different levels of initial
income. The regions with low levels of income may be converging to their own steady
states, whereas those regions with high levels of initial income are doing the same but to
a high steady state position.
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Table 3.6: Convergence of EU12 regions 1987-1992
Dependent Variable: Average Growth Rate 1987-1992
Method: Least Squares
Included observations: 166
Estimated equation:
* l Y;,;+r
_Q.T
= + ^l - e ^ * 1 ^+og^ Y;,,
a oglY,,r u;r,;+^^T
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.184763 0.036079 5.121096 0.0000
LNY87 -0.017840 0.003925 -4.545858 0.0000
R-squared 0.111905 Mean dependent var 0.020831
Adjusted R-squared 0.106489 S.D. dependent var 0.015041
S.E. of regression 0.014217 Akaike info criterion -5.656751
Sum squared resid 0.033149 Schwarz criterion -5.619257
Log likelihood 471.5103 F-statistic 20.66483
Durbin-Watson stat 0.842246 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000011
Dataset: EUROSTAT
ESA79
Estimation in Eviews
Taking into account the possibility of different steady states among the European Union
economies, we re-estimate our initial specification by including dummy variables for
the countries of the European Union. Another important reason to use dummy variables
in regional growth analyses is derived from the possibility of spatial correlation
patterns. It is very likely that a region's growth is influenced by that of neighbouring
regions. Fingleton (1995) suggests using a spatially auto correlated errors model in
order to cope with this obstacle. The use of dummy variables is an alternative
approximation method for absorbing spatial correlation. To this new specification we
add eleven dummy variables27 for the regression of absolute ^3 -convergence. The
dummy variables take the value of 1 for all the regions in the country for which we are
27 Obviously, we exclude one country dummy to avoid multicolineality problems.
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defining the dummy and the value 0 for the remaining regions of the remaining
countries. This specification provides the same results as those derived from the
Geographical conditioning a la Quah28.
The results of this conditional ^(3 -convergence cross-section regression for EU12 are
shown in table 3.7. By comparing this estimation with the previous one, we find that the
speed of convergence is almost the same with ^3 reaching 1.77% in the case of the
latter. The estimate of ^3 shows that there is convergence among the EU12 regions.
Ireland and Spanish regions towards the bottom of the income scale performed above
average. So did German and Portuguese regions, but Greece, French and UK regions
fell behind. The coefficients of the country dummy variables show the differences in
steady states of these countries'regions.
28 In the Geographical conditioning a la Quah the dummy variables take the value 1 for each region that
geographically borders with other regions and the value 0 for the remaining ones.
•
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Table 3.7: Conditional Convergence of EU12 regions
1987-1992
Dependent Variable: Average Growth Rate 1987-1992
Method: Least Squares
Included observations: 166
Estimated equation:
*l y'^'+'^ = (1- e-R^^ )+ *l ^+X +u^ o
g Y; ^
oa
T g
. .;,^ , ,^,,+T
Variable
,
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C
LNY87
DDE
DES
DFR
DGR
D I E
DSIT
DLU
DNL
DP
DDK
DUK
.
0.181175 0.04073
-0.016996 0.00434
0.007823 0.00260
0.001839 0.00342
-0.009808 0.00282
-0.009512 0.00431
0.033548 0.00986
-0.010120 0.00423
0.029982 0.00965
-0.008739 0.00337
0.021886 0.00566
-0.016302 0.00960
-0.018477 0.00261
5 4.447668
6 -3.910842
6 3.001615
2 0.537378
7 -3.469862
1 -2.206289
1 3.402187
0 -2.392464
2 3.106119
3 -2.590964
9 3.860460
0 - 1.698151
7 -7.059241
0.0000
0.0001
0.0031
0.5918
0.0007
0.0289
0.0009
0.0179
0.0023
0.0105
0.0002
0.0915
0.0000
R-squared 0.638086 Mean dependent var 0.020831
Adjusted R-squared 0.609701 S.D. dependent var 0.015041
S.E. of regression 0.009396 Akaike info criterion -6.421894
Sum squared resid 0.013509 Schwarz criterion -6.178184
Log likelihood 546.0172 F-statistic 22.47939
Durbin-Watson stat 1.742182 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Dataset: EUROSTAT
ESA79
Estimation in Eviews
Our final sample period of analysis using the EUROSTAT-REGIO database (ESA79)
was 1993-1997. This period corresponds to the economic recovery, with average growth
rates in the EU12 which were higher than 2.5% per annum. The analysis carried out is
similar to that which was carried out for the period 1987-1992. First we éstimated
absolute ^3 convergence (Table 3.8) and then re-estimate our initial specification while
conditioning for the differences in the steady states of the European countries by
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including dummy variables (Table 3.9). The results obtained for absolute ^3
convergence are fairly similar to those obtained for the previous period and reflect a
convergence speed of about 1.9% per annum. On conditioning for differences in the .
steady states the speed of convergence is about 2.3%.
Table 3.8: Convergence of EU12 regions 1993-1997
Dependent Variable: Average Growth Rate 1993-1997
Method: Least Squares
Included observations: 178
Estimated equation:
1 T* log Y;,^+r
= a+ 7, * logLY;,r ^+ u;^,^+•r^^ (1- e-^*r )v;,,
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.193355 0.043931 4.401362 0.0000
LNY94 -0.018142 0.004744 -3.824404 0.0002
R-squared 0.076726 Mean dependent var 0.025419
Adjusted R-squared 0.071481 S.D. dependent var 0.017881
S.E. of regression 0.017230 Akaike info criterion -5.273163
Sum squared resid 0.052249 Schwarz criterion -5.237413
Log likelihood 471.3115 F-statistic 14.62607
Durbin-Watson Stat 0.822902 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000182
Dataset: EUROSTAT
ESA79
Estimation in Eviews
•
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Table 3.9: Conditional Convergence of EU12 regions
1993-1997
Dependent Variable: Average Growth Rates 1993-1997
Method: Least Squares
Included observations: 178
Estimated equation:
* l y;,r+T =
-Q•T
+ ^l - e ^ * 1 ^+ + uX^ og y
^,r
a
T
oglY;,, ; ;r,r+ T
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C
LNY94
DDE
DES
DFR
DGR
DIE
DSIT
DLU
DNL
DP
DDK
DUK
0.247960
-0.023765
-0.006087
-0.002347
-0.026141
-0.012311
0.035262
-0.013609
0.015633
0.023109
0.007917
0.019335
0.008510
0.042085
0.004436
0.003110
0.004048
0.003586
0.004910
0.012026
0.005218
0.012139
0.004214
0.005730
0.011991
0.003322
5.891846
-5.357760
- 1.957012
-0.579923
-7.289129
-2.507258
2.932025
-2.608048
1.287772
5.483995
1.381698
1.612563
2.561823
0.0000
0.0000
0.0520
0.5628
0.0000
0.0131
0.0038
0.0099
0.1996
0.0000
0.1689
0.1088
0.0113
R-squared 0.598294 Mean depend ent var 0.025419
Adjusted R-squared 0.569079 S.D. depende nt var 0.017881
S.E. of regression 0.011738 Akaike info criterion -5.981772
Sum squared resid 0.022733 Schwarz criterion -5.749395
Log likelihood 545.3777 F-statistic 20.47900
Durbin-Watson stat 1.655734 Prob(F-statist ic) 0.000000
Dataset: EUROSTAT
ESA79
Estimation in Eviews
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Finally, figure 3.8 illustrates the convergence process in the EU12 for 1993-1997.
Figure 3.8: Regional Convergence in the EU12
1993-1997
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Among the EU 15 regions, convergence was slightly higher than in the EU 12 with
absolute ^3 convergence reaching 2% in the period 1987-1992 and 1.9% in the period
1993-1997. The results of these estimations are shown in tables 3.10 and 3.11.
Table 3.10: Convergence of EU15 regions 1987-1992
Dependent Variable: Average Growth Rate 1987-1992
Method: Least Squares
Included observations: 184
Estimated equation:
1 * lo Y^,r+T (1- e+= l C ^g7,
Va
Y^,t
riable
a
T
Coefficient
og y; ^ + u;,,,+T
Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C
LNY87
0.205730
-0.020332
0.038724 5.312656
0.004206 -4.833561
0.0000
0.0000
R-squared 0.113766 Mean dependent var 0.018637
Adjusted R-squared 0.108896 S.D. dependent var 0.016731
S.E. of regression 0.015794 Akaike info criterion -5.447539
Sum squared resid 0.045401 Schwarz criterion -5.412594
Log likelihood 503.1736 F-statistic 23.36332
Durbin-Watson stat 0.692029 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000003
Dataset: EUROSTAT
ESA79
Estimation in Eviews
_Q.T
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Table 3.11: Convergence of EU15 regions 1993-1997
Dependent Variable: G9397
Method: Least Squares
Included observations: 193
Estimated Equation:
* l Y;,^+T
.(1 _ e- r ^
= + * l ^+og^ Y,,,
a T og LY,,r u,^,r+^^
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C
LNY93
0.195970 0.037576 5.215271
-0.018535 0.004062 -4.563082
0.0000
0.0000
R-squared 0.098298 Mean dependent var 0.024580
Adjusted R-squared 0.093577 S.D. dependent var 0.015972
S.E. of regression 0.015206 Akaike info criterion -5.523904
Sum squared resid 0.044165 Schwarz criterion -5.490094
Log likelihood 535.0568 F-statistic 20.82172
Durbin-Watson stat 0.947112 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000009
Dataset: EUROSTAT
ESA79
Estimation in Eviews
For the time periods 1987-1992 and 1993-1997 we also estimate conditional ^3 -
convergence adding to our cross section regression a dummy variable for each of the
European countries in order to control for differences in the steady state incomes. The
results of these estimations are shown in tables 3.12 and 3.13.
Figures 3.9 and 3.10 illustrate the convergence process in the EU15 for 1987-1992 and
1993-1997.
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Table 3.12: Conditional Convergence of EU15 regions
1987-1992
Dependent Variable: Average Growth Rate 1987-1992
Method: Least Squares
Included observations: 184
Estimated equation:
-Q'T
^*lo y`,'+T = a+^1-e ^*lo ^+X.+u.g ^, gl.Yr,, , u,r+T
.v^,^
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C
LNY87
DDE
DES
DFR
DGR
DIE
DSIT
DLU
DNL
DP
DDK
DUK
DAT
DSE
DFI
0.171156
-0.015926
0.007797
0.002263
-0.009717
-0.008817
0.034104
-0.009692
0.029731
-0.008635
0.022689
-0.016345
-0.018353
-0.008561
-0.032044
-0.055814
0.036905
0.003937
0.002509
0.003246
0.002718
0.004047
0.009463
0.004032
0.009285
0.003244
0.005353
0.009241
0.002514
0.003565
0.004150
0.005579
4.637731
-4.045488
3.108377
0.697150
-3.574746
-2.178710
3.603876
-2.403744
3.201918
-2.662049
4.238818
-1.768849
-7.299981
-2.401551
-7.721191
-10.00396
0.0000
0.0001
0.0022
0.4867
0.0005
0.0307
0.0004
0.0173
0.0016
0.0085
0.0000
0.0787
0.0000
0.0174
0.0000
0.0000
R-squared 0.731720 Mean dependent var 0.018637
Adjusted R-squared 0.707767 S.D. dependent var 0.016731
S.E. of regression 0.009045 Akaike info criterion -6.490316
Sum squared resid 0.013744 Schwarz criterion -6.210756
Log likelihood 613.1091 F-statistic 30.54746
Durbin-Watson stat 1.761313 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Dataset: EUROSTAT
ESA79
Estimation in Eviews
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Figure 3.9: Regional Convergence in the EU15
1987-1992
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Table 3.13: Conditional Convergence of EU15 regions
1993-1997
Dependent Variable: G9397
Method: Least Squares
Included observations: 193
Estimated equation:
/T ^1- e-^*^ ) r^^* log Y;,r+T = a+ 7, * IoglY^,r ^+ X! + u;,,,+T
.v,,,
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C
LNY93
DDE
DES
DFR
DGR
DIE
DSIT
DLU
DNL
DP
DDK
DUK
DAT
DSE
DFI
0.266600
-0.025739
-0.003819
-0.011295
-0.025362
-0.012667
0.036464
-0.014736
0.017485
0.016486
0.004653
0.018690
0.002669
-0.002196
0.005035
0.003918
0.038271
0.004044
0.002935
0.003724
0.003334
0.004570
0.011262
0.004855
0.011338
0.003939
0.005358
0.011212
0.003091
0.004326
0.005062
0.006900
6.966120
-6.364845
-1.301372
-3.033343
-7.607458
-2.771524
3.237787
-3.035181
1.542120
4.185287
0.868467
1.666941
0.863478
-0.507662
0.994760
0.567870
0.0000
0.0000
0.1948
0.0028
0.0000
0.0062
0.0014
0.0028
0.1248
0.0000
0.3863
0.0973
0.3890
0.6123
0.3212
0.5708
^
R-squared 0.564654 Mean dependent var 0.024580
Adjusted R-squared 0.527760 S.D. dependent var 0.015972
S.E. of regression 0.010976 Akaike info criterion -6.106969
Sum squared resid 0.021323 Schwarz crite rion -5.836487
Log likelihood 605.3225 F-statistic 15.30488
Durbin-Watson stat 1.700835 Prob(F-statist ic) 0.000000
Dataset: EUROSTAT
ESA79
Estimation in Eviews
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The regional convergence process that has been taking place since 1986 within the
group of objective 1 regions, and which had become the main focus of the European
Union regional policy is worth investigating separately and this we will do in the
following chapter where we deal with the economic development of these regions and
their experience with the European Union regional programmes.
3.7.2 Results from panel data regression analysis of European
Regional Convergence
Only recently, have panel data estimation techniques (see Hsiao 1986, Baltagi 1995)
become influential in growth estimation. The main reasoning behind the use of this
estimation technique is the desire to exploit panel data in order to control unobserved
time-invariant heterogeneity in cross-sectional models. This methodology is loosely
linked to one strand of panel data literature known as fixed effects models.
The assumption that economic-specific, time-invariant fixed effects exist, and which are
responsible for individual steady state income positions, was adopted in several growth
analyses (Islam, 1995, Canova and Marcet 1995).
Differences in regional steady state incomes obviously has become increasingly
important since the 1980s. These differences no longer appear to be linked to the
characteristics of the country where the region is located. The cross-section regression
analysis however does not allow us to estimate individual regional effects in conditional
convergence to their full extent. We thus aimed to employ an alternative framework for
the estimation, one which was able to provide a direct estimate for individual regional
factors, reflecting region-specific steady state differences. We again estimated
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convergence again for the period 1983-1999, but this time exploiting the whole time
series information for each region. Within the framework of the panel data, the
individual regional effects that condition the regions specific steady state income, can
be estimated. The results show that the regions' steady state incomes did indeed, drift
apart. When regions are bound to very different steady state positions, convergence to a
common income level appears to be impossible.
In this particular analysis the concept of convergence is somewhat different in the sense
that it is now regarded as convergence towards the region's own steady state income.
Consequently, as a region is closer to its own steady state than to the average steady
state of a total group, the convergence coefficient is higher than in the cross-section
analysis.
This alternative estimation leads to striking results, summarized in tables 3.14, 3.15,
3.16, 3.17 and 3.18. Overall, growth rates are significantly negatively related to income
levels and show that the convergence relationship holds. We only report minimum and
maximum values of the region-specific fixed effects, as 206 fixed effects would have to
be listed.
The estimated coefficient b for the whole period 1982-1997 is 0.17, which corresponds
to a convergence rate ^3 of 8.7 per cent per annum implying that regions would be
halfway from their steady state income in 7.96 years (the half-period for the complete
closure of the income gap is calculated from the formula, H= log(2) ^ = 0.69/3 . Other
studies with similar specifications, reported a rise in ^3 using panel data estimations. De
la Fuente (1996) found a rate of convergence of 12.7 per cent for the Spanish regions
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for 1955-91 when using a fixed effects model. Canova and Marcet (1995) showed that
the convergence coefficient increases to 23 per cent when each region converges to its
own steady state.
From the basic results for 1983-1997 it is clear that steady state incomes must have
changed during this period of time, since if this was not the case then zero growth
would soon have been observed. Therefore, convergence in the particular periods used
previously in the cross-section analysis need to be investigated on the grounds of the
business cycle argument. For the period 1983-1986, the estimation shows a convergence
rate ^3 of 40.49 per cent. The convergence coefficient implies that, on average, regions
would have reached half of their steady state in about 1.71 years in 1982-1986. These
results are consistent with those of the previous section, where hardly any convergence
was detected particularly for the period 1982-1986. The low speed of convergence,
highlighted in the cross-section regression, simply reflects the fact that conditional
factors had become very pronounced, but it was impossible to take this fully into
account. The estimated coefficient for the period 1986-1992 (1992-1997) is somewhat
lower, implying a convergence rate of 20.85 (17.08 per cent) per cent, and the fixed
effects are now less disperse than in the previous period. These results are again in line
with the results from the cross-section analysis, where convergence sped up after 1986
and where the convergence rate was higher in 1986-1992 than in 1992-1997.
We also estimated our fixed effects panel data model (table 3.18) for the period 1995-
1999 using the figures based on the EUROSTAT (ESA95). The results show a
convergence rate of about 11.11 per cent per annum.
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Table 3.14: Panel data estimation of convergence 1982-
1997
Dependent Variable: LnY,., - LnY;,_,
Method: Pooled Least Squares
Number of cross-sections used: 206
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 2592
Estimated equation:
LnY,., - LnY,.,_, = a; -b * LnY,.,_, +u;,
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
YA? -0.174864 0.012206 -14.32592 0.0000
Fixed Effects
Min a; 1.492127 s.d 0.04709
1.820381
Max a;
R-squared 0.148181 Mean dependent var 0.016356
S.E. of regression 0.054640 S.D. dependent var 0.056800
F-statistic 2.014026 Sum squared resid 7.120567
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 Durbin-Watson stat 2.243721
Table 3.15: Panel data estimation of convergence 1982-
1986
Dependent Variable: LnY,., - LnY,.,_,
Method: Pooled Least Squares
Number of cross-sections used: 139
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 538
Estimated equation:
LnY,., - LnY; r_, = a; - b* LnY;,r_, + u;,,
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
YA? -0.792775 0.061944 - 12.79834 0.0000
Fixed Effects
Min a; 6.683014 s.d 0.24318
7.951403
Max a ;
R-squared 0.404727 Mean dependent var 0.002926
S.E. of regression 0.037752 S.D. dependent var 0.042124
F-statistic 1.946766 Sum squared resid 0.567227
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 Durbin-Watson stat 2.145309
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Table 3.16: Panel data estimation of convergence 1986-
1992
Dependent Variable: LnY; ^ - LnY;,_,
Method: Pooled Least Squares
Number of cross-sections used: 191
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 1193
Estimated equation:
LnY;, -LnY;,_, =a; -b*LnY,.,_, +u;,
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
YA? -0.415950 0.024732 - 16.81816 0.0000
Fixed Effects
Min a 3.545936 s.d 0.1147;
4.179079
Max a;
R-squared 0.300802 Mean dependent var 0.021081
S.E. of regression 0.065949 S.D. dependent var 0.072275
F-statistic 2.254656 Sum squared resid 4.353631
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 Durbin-Watson stat 2.560657
Table 3.17: Panel data estimation of convergence 1992-
1997
Dependent Variable: LnY;, - LnY;,_,
Method: Pooled Least Squares
Number of cross-sections used: 206
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 1191
Estimated equation:
Lr1Y; ,- LrtY,. ,_, = a; - b* LnY;,r-, + u,,r
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic ob.
YA? -0.270969 0.019397 -13.96958 0.0000
Fixed Effects
2.324076 s.d 0.0699Min a ;
2.800542
Max a;
R-squared 0.434750 Mean dependent var 0.015195
S.E. of regression 0.033304 S.D. dependent var 0.040281
F-statistic 3.673900 Sum squared resid 1.091411
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 Durbin-Watson stat 1.674568
•
155
The neo-classical model of growth and the convergence process in Europe
Table 3.18: Panel data estimation of convergence 1995-
1999
Dependent Variable: LnY,., - LnY.,_,
Method: Pooled Least Squares
Number of cross-sections used: 211
Total panel (balanced) observations: 844
Estimated equation:
LnY,., - LnY,.,_, = a; - b* LnY.,,_, + u;,,
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
YA?
Fixed Effects
-0.143666 0.021954 -6.543894 0.0000
Min a; 1.256151 s.d 0.03985
Max a!
1.519423
R-squared 0.317509 Mean dependent var 0.028615
S.E. of regression 0.024584 S.D. dependent var 0.025766
F-statistic 1.393458 Sum squared resid 0.381955
Prob(F-statistic) 0.001161 Durbin-Watson stat 2.319766
3.8 Conclusions
In this chapter we have studied the regional convergence of the regions in the European
Union since 1982 using cross-section and panel data regressions. The cross-section
estimations indicate that from 1982 to 1986 there is a clear non-convergence pattern for
all of the regions both in EU9 and EU12. Absolute ^3 -convergence has been the norm
since 1987. That is, the poor regions in these countries tend to experience faster per
capita growth than rich regions. The values found for absolute ^l3 -convergence in the
period 1987-1992 are higher in the EU15 than in the EU12 (speed of convergence of
about 2% in EU15 and 1.77% in EU12). However, in 1993-1997 the speed of
convergence reached similar values both for the EU12 and EU15, a value of around
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1.9%. Although the coefficient estimate for the speed of convergence is highly
significant in all our estimations, the explanatory power of the cross section estimates
of absolute ^Q -convergence are rather low, suggesting that country-specific steady
states could be behind these results. In order to check for these differences in steady
states we estimate conditional /.3 -convergence for our periods of analysis while
including dummy variables for each of the countries in the European Union. The
explanatory potential of the is much improved, and this is reflected by higher R2 value
and the ^3 coefficients are highly significant.
We estimated convergence rates again for the period 1982-1999, using a fixed effects
panel data model capable of providing a direct estimate for individual regional factors
reflecting region-specific steady state differences. The results show that the regions
steady state incomes drifted apart. When regions are bound to very different steady state
positions, convergence to a common income level is therefore impossible.
The figures obtained for the convergence rates are much higher than in the cross-section
regressions, since the specifications of the model implies convergence to each region's
own particular steady state income.
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Chapter four
European Union Regional Policy and its
effects on Objective 1 regions
••
Chapter IV
4.1 I ntrod uction
This chapter' analyses regional growth, and the impact that European Union structural
policy has had on the objective 1 regions since 1989 against the backdrop of talks on
EU regional policy after 2000. Before developing this analysis, we will trace the
evolution of regional disparities in the European Union during the period 1986-1999 in
order to provide a frame of reference for the developments in the growth rates in the
objective 1 regions. The analysis of the growth process in the objective 1 regions is
carried out in section 4.4. lt is shown that objective 1 regions have been one of the most
energetic groups in terms of growth during the period 1989-1993 and 1995-1999. This
result becomes even more striking when we take into account that it took place during a
period in which markets and populations were becoming more "globalized" and
competition was becoming more intense through the completion of the internal market.
We also provide evidence of the catching-up process experienced by objective 1 regions
which was set in motion when the regional development programmes were initiated.
The analysis of this catching-up process was carried out by regressing the gap between
the per capita income of the objective 1 regions and the average per capita income of
the EU 15 on a trend variable using a panel data model with fixed effects.
^ We wish to thank seminar participants at ECSA conference (Brussels 2000) and UACES 31S` Annual
conference and 6`^ Research Conference (2001) where earlier versions of this chapter have benefited
from constructive suggestions (http://www.ecsanet.org/fifth_ecsaworld/index.htm.). I also want to thank
the staff of the Economics Department at Exeter University and especially Prof. Marco Mariotti for the
research-invitation and all the facilities and help given for finishing this chapter. A preliminary version of
the chapter has been published as a working paper at Exeter University. Discussion paper in Economics
O1/07, University of Exeter, pags 23, http://www.ex.ac.uk/sobe/.
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Nowadays EU Regional Policy is facing new challenges: On the one hand, the
implications of the European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP) need to be taken
on board and the measures that have been adopted in order to foster competitiveness in
the EU need to be fully assimilated. Further, resources and institutional bureaucracy
must be adapted in order to cope with the enlargement process. The search for global
competition implicit in the ESDP framework mean that the Regional Policy must
become broader in outlook. The accession of the CEECs will mean that the statistical
threshold of the objective 1 regions will fall by several percentage points. These two
factors seems to suggest that it is not wise to concentrate assistance in the least-favoured
regions. However, it should be remembered that Regional Policy is a highly selective
tool which cannot be used as a blanket measure for improving competitiveness
throughout the European territory. In spite of these obstacles it is still possible to
maintain a certain emphasis on the present objective 1 regions by introducing some kind
of balance in order to compensate for the "contraction effect on the statistical threshold
subsequent to the accession of the CEECs.
Sections 4.5 and 4.6, which constitute the last part of this chapter, deal with the
challenges thrown up by recent debates on European Union regional policy by
providing a simulation which utilises the figures foreseen for structural actions in the
financial framework for an enlarged EU-21, a proposal that was sketched out at the
Berlin European Council in March 1999. The results of the simulation show that the
financial perspectives approved in the Berlin Summit (March 1999) suggest that there is
•
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enough financial leeway to assist 90% of population in CEECs and 75% of the current
objective 1 population. Section 4.7 concludes with the main findings.
4.2 The need of a Regional Policy in the European
Union
Following a decade of rather limited initiatives, in 1986, within the context of the Single
Market project, the European Community assumed the task of a common regional
policy. The main aim of this policy was to support the development of the weakest
regions, which, in addition to Ireland and the Mezzogiorno, included the new entrants,
Greece, Spain and Portugal. Article 130a-e of the Single European Act, firmly
established EC regional policy and the objectives of economic and social cohesion as
corner-stones of the Community's constitutional framework. The main reasoning
behind the creation of EC regional policy was the potential threat of problems arising
from the economic restructuring of the weaker, peripheral parts of the Community,
linked to 1992 project. In order to speed up the restructuring process, and to improve the
conditions for economic development, Community financial assistance was deemed
necessary. Further reasons that make regional policy necessary for the European Union
are:
First, there is no natural tendency toward a spatial balance in the development of the
regions.
Secondly, the concentration of population and economic activities is a well-established
feature of EU territory. It is perhaps worth reiterating, what is frequently cited in
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relevant literature, namely that London, Paris, Milan, Munich and Hamburg together
form a pentagonal area that represents 20% of the total area and contains 40% of the EU
citizens who produce about 50% of the EU's total GDP. This gives rise to major
imbalances.
Thirdly, Unconditional convergence in GDP ph levels is not a natural tendency. If there
exists a certain level of convergence it would appear to be a very long term process and
spontaneous speeds of catching up are too low.
With the institutionalisation of regional policy and the Delors I and II packages
peripheral economies received substantial financial support which aimed to accelerate
growth in these areas.
4.3 Economic and Social Cohesion: New European
Union Regional Policy and its programming periods
According to the Treaty, the Community must act "to promote overall harmonious
development" and "to reduce disparities between the levels of development of the
various regions and the backwardness of the least favoured regions" (Art 158). The
Single European Act (SEA)(1987) was conceived with the aim of fostering the
integration process in the European Community. Integration was to be characterized by
the twin dynamic of monetary union and regional expansion. The former process came
about through the unification of European markets and the bases for monetary union
which were set out in the EU Treaty, Maastricht (1992), and had the effect of
intensifying integration and giving rise to economic and monetary union (EMU). The
•
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latter process, that of regional expansion resulted in a EU made up of 15 member
countries and a population more than 370 million people.
The deepening of economic integration was followed by a wide-scale reform in
Regional Policy. Present Regional Policy has been shaped by the introduction of the
Economic and Social Cohesion principle in the EEC Treaty by the Single European Act
(SEA) in 1987. It was reinforced after the ratification of the EU Treaty and the creation
of the new Cohesion Fund.
The provisions of the SEA foresaw Economic and Social Cohesion as the back bone of
European Union Regional Policy (old Article 130a EEC Treaty). The objective of
strengthening Economic and Social Cohesion implies the promotion of an overall
harmonious development of the EU by reducing regional disparities and, in particular,
the backwardness of least-favoured regions. The ERDF along with the other structural
funds operating within a coordination framework are intended to help redress the main
regional imbalances in the EU by participating in the development and structural
adjustment of less developed regions and in the conversion of declining industrial
regions and other areas with structural and/or employment problems.
After these changes in the Primary Community Law, both reforms of the Regional
Policy were implemented. In 1988 legislative tasks were completed and the funding for
the new programming period 1989-1993 was approved (European Commission, 1989).
Both, the general procedures and the financial amounts assigned to European Regional
Policy were reformed providing it with its contemporary structure. With respect to
general procedures, a new scheme of planning and programming via negotiation
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throughout the various strata public authorities was set up by means of the "Community
Support Frameworks" (CSF). The reform affecting financial amounts, involved
doubling the real value of funding allocated to Regional Policy in this first
programming period 1989-1993 (Delors I package).
After the EU Treaty, (Maastricht 1992), the coordination and programming of structural
funds were reinforced and their funding was again doubled in terms of real value.
Legislative reform was completed during the year 1993 (European Commission,1993,
1994a) and the new programming period 1994-1999 (Delors II package) was on the
point of coming into effect (European Commission, 1994b).
At present, the EU is facing some important challenges. On the one hand, the European
Union must foster growth and competitiveness and find its way in a global economy
while meeting the requirements of the World Trade Organization (WTO). On the other,
the consolidation of European Monetary Union (EMU) and the initiation of the
enlargement process towards Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) are
fundamental aims of the EU. The strategic framework for meeting these challenges has
been put forward by the European Commission in the "Agenda 2000", where the
financial guidelines for the next programming period 2000-2006 were also drawn up
(European Council, 1999b, 1999c, 1999d, 1999e).
These guidelines for the medium-term implementation and funding of the main EU
policies were agreed to at the Berlin Summit (European Council 1999a), where a
coherent framework designed to link expenditure commitments and foreseen resources
was set out by the European Council. European Union expenditure must respect the
166
Chapter IV
imperative of budgetary discipline needed to maintain EMU stability whilst
simultaneously ensuring the orderly development of EU policies and coping effectively
with the process of enlargement.
The figures given in the following table show the main structural features of the new
European Regional Policy through its three programming periods from 1989 to 2006.
The table reflects the increases in the real value of funds allocated to structural
interventions, both in terms of total amounts and in terms of annual averages.
Table 4.1: Economic and Social Cohesion: Regional Policy Figures
PROGRAIVIMING 1989-93 1994-99 2000-06
PERIODS
STRUCTURAL Total Annual Total
Annual Year Total Annual
OPERATIONS Average Average 1999 Average
Billions Ecus 1999
Structural Funds 74.821 14.964 166.911 27.818 32.119 195.000 27.857
O Amount 48.046 9.609 103.061 17.177 19.818 135.900 19.414
B
J % Objectives 69,6% --- 68.0% --- --- 74.5% ---
1 % Total Stral. Funds 64.2% --- 61.7% --- --- 69.7%a ---
Cohesion Funds 1.746b --- 17.364 2.894 2.894 18.000 2.571
Future Acceding and
--- ---- --- --- --- 47.780° 8.254
New Member Sates
Total Funding 76.567 15.313 184.275 30.712 35.013 260.780 38.682
a Only 1993, b 65,4% without transitional support ,° New MS increasing amounts
starting from 2002
Source: Annual Reports on Structural Funds (European Commission) and Conclusions
of the Presidency from the Berlin European Council (March 1999).
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In accordance with the Economic and Social Cohesion principle, a concentration
process with respect to structural funds in the most needy areas and particularly in those
regions whose development is lagging behind, the main thrust of EU development, that
is, the objective 1 regions is already underway. The concentration process in the
structural funds is implemented by means of a reduction in the total percentage of
population receiving assistance, with the exception of the objective 1 regions. It should
be remembered however, that the amount of the population receiving assistance
according to the different objectives, is not, and must not be independent of the
distribution of developmental disparities and structural imbalances throughout the
European Union.
This concentration principle has meant that the perspectives for the new period 2000-
2006 give rise to a certain optimism. The percentage of the structural funds being
assigned to objective 1 regions has increased up to a figure of 65.4 (69,7% if the regions
with transitional assistance are included). By this means, sufficient support has been
maintained for the objective 1 regions, while creating enough financial space to
facilitate the enlargement process both for the pre-accession, financial instrument and
PHARE program as well as for structural interventions in the new member States,
(future acceding countries after 2002).
Concentrating support within the most needy areas is at the core of the arrangements
drawn up by the European Council at the Berlin Summit in order to address the
problems of financial stability, assistance to those regions with structural problems and
•
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the process of enlargement to include CEE countries. This is clearly emphasized in the
conclusions of the Berlin Summit:
"Improving the effectiveness of the structural and Cohesion funds in achieving the goal
of economic and social cohesion enshrined in the Treaty is a central plank of the
Agenda 2000 reforms. This goal has to be maintained in the future as priorities
continue to evolve in a more diverse Union, taking account of the aim of achieving
greater concentration of structural assistance, improving the financial management of
the structural funds as well as simplifying their operation and administration"
(Presidency conclusions - Berlin European Council 24 and 25 March 1999 )
4.4 Structural Actions, convergence and growth in
Objective 1 regions
Since the expansion of the industrial revolution last century, Western European
economies have grown on average by 2-2'/2% a year, although there have been periods
of market fluctuations such us the prolonged boom period in the 1950s and 1960s. This
boom ended with the oil crises of the 1970s. From 1973 onwards, growth in the EU has
once again averaged 2-2%2%. This figure is slightly lower than the figure for growth in
the US, whereas previously it had been substantially higher. This statistic implies that
both output - and real income- have doubled every 30 years or so. In the 10 years from
1986 to 1996, GDP in the EU grew on average by just over 2% a year , though this
growth was much more intense in the first half of the period-1986 to 1991- when
growth, buoyed by expansion of the global economy and closer European integration,
averaged over 3% a year. In the second half of the period, from 1991 to 1996, and partly
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as a result of the downturn in the world economy, growth in the EU averaged just 1'/2%
a year and GDP fell by '/z% in 1993 for the first time since the oil crisis in 1975. Despite
the worsening of the global economic situation the average growth rate over the period
1995 to 1999 reached 2.8%.
4.4.1 Regional disparities in the EU 1986-1999
The scale of regional disparities throughout the Union, the variation in performance
between different types of region and the specific problems in particular countries go
beyond the simple core/periphery and rich/poor distinctions. Nevertheless, the
disparities between rich and poor regions and the way that these have changed over
recent years, is perhaps the defining characteristic of European imbalance.
The regions whose development is lagging behind have, on the whole, achieved
improved performance during a period of deepening and intensified competition which
has came about through the completion of the internal market, the liberalization of
monetary and capital movements in the EU and within the context of more global
competition in the world economy. The reform of EU Regional Policy has certainly
played a key role in obtaining these results since it has facilitated:l) the coordination of
planning and programming of Structural Funds within the Community Support
Frameworks (CSF) 2) the intensification of the concentration of its efforts within the
objective 1 regions, i.e. those regions whose development is lagging behind and 3) an
increase in the funding allocated to regional structural interventions.
Closer integration in the EU, together with a strengthening of Regional Policy and the
competitive advantages intrinsic to the poorer regions, has favoured the convergence of
•
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objective 1 regions over the period 1986 to 1999. The result was that the disparities
became polarized at the bottom end of the distribution pattern. A typical "poor" region
(ie one with below-average output) experienced an increase in per capita GDP of some
3 percentage points relative to the EU average.
As is shown in the 6t" Periodic Report on the Social and Economic situation and
Development of the Regions of the European Union, the poorest regions achieved a
level of convergence, which was remarkable for its intensity and for the historical
perspective in which it took place:
"There is clear evidence that GDP per head, and therefore the output and income of
poorer regions, is converging towards the EU average. Over the 10 years, 1986 to 1996,
the level in regions with below average GDP per head typically increased by around 3
percentage points relative to the EU average. Convergence, moreover, seems to have
been more pronounced in the poorest regions, the 25 with the lowest GDP per head in
1986 narrowing the gap with the EU average by 5'/2 percentage points and the 10 lowest
by 7'/z percentage points". (6t" Periodic Report on the Social an Economic situation and
Development of the Regions of the European Union).
However there was a small reduction in the overall regional disparity in the EU, due to
the confluence of a sharp decline in disparities below average GDP per head and an
increase above the average. As noted above, the relative prosperity of both the richest
and the poorest regions increased over the period. The summary measure reflects that
these disparities are compressed at the bottom end of the distribution pattern and
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expanded at the top. However, there has been very little change in the regional ranking
in terms of GDP per head, which remains just the same as 10 years earlier.
4.4.2 Regional Growth in objective 1 regions
The following dispersion graphs (Figure 4.1 and 4.2) show the distribution of European
Union regional growth (NUTS 2) according to levels of development and growth rates
in the EU15 for the periods 1989-1993z and 1995-1999. We have chosen these time
periods because they represent the span in which the two regional development
programmes have been operational3. The first Community Support Framework (CSF I)
was in place from 1989-1993, and the second (CSF II) from 1994 until 1999. The
regions for each of the EU 1 S countries have been plotted using different colours. In
this sense it is easier to compare the relative performance of those countries that are
subject to objective 1 regional Policy4 (mainly Greece, Spain, Portugal, Italy and
Ireland) with the performance of the non-objective 1 regions.
2 Computations for 1989-1993 were carried out using the EUROSTA-REGIO database (ESA79) while for 1995-1999
they were carried out using the EUROSTAT-REGIO database (ESA95)
3 Although the second CSF was in place in 1994, we chose the interval 1995-1999 in order to be able to use the new
EUROSTAT (ESA 95) figures.
4 There are other countries which have objective 1 regional policies such as the new German Laender, French
dominions.
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Figure 4.1 Regional Growth EU15
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A visual inspection of these graphs indicates the performance of the EU periphery
(Spain, Greece, Portugal, Ireland) in terms of growth during 1989-1993 and 1995-1999
was unequivocally positive.
During the programme periods 1989-1993 and 1994-1999, many objective 1 regions
benefited in terms of additional investment, job creation and growth of per capita
income. Since 1989 Regional strategic planning and programming along with support
from Structural Funds have facilitated supply-side improvements in many of the weaker
regions, a strengthening of their productive potential and a shift into higher value-added
sectors (see reports European Commission, 1991, 1996a, 2000). Income disparities have
been on the increase since 1975 (Tondl 1997, European Commission 1996b, Armstrong
1995, Dunford 1993). A closer appraisal of these regions, i.e., the regions with
sluggish development, shows that their performance and the rate at which they have
been catching up with the rest of the regions has not been uniform.
Regional growth performance was strongly linked to national growth, which varied
according to the country in question. Further, some of the regions within a given
country clearly performed much better than others, which seemed to be cursed by
persistent stagnation. Spain and Portugal both enjoyed an impressively intense period of
growth after 1987 following the stagnation they experienced in the early 1980's. This
growth was due to policies aimed at fomenting stabilization and, in Spain, on economic
restructuring (Tsoukalis 1992, Bradley et al. 1995, Axt 1992). By contrast, the
Mezzogiorno and Greece remained experienced rather febrile growth path throughout
the 1980's and early 1990's, although they recovered during the mid nineties,
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particularly Greece. The Mezzogiorno, which, to a certain extent caught-up with the
North of Italy in the 1960's, suffered an about-turn in this trend in 1975 (Baussola and
Fiorito 1994, Terrasi, 1999). The Greek economy suffered from a postponing of
economic restructuring and a lack of clear macroeconomic policy commitments, as a
result of which economic growth failed to gain momentum (Alogoskoufis 1995,
Tsoukalis, 1992). However, since the change of government in 1996, Greece has
adopted a more consistent economic policy, which seems to be encouraging growth.
In Spain, regional disparities have been increasing since 1986 and certain regions in the
North East and Madrid are now nearly twice as rich as the poorest region which is
Extremadura, while the economic position and income generated by the country as a
whole has improved significantly (Villaverde Castro, 1993, Mas et al. 1995). Since
1980, it is mainly the rich regions such as Madrid, Catalunya, Aragon and Baleares
which have improved their income position substantially. The poorer, less developed
regions, located in the centre, the North West and the South also improved.
The richest regions of Portugal are those which absorb the country's capital, Lisbon,
the Algarve with its buoyant tourism-based economy and the industrial North of the
country, which is the regions of Norte. During Portugal's macroeconomic stabilization
period, only the area of Lisbon and the Norte managed to augment their incomes
substantially, while the agricultural Centro and the Alentejo regions experienced
declines sin income. The Algarve was in fact the regions in which growth was most
impressive while the convergence of Portugal as a whole has become relatively
balanced.
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The general stagnation of income convergence in the Mezzogiorno is one of the few
exceptions. The richest provinces of Abruzzo and Sardegna, have improving in terms
of income since 1980 although this improvement has been modest. In contrast, the other
richer provinces of the Mezzogiorno on the Adriatic side, Molise and Puglia, were in
decline in relative terms until 1994. The poorer provinces in the West and Sicily
maintained roughly the same position in 1994 as in 1980, or fell behind (Basilicata).
Since 1995 however, these regions have experienced high growth rates, which in the
case of Basilicata reached 4.2%, Sicilia 3%, Molise 3.7%, Puglia 3%, in the period
1995-1999.
In Greece the regions'ranking in per capita GDP underwent some important changes. Of
those regions which had the highest per capita index scores in 1980, only the Athens
area and Central Macedonia (Thessaloniki) managed to maintain this status by 1994,
while Central Greece and the Peloponnese lost considerable ground. However, during
the most recent programming period they performed most encouragingly with growth
rates which were well above 3% for all the Greece regions.
A Closer look at the growth rates of the objective 1 regions in the period 1989-1993 and
1995-1999 can be seen figures 4.3 and 4.4.
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Although there are some notable exceptions in the case of some of the Italian and Greek
regions, it can be seen that the objective 1 regions performed very well during 1989-
1993 (their average growth rates during this period reached 0.04%, while for the EU15
during the same period of time average growth rates were -1 %). Similarly during the
period 1995-1999, on average, the objective 1 regions again outperformed the rest of
EU 15 regions. Average growth rates for the former reached 3.36% and for the latter
2.8%.
It would seem logical to weight the average growth rates of each of the NUTS lI regions
according to their respective populations. In this way we avoid biases that might occur
by giving the same weight to two regions that have very different amounts of population
(It should be obvious that negative growth rates in Ille the France or in London do not
have the same impact in economic terms as the same negative growth rates when
hypothetically linked to Cantabria or any other less populous regions).
To this end, we have analysed regional growth according to population decile and to
population quintile for 1989-1993 and for 1995-1999. We make the assumption that
each individual belongs to a specific point in physical geographical space and by
extension to a particular area surrounding that point in space. This analysis sheds new
light on the positive performance of the objective 1 regions in terms of growth.
Figures 4.5 and 4.6 represent the growth rates by quintile and decile of population in
the EU15 for 1989-1993. On analysing the figure that reflects growth according to
population quintiles, there appears to be a clear negative correlation between the
growth rates and the population quintiles. However, when analysing growth according
•
•
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to deciles of population we find that the negative relationship no longer holds true.
Rather, the figure that breaks population down into deciles projects a"U"-shaped
profile in the EU-15 for the period 1989-1993. This pattern indicates a process in which
regional growth is becoming polarized. This model of polarized growth is known as the
so-called "twin peaks" model (Chaterij, 1993, Quah, 1996a, 1996b, 1997). It has
created what Baumol called convergence "clubs", polarized either at the highest or
lowest levels of income (Ben-David 1994, Quah, 1996a, 1996b, Fagerberg and
Verspagen, 1996).
Figure 4.5: Average Growth Rate by Population Quintile
(1989-1993)
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Figure 4.6: Average Growth Rate by Population decile
(1989-1993)
0.015 ,
-0. 015
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On associating the population deciles (or population quintiles), classified in order of
growth rates, with the population of the different NUTS II regions in the EU we found
that the first quintile of population (first two deciles), contain individuals that live in
NUTS II regions that are objective 1. Moreover figures 4.5 and 4.6 show that in 1989-
1993 the only deciles that have positive growth rates were the first and second. We can
conclude that the objective 1 regions performed very well during this period of time.
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They, experienced positive growth rates while the remaining regions lost momentum
during this period.
The profile of regional growth by population quintile and decile in EU 15 for 1995-
1999 is shown in figures 4.7 and 4.8.
Figure 4.7: Average Growth Rate by Population quintile
(1995-1999)
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Figure 4.8: Average Growth Rate by Population decile
(1995-1999)
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The analysis of the period 1995-1999 differs substantially from the previous period.
Here, figures 4.8 and 4.9 show that the negative relationship between average growth
rates and population quintiles holds, both in the case of quintiles and deciles. The "U"
profile which characterized the 1989-1993 is no longer present.
The regions that make up the first and second deciles are once again, mainly objective
l, and are these are the deciles whose growth rates are highest. The fact that the
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performance of objective 1 regions outstrips the rest of the regions, is once again
highlighted.
The following maps (map 4.1 and map 4.2) represent the regional distribution of
average growth rates over the period 1989-1993 and 1995-1999 in the EU 15 and
provide us with an intuitive vision of the relationship between growth rates and their
geographical distribution throughout the EU.
Map 4.1: Regional Growth in the EU15 (1989-1993)
Average Growth Rate (1989-1993)
[ ^Í 1
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Source: Own elaboration using Arc View 8.1
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Map 4.2: Regional Growth in the EU15 (1995-1999)
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xverage Growth Rates (1995-1999)
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This maps reflect the positive trajectory of the vast majority of the objective 1 regions
during both periods.
4.4.3 The Catching-up process of objective 1 regions towards the
European Union average
In this section we are going to explore the dynamics that shape the convergence process,
that is, the mechanisms that allow the objective 1 regions to catch up with the European
Union benchmark average and have been doing so since 1983. To this end we divide the
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entire period of analysis into three subperiods. First, we assess the trajectory of the
objective 1 regions prior to implementation of the two regional development
programmes, that is before so-called Community Support Framework Programmes
(CSF). Second, we analyse how this catching-up process evolves during the first
Community Support Framework (CSF I, 1989-1993), and third we repeat this
procedure for the second Community Support Framework (CSF II, 1994-1999).
Using the temporal divisions of our periods of analysis we attempt to ascertain whether
or not the objective 1 regions have been catching-up with the rest of the EU regions as
a direct result of EU regional policy, or whether this tendency began prior to its
inception.
The methodology adopted in order to achieve our goals, involved the estimation a panel
data model with fixed effects by pooled least squares.
The model took the following form:
x;, = a; +bt+u;, (1)
GDPpc .
x;, _ ''^ represents the gap between the per capita income of the i-objective
GDPpcr,uE
1 region and the average per capita income of the European Union in t. t is the trend
variable and u;, represents a random disturbance.
A positive and statistically significant value for b for a particular period suggests that,
in the period in question, the objective 1 regions did indeed catch-up towards the
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average European Union income. In other words there is a convergence process under
way which involves the objective 1 regions closing the gap between themselves and the
rest of the European Union regions.
Equation (1) was estimated for different sub samples of objective 1 regions, and covers
the programming periods, in which they were status objective 1 regions. First, we
estimated equation (1) for those regions that were objective 1 in the first programming
period (1989-1993). The results of the estimation are shown in table 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4.
•
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Table 4.2: Catching-up Objective 1 regions during CSF I
(1983-1988)
Dependent Variable: x; ,
Method: Pooled Least Squares
Sample: 1983 1988
Number of cross-sections used: 41
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 236
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
T? 0.002010 0.001231 1.632822 0.1041
Fixed Effects
ES 11--C 0.569445 G R41--C 0.428545
ES 12--C 0.720209 G R42--C 0.633133
ES41--C 0.672471 GR43--C 0.556270
ES42--C 0.565218 IE--C 0.611149
ES43--C 0.459632 IT71--C 0.870998
ES52--C 0.713442 IT72--C 0.752567
ES61--C 0.537263 IT8--C 0.681122
ES62--C 0.651650 IT91--C 0.710451
ES63--C 0.582803 IT92--C 0.650309
ES7--C 0.678945 IT93--C 0.590904
FR83--C 0.866146 ITA--C 0.676067
G R 11--C 0.574691 ITB--C 0.738186
G R 12--C 0.576029 PT 11--C 0.487369
G R 13--C 0.577535 PT 12--C 0.454810
G R 14--C 0.541035 PT 13--C 0.783801
G R21--C 0.448597 PT 14--C 0.446232
GR22--C 0.528875 PT15--C 0.499213
GR23--C 0.497938 PT2--C 0.396335
G R24--C 0.726968 PT3--C 0.386969
GR25--C 0.597202 UKN--C 0.753083
G R3-C 0.626041
R-squared 0.937934 Mean dependent var 0.621489
Adjusted R-squared 0.924817 S.D. dependent var 0.117261
S.E. of regression 0.032152 Sum squared resid 0.200553
F-statistic 71.50489 Durbin-Watson stat 1.510642
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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Table 4.3: Catching-up Objective 1 regions during
CSF I (1989-1993)
Dependent Variable: x; ,
Method: Pooled Least Squares
Sample: 1989 1993
Number of cross-sections used: 41
Total panel (balanced) observations: 205
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
T? 0.011548 0.001078 10.71565 0.0000 •
Fixed Effects
ES 11--C 0.494116 G R41--C 0.332973
ES12--C 0.617139 GR42--C 0.578775
ES41--C 0.589483 GR43--C 0.538681
ES42--C 0.546332 IE--C 0.661503
ES43--C 0.416019 IT71--C 0.787658
ES52--C 0.671267 IT72--C 0.657863
ES61--C 0.481454 IT8--C 0.578566
ES62--C 0.610706 IT91--C 0.608943
ES63--C 0.561783 IT92--C 0.532497
ES7--C 0.646382 IT93--C 0.482601
FR83--C 0.740665 ITA--C 0.574346
GR11--C 0.441245 ITB--C 0.649379
G R 12--C 0.496316 PT 11--C 0.445539
G R 13--C 0.507540 PT 12--C 0.402739
G R 14--C 4615510 PT 13--C 0.716457
G R21--C
.
0.310034 PT 14--C 0.435649 •
GR22--C 0.447980 PT15--C 0.561030
GR23--C 0.407272 PT2--C 0.350171
GR24--C 0.577195 PT3--C 0.350101
GR25--C 0.462045 UKN--C 0.658904
GR3--C 0.548418
R-squared 0.971674 Mean dependent var 0.6390
Adjusted R-squared 0.964549 S.D. dependent var 0.1158
S.E. of regression 0.021822 Sum squared resid 0.0776
F-statistic 136.3769 Durbin-Watson stat 1.5849
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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Table 4.4: Catching-up Objective 1 regions during CSF I
(1994-1997)
Dependent Variable: x; ,
Method: Pooled Least Squares
Sample: 1994 1997
Number of cross-sections used: 45
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
T? 0.003643 0.000970 3.757714 0.0003
Fixed Effects
ES11--C 0.576512 GR24--C 0.598526
ES12--C 0.692778 GR25--C 0.526083
ES41--C 0.700007 GR3--C 0.698274
ES42--C 0.610820 GR41--C 0.453398
ES43--C 0.497661 G R42--C 0.690841
ES52--C 0.704549 G R43--C 0.662103
ES61--C 0.529017 I E--C 0.897466
ES62--C 0.632425 IT71--C 0.848914
ES63--C 0.645876 IT72--C 0.730583
ES7--C 0.709821 IT8--C 0.614478
FR83--C 0.758873 IT91--C 0.665109
FR91--C 0.357071 IT92--C 0.637541
^ FR92--C 0.496696 IT93--C 0.544526
FR93--C 0.436637 ITA--C 0.615172
FR94--C 0.413551 ITB--C 0.690544
GR11--C 0.546767 PT11--C 0.575774
G R 12--C 0.610624 PT 12--C 0.556169
G R 13--C 0.554026 PT 13--C 0.844175
G R 14--C 0.562902 PT14--C 0.548713
GR21--C 0.381047 PT15--C 0.660990
G R22--C 0.556687 PT2--C 0.449111
G R23--C 0.515843 PT3--C 0.492634
UKN--C 0.747628
R-squared 0.989020 Mean dependent var 0.667175
Adjusted R-squared 0.984970 S.D. dependent var 0.113238
S.E. of regression 0.013883 Sum squared resid 0.023512
F-statistic 244.2053 Durbin-Watson stat 1.553917
• Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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The results of the estimation show that the gap between the objective 1 regions and the
EU begins to close only after the regional development programmes got underway. The
positive value of the parameter b in the first estimation does not diverge statistically
from zero (see t-statistic value). However, from 1989 onwards the objective 1 regions
began to move towards the European Union income average and this is reflected in the
b parameter. Moreover, the catching-up process was faster during the first
programming period. On comparing the different values estimated for the parameter we
find that b( b (1989-1993 )= 0.011548 and b (1994- l 997)= 0.003643).
We also estimated equation (1) for the objective 1 regions in the period 1995-1999
using the figures provided by the new European accounting system (ESA95). The
results show that the catching-up process is faster than that which took place in the
period 1994-1997. This acceleration in terms of convergence was due principally to the
positive performance of the objective 1 regions in 1998 and 1999. Table 4.5 shows the
output of the estimation.
Finally, equation (1) has been estimated for the regions that were objective l, either in
the first programming period or in the second. The results of these estimations are
shown in tables 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8.
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Table 4.5: Catching-up Objective 1 regions during CSF I
(1995-1999)
Dependent Variable: x; ,
Method: Pooled Least Squares
Sample: 1995 1999
Number of cross-sections used: 46
Total panel (balanced) observations: 230
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
T? 0.006440 0.000961 6.702004 0.0000
Fixed Effects
ES11--C 0.619282 GR3--C 0.727718
ES 12--C 0.677989 G R41--C 0.603185
ES41--C 0.723911 G R42--C 0.768709
ES42--C 0.628252 GR43--C 0.646763
ES43--C 0.481298 I E01--C 0.737682
ES52--C 0.744747 IE02--C 1.091090
ES61--C 0.566685 IT71--C 0.842638
ES62--C 0.646130 IT72--C 0.774999
ES63--C 0.636584 IT8--C 0.634355
ES7--C 0.752737 IT91--C 0.646109
FR83--C 0.760512 IT92--C 0.706378
FR91--C 0.537069 IT93--C 0.596100
FR92--C 0.615432 ITA--C 0.641950
FR93--C 0.511725 ITB--C 0.749669
FR94--C 0.496148 PT11--C 0.588559
G R 11--C 0.533434 PT 12--C 0.556448
G R 12--C 0.658440 PT 13--C 0.954226
G R 13--C 0.616714 PT 14--C 0.571527
G R 14--C 0.563625 PT 15--C 0.667161
GR21--C 0.435948 PT2--C 0.491039
G R22--C 0.567421 PT3--C 0.656778
G R23--C 0.501993 U KN--C 0.777875
G R24--C 0.804898
G R25--C 0.521879
R-squared 0.978842 Mean dependent var 0.672229
Adjusted R-squared 0.973523 S.D. dependent var 0.126660
S.E. of regression 0.020610 Sum squared resid 0.077731
F-statistic 184.0454 Durbin-Watson stat 1.088385
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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Table 4.6: Catching-up Objective 1 regions during CSF I
or CSF II (1983-1988)
Dependent Variable: x; ,
Method: Pooled Least Squares
Sample: 1983 1988
Number of cross-sections used: 45
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 252
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
T?
Fixed Effects
0.001525 0.001198 1.273408 0.2043
AT 11--C 0.601911 G R41--C 0.430240
BE32--C 0.779781 GR42--C 0.634827
ES11--C 0.571139 GR43--C 0.557965
ES 12--C 0.721904 I E--C 0.612844
ES13--C 0.723134 IT71--C 0.872693
ES41--C 0.674165 IT72--C 0.754261
ES42--C 0.566913 IT8--C 0.682817
ES43--C 0.461327 IT91--C 0.712145
ES52--C 0.715136 IT92--C 0.652004
ES61--C 0.538957 IT93--C 0.592599
ES62--C 0.653345 ITA--C 0.677762
ES63--C 0.584497 ITB--C 0.739880
ES7--C 0.680639 NL23--C 0.710082
FR83--C 0.867840 PT11--C 0.489064
G R 11--C 0.576386 PT 12--C 0.456505
G R 12--C 0.577724 PT 13--C 0.785496
G R 13--C 0. 579230 PT 14--C 0.447927
G R 14--C 0.542729 PT 15--C 0.500907
G R21--C 0.450291 PT2--C 0.399240
G R22--C 0.530570 PT3--C 0.389874
GR23--C 0.499633 UKN--C 0.754777
GR24--C 0.728662
G R25--C 0.598896
GR3-C 0.627736
R-squared 0.938972 Mean dependent var 0.629036
Adjusted R-squared 0.925641 S.D. dependent var 0.117836
S.E. of regression 0.032132 Sum squared resid 0.212694
F-statistic 70.43351 Durbin-Watson stat 1.513729
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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Table 4.7: Catching-up Objective 1 regions during CSF I
or CSF II ( 1989-1993)
Dependent Variable: x;,,
Method: Pooled Least Squares
Sample: 1989 1993
Number of cross-sections used: 52
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 246
Cross sections without valid observations dropped
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
T? 0.013668 0.001352 10.11141 0.0000
Fixed Effects
AT11--C 0.526227 GR23--C 0.388195
BE32--C 0.657616 GR24--C 0.558118
DE3--C 0.851226 GR25--C 0.442967
DE4--C 0.363251 GR3--C 0.529341
DE8--C 0.324372 GR41--C 0.313896
DEE1--C 0.288800 GR42--C 0.559698
DEE2--C 0.372257 GR43--C 0.519604
DEE3--C 0.31717,0 IE--C 0.642426
DEG--C 0.301773 IT71--C 0.768581
ES 11--C 0.475039 IT72--C 0.638786
• ES12--C 0.598062 IT8--C 0.559489
ES13--C 0.640366 IT91--C 0.589866
ES41--C 0.570406 IT92--C 0.513420
ES42--C 0.527255 IT93--C 0.463524
ES43--C 0.396942 ITA--C 0.555269
ES52--C 0.652190 ITB--C 0.630301
ES61--C 0.462377 N L23--C 0.624038
ES62--C . 0.591629 PT11--C 0.426462
ES63--C 0.542706 PT12--C 0.383662
ES7--C 0.627305 PT13--C 0.697380
FR83--C 0.721588 PT14--C 0.416572
G R 11--C 0.422167 PT 15--C 0.541953
GR12--C 0.477239 PT2--C 0.331094
GR13--C 0.488463 PT3--C 0.331024
GR14--C 0.442474 UKN--C 0.639827
GR21--C 0.290957 GR22--C 0.428903
R-squared 0.959336 Mean dependent var 0.638338
Adjusted R-squared 0.948380 S.D. dependent var 0.128156
S.E. of regression 0.029117 Sum squared resid 0.163626
F-statistic 87.56196 Durbin-Watson stat 1.432507
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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Table 4.8: Catching-up Objective 1 regions during CSF I
or CSF II (1994-1997)
Dependent Variable: x; ,
Method: Pooled Least Squares
Sample: 1994 1997
Number of cross-sections used: 59
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 224
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
T?
Fixed Effects
0.005929 0.001070 5.543754 0.0000
AT11--C 0.635027 GR13--C 0.523165
BE32--C 0.725091 GR14--C 0.532041
DE3--C 1.024423 GR21--C 0.350186
DE4--C 0.636572 GR22--C 0.525826
DE8--C 0.568508 GR23--C 0.484982
DED1--C 0.512691 GR24--C 0.567665
DED2--C 0.609825 GR25--C 0.495222
DED3--C 0.665864 GR3--C 0.667413
DEE1--C 0.512094 GR41--C 0.422537
DEE2--C 0.623764 GR42--C 0.659980
DEE3--C 0.532057 GR43--C 0.631242
DEG--C 0.557090 IE--C 0.866605
ES 11--C 0.545651 IT71--C 0.818053
ES12--C 0.661917 IT72--C 0.699722
ES13--C 0.686756 IT8--C 0.583617
ES41--C 0.669146 IT91--C 0.634248
ES42--C 0.579959 IT92--C 0.606680
ES43--C 0.466800 IT93--C 0.513665
ES52--C 0.673688 ITA--C 0.584311
ES61--C 0.498156 ITB--C 0.659683
ES62--C 0.601564 NL23--C 0.701370
ES63--C 0.615015 PT11--C 0.544913
ES7--C 0.678960 PT12--C 0.525308
FR83--C 0.728012 PT13--C 0.813314
FR91--C 0.329639 PT14--C 0.517852
FR92--C 0.469264 PT15--C 0.630129
FR93--C 0.409205 PT2--C 0.418250
FR94--C 0.386119 PT3--C 0.461773
GR11--C 0.515906 UKN--C 0.716767
G R 12-C 0.579763
R-squared 0.983775 Mean dependent var 0.680949
Adjusted R-squared 0.977938 S.D. dependent var 0.119413
S.E. of regression 0.017737 Sum squared resid 0.051594
F-statistic 168.5383 Durbin-Watson stat 1.785120
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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If we pool together the regions that were objective 1 either in the first or in the second
Community Support Framework, the trend does not differ when we only take into
account those regions that were objective 1 during CSF I. We can state quite
categorically that these regions were not "catching up" in terms of average European
Union Per Capita GDP prior to the implementation of the EU regional policy. Moreover
the catching-up process is faster during the period 1989-1993 than during 1994-1997.
On Comparing the values for the b parameter estimated for the two samples of
objective 1 regions ( regions that were objective 1 during CSF I and regions that were
objective 1 during CSF I or CSF II), it may be observed that in 1989-1993 the b
values are very close to each other (0.011548 and 0.013668), but in 1994-1997, the b
value for the sample that takes in the objective l regions for both periods is over 1.5
times greater (0.003643 versus 0.005929). The reason for this result is basically due to
the exceptional performance experienced by the German objective 1 regions,
particularly during the period 1994-1996.
A Re-estimation of equation (1) utilizing the most recent EUROSTAT (ESA95) data,
provides a b value of 0.003517 which, compared with the value obtained in table 4.5
(0.006440), indicates that the same German regions that were out performers in 1994-
1996, were under performers in 1997-1999. Table 4.9 gives the results of the estimation
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Table 4.9: Catching-up Objective 1 regions during CSF I
or CSF II (1995-1999)
Dependent Variable: x; ,
Method: Pooled Least Squares
Sample: 1995 1999
Number of cross-sections used: 60
Total panel (balanced) observations: 300
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
T?
Fixed Effects
0.003517 0.000899 3.910760 0.0001
AT 11--C 0.699897 G R 13--C 0.625483
BE32--C 0.721626
DE3--C 1.031108 GR21--C 0.444717
DE4--C 0.707661 GR22--C 0.576190
DE8--C 0.699821 GR23--C 0.510762
DED1--C 0.665092 GR24--C 0.813667
DED2--C 0.719052 GR25--C 0.530649
DED3--C 0.779086 GR3--C 0.736488
DEE1--C 0.628728 GR41--C 0.611954
DEE2--C 0.702838 GR42--C 0.777479
DEE3--C 0.672168 GR43--C 0.655532
DEG--C 0.679096 IE01--C 0.746451
ES 11--C 0.628052 I E02--C 1.099859
ES 12--C 0.686759 IT71--C 0.851407
ES13--C 0.732270 IT72--C 0.783768
ES41--C 0.732681 IT8--C 0.643125
ES42--C 0.637022 IT91--C 0.654879
ES43--C 0.490067 IT92--C 0.715148
ES52--C 0.753516 IT93--C 0.604869
ES61--C 0.575455 ITA--C 0.650719
ES62--C 0.654899 ITB--C 0.758439
ES63--C 0.645354 NL23--C 0.799373
ES7--C 0.761507 PT11--C 0.597328
FR83--C 0.769281 PT12--C 0.565217
FR91--C 0.545838 PT13--C 0.962996
FR92--C 0.624201 PT14--C 0.580297
FR93--C 0.520494 PT15--C 0.675930
FR94--C 0.504917 PT2--C 0.499808
G R 11--C 0.542204 PT3--C 0.665548
GR12--C 0.667210 UKN--C 0.786645
R-squared 0.974610 Mean dependent var 0.688468
Adjusted R-squared 0.968236 S.D. dependent var 0.123601
S.E. of regression 0.022029 Sum squared resid 0.115979
F-statistic 152.9026 Durbin-Watson stat 1.027632
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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4.4.4 Income Convergence in objective 1 regions
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 in page 177 reflected a negative relationship between average
growth rates and initial income. With the objective of obataining a more robust
interpretation of this relationship we estimate the convergence rate within the group of
objective 1 regions for 1989-1993 (table 4.10) and 1995-1999 (table 4.11).
Table 4.10: Convergence of objective 1 regions 1989-
1993
Dependent Variable: Average Growth Rate 1989-1993
Method: Least Squares
Included observations: 39
Estimated Equation:
(1- e-^^' ) f-^
^* log Yr,^+r = a+ T, * logLY;,r ^+ u;^,,+rv;,,
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C
LNY87
0.493003
-0.052742
0.112626 4.377365
0.012788 -4.124458
0.0001
0.0002
R-squared 0.314956 Mean dependent var 0.028611
Adjusted R-squared 0.296442 S.D. dependent var 0.019599
S.E. of regression 0.016439 Akaike info criterion -5.328345
Sum squared resid 0.009999 Schwarz criterion -5.243034
Log likelihood 105.9027 F-statistic 17.01115
Durbin-Watson stat 1.051123 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000202
Dataset: EUROSTAT
ESA79
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Table 4.11: Convergence of objective 1 regions 1995-
1999
Dependent Variable: Average Growth Rate 1995-1999
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1 60
Estimated Equation:
^* log y;,r+7'
y;,,
(1- e-a*^ )
= a+ T, * log f^^LY^,r ^+ x; + ui,,r+T
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.311279 0.082569 3.769942 0.0004
LNY95 -0.030917 0.009189 -3.364538 0.0014
DFR -0.015771 0.005520 -2.857389 0.0060
DIE 0.044506 0.008671 5.133013 0.0000
R-squared 0.404247 Mean dependent var 0.033686
Adjusted R-squared 0.372331 S.D. depende nt var 0.014726
S.E. of regression 0.011667 Akaike info criterion -5.999791
Sum squared resid 0.007622 Schwarz crite rion -5.860168
Log likelihood 183.9937 F-statistic 12.66620
Durbin-Watson stat 1.724001 Prob(F-statist ic) 0.000002
Dataset: EUROSTAT
ESA79
As we can see from table 4.10 and 4.1 l, the rate at which the objective 1 regions are
converging is high. The highest rate of convergence among the group of objective 1
regions was registered in the period 1989-1992 and was 6.12%. However, the rate for
the period 1995-1999 remains high (3.3%). In the previous estimation we can see that
the Greek and Irish regions have diverged from the groups' average steady state income.
Ireland actually outstripped the group average while the Greek regions fell back sharply.
We can conclude that the catching-up process among the objective 1 regions is much
faster than that which is taking place among the regions of the European Union as a
whole.
a
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4.5 Central and Eastern European Countries, regional
policy and the European Market
Accession to the European Union will provide an important opportunity for Central and
Eastern European Countries (CEECs). The EU is offering these countries a powerful
development strategy which is based on a combination of market competition and
development policy:
• Competition in a large market within the framework of European Economic and
Monetary Union will foster competitiveness in domestic sectors and attract
foreign direct investment aimed at taking advantage of new business
opportunities.
• The EU also offers a structural development policy focused on those regions
whose development is lagging behind. This development policy is not a price
support policy but an investment policy that aims to take advantage of the
competitive forces derived from integration in a larger market.
It is hoped therefore, that the competition generated from an enlarged market, in
combination with EU regional development policy will boost the growth of CEECs
within the framework of an open market economy.
Regional development policy is drawn up within a planning and programming
framework based on a partnership system. Planning and programming documents are
elaborated through consultation with social and economic agents. Community Support
Frameworks (CSFs) are elaborated through processes of consensus conducted
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throughout different governmental levels (Regional, Member States's Central
Governments, European Commission) and are formally approved by a Decision of the
European Commission. Operational Programmes, principally regional integrated
operational programmes, are the policy tools used to implement the regional
development strategies and investments which are also contained in the CSFs. They are
also submitted for approval to the European Commission by Member States, and are
managed under the auspices of steering and monitoring committees.
The management of structural funds is a complex task which must be carried out by
competent administrations at central and regional levels. This management process must
be compatible with the legal and policy frameworks of the EU, i.e., with the rules that
govern competition, especially with respect to state support. The EU must guarantee not
only the entire investment of resource funding, but also the adequate and most efficient
way of addressing expenditure allocation. Management plays a key factor in the
successful outcome of EU regional development policy. The CEECs will have to make
a great effort to ascertain and maintain the requisite of management capabilities.
Extraordinary administrative reforms will be needed together with the training of human
resources both within the civil service and in other pertinent managerial sectors.
In order to help to prepare the market economy and administrative structures for
accession, EU Regional Policy has been extended to the CEECs through new
instruments such us the Phare programme and Pre-accession instruments. These
procedures require much technical assistance, training and administrative cooperation.
•
•
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The changing face of the world economy, characterized by intensified competition
globalisation and the growing importance of the information society, mean that regional
economic growth is now determined by a plethora of factors which combine in
evermore subtle ways. Emphasis must be placed not simply on those regions whose
development is lagging behind the rest of regions, but also on all the factors that affect
competitiveness as a whole. These factors include territorial accessibility and transport,
research and innovation, education and vocational training, productive structure and so
on.
These new criteria may be addressed via the ESDP that aims to foment a polycentric
type of development which is both harmonic and balanced throughout the whole of the
European territory. The range of the dimensions and criteria involved however, a great
deal of risk due to the dispersion and enlargement of the areas that are to be assisted.
This will damage the effectiveness that the European Regional Policy has fomented
through the concentration of its efforts, both in the personal and financial sphere, on
those regions whose development is slower than the rest.
The main challenge for the ESDP is to achieve its goals under the conditions of
enlargement. The peculiarities of the acceding countries will mean that it is important to
clarify certain factors such as the investment carried out by the public sector, reducing
the foreseeable conflicts between different policy fields, and the best way of stimulating
latent economic potential. All these factors mean that spatial coordination will play a
greater role in the Acceding Countries than in the current Member States. This has
particular ramifications for:
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a) The planning of the expansion of the trans-European transport infrastructure and the
Community's transport policy.
b) Certain environmental measures, in particular, the rehabilitation and renovation of
old industrial zones.
c) Measures for structural adjustments in rural regions.
More intensive cross-border co-operation and trans-national, cooperation in spatial
development will aid the integration process in the enlargement area.
Moreover, EU enlargement to include the Central and Eastern European Countries
(CEEC) affects Regional Policy, because of its current focus on those regions that are
presently considered to be objective 1 regions. The accession of the CEE countries will
provoke a contraction effect in the statistical GDP ph threshold that defines the
objective 1 regions (see map EU-25), because the CEE countries have the lowest levels
of development. There are, of course regions that are objective 1 for reasons of low
population density -northern areas in Scandinavian countries- and regions that are right
on the periphery ^ceanic isles: The Canary Islands, The Azores, Madeira, and French
dominions. A very important group of regions, which are, at present, considered to be
objective 1, will probably lose this status because of the contraction effect acting on
the statistical threshold of reference. A second group of regions might lose their
•
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objective 1 status because of the growth dynamic that has succeeded in boosting their
development and accelerating the Per capita GDP convergence process already
underway in European Union. A much higher proportion of the present objective 1
regions risk losing this status because of the contraction of the statistical threshold than
those that will lose their objective 1 status due to their positive performance in terms of
growth. Map 4.3 shows GDPph levels for the current European Union's regions in the
case of a hypothetical enlar^ement of the EU to 25 members.
Map 4.3: GDP pc in 1997 (UE25=100)
1000 0 1000 2000 Miles
There are very few regions that are in a position to enjoy the positive effects of the
convergence while remaining objective 1 regions. The remaining regions, simply
because of the contraction effect on the statistical threshold of reference, would be
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situated in upper levels, i.e. levels of above the 70% average GDPph EU-25. A minor
boost towards convergence therefore, would mean that these regions would lose their
objective 1 status.
Map 4.4: Regions eligible under structural funds {2000-2006)
^ Regions Eligible underOhjective 1
0 CEEC
Source: Own elaboration using Arc View 8.1
1000 1000 2000 Miles
These regions would experienced the dramatic and premature withdrawal of assistance
which is a key factor in the realisation of their growth potential and in overcoming the
handicaps and vicious circles of the structural lag. The withdrawal of funds from these
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areas therefore, would harm the regions where the Structural Funds are most effective in
contributing to European growth.
It is important to maintain the concentration and effectiveness of the Community
Regional Policy and the contribution of the structural funds themselves, focused on the
most deserving regions since they combine the lowest levels of development together
with the highest levels of potential growth. The crux of the solution to the problem of
balanced development throughout Europe, therefore, is to provide the poorer regions
with the means whereby they can compete unaided.
There are several means by which this compensation might be applied. The common
denominator might be: To clasify those region ŝ in the present European Union whose
GDPph is below 75% of the EU-15average GDPph immediately after the accession as
objective 1 regions.
A comparison of this map with the others in this section reveals that the situation is not
as dramatic in less developed regions as one might have expected. A significant
proportion of the current objective 1 regions will no longer be objective 1 due to the
dynamism of their growth. In fact some of these regions would not have fallen below
the 75% of the average GDPph threshold in 1997.
By the end of the current programming period the population in those regions in the
current UE-15 whose Per Capita GDP is below 75% of the average should have fallen
by just under 25% will facilitate an increase in concentration of the assisted population
and will allow policy to focus on other objectives, such as restructuring and
unemployment. However, in a hypothetical UE-25, due to low levels of development
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and GDP ph, the vast majority of the regions in the future acceding countries, would
be objective l. One of the effects of enlargement therefore, will be an increase in the
percentage of the EU population which fall into the objective 1 regions.
At present, if we discount those objective 1 regions that will surpass the 1997 threshold
of 75% average GDP ph for the EU-15, over the following years, then the assisted
population under objective 1 could be placed within the range of 15.6%-16.6%. If we
add the 90% of the population of the acceding CEECs (EU-25) the percentage of
population receiving assistance under objective 1 in the future EU-25 will rise to 31%.
That it is to say, a total of 47% of the population will be assisted, if the assistance
objective 2 regions is maintained.
The dynamism of a significant number of the present objective 1 regions, effectively
requalifying them as non-objective 1 regions by the end of the 2000-2006 programming
period, will provide sufficient financial "space" to assist the future CEE acceding
countries. The financial framework of Agenda 2000 and the Berlin European Council
provides the mechanisms to utilise the funding space for structural interventions in the
future acceding countries in a hypothetical EU25.
4.6 The Agenda 2000 and the Berlin European Council
The guidelines for the medium-term implementation and funding of the main EU
policies were agreed upon at the Berlin Summit (March 1999), where a coherent
framework to marry expenditure commitments and foreseen resources was set out by
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the European Council. The European Union's expenditure must respect the imperative
of budgetary discipline required for stability in the EMLT, and an efficient pattern of
spending must be established and maintained among the various headings (Agriculture,
Structural actions and Regional Policy, Internal Policies, External Action, Pre-
Accession Aid and Enlargement). This pattern of spending must also ensure the orderly
development of EU policies and to cope effectively with the process of enlargement.
During the meeting of the Berlin European Council, the "Agenda 2000" set out the
guidelines for policy reforms and drew up the framework for funding these reforms in
the medium-term, as a means of ensuring that the Union will be in a position to face the
challenges which enlargement will create. Both the financial perspectives for the current
EU-15 and the financial framework for an EU with six future acceding countries (EU-
2l ) were set out on the basis of the working assumption that the accession of new
Member States would begin in 2002. Table 4.4 defines the framework for action in
terms of the main EU policies both for the current members of the EU and for the
foreseeable framework of a Union enlarged up to 21 members States.
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TABLE 4.12: FINANCIAL PERSPECTIVES (EU15) AND FINANCIAL FRAMEWORK (EU21)
A: FINANCIAL B: FINANCIAL
EUR Million 1999 prices- PERSPECTIVE EU15 FRAMEWORK EU21
Appropriations for
commitments 2000-2006 Year 2006 2000-2006 Year 2006
1.AGRICULTURE 297.740 41.660 297.740 41.660
CAP expenditure (excluding rural
development) 267.370 37.290 267.370 37.290
Rural development and accompanying 30.370 4.370measures 30.370 4.370
2. STRUCTURAL OPERATIONS 213.010 29.170 213.010 29.170
Structural Funds 195.010 26.660 I95 010 26 660
Cohesion Fund 18.000 2,510
.
18.000
.
2.S l0
3.INTERNAL POLICIES 42.350 6.200 42.350 6.200
4. EXTERNAL ACTION 32.060 4.610 32.060 4.610
5. ADM(NISTRATION 33.660 5.100 33.660 5.100
6. RESERVES 4.050 400 4.050 400
Monetary reserve 1.250 0 1.250 0
Emergence aid reserve 1.400 200 1.400 200
Guarantee reserve 1.400 200 1.400 200
7. PRE-ACCESSION AID 21.840 3.120 21.840 3.120
Agriculture 3.640 520 3.640 520
Pre-Accession structural instrument 7.280 1.040 7.280 1.040
PHARE a licant countries) 10.920 1.560 10.920 1.560
8. ENLARGEMENT 58.070 16.780
Agriculture 12.410 3.400
Structural operations 39.580 12.080
Internal policies 3.950 850
Administration 2.130 450
TOTAL APROPRIATIONS FOR
COMMITMENTS 640.470 90.260 702.780 107.040
CEILING ON APROPRIATIONS 685.870 103 530 685 870 103 530FOR PAYMENTS 1 l5%
.
1 13%
.
1 12%
.
1 09%Appropriations for payments as% of . . . .
GNP
Margin 0.12% 0.14% 0.14% 0.18%
Own resources ceilin 1.27% 1.27% 1.27% 1.27%
SOURCE: Conclusions of the Presidency, Berlin European Council 24-25 March 1999.
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The previous table reflects the total amounts of expenditure that corresponding to the
different headings for the present EU-15 (financial framework) and for an EU-21 under
the hypothesis of enlargement (financial framework) during the period 2000-2006.
The foreseeable amount of resources and the Community financial rules with respect to
the own resources ceiling are reflected in these frameworks. The reserve margin which
arises as a direct consequence is also given in the last row of the table.
In the financial framework for the EU-21, the total number of headings is enlarged to 8,
and the last of these is reflects the interventions in the new member States. The table
also reflects the annual appropriations for the commitments foreseen for the year 2006.
4.7 European Union regional policy: The 2007 Financial
envelope for the objective 1 regions
ln this section, we use the figures for 2006 for structural interventions and carry out a
simple simulation exercise in order to discover the financial space available for
extending objective 1 aid to CEECsS. The simulation is based on the GDPph data for
97, the expected reduction in the number of EU-15 objective 1 regions, and the
hypothesis of the provision of objective 1 assistance to 90% of the CEEC population.
The simulation is carried out by computing the amounts required in order to provide the
average per head aid to 75% of the currently assisted population in EU-15 and to 90%
of CEEC population and marrying the percentages to the amount of resources foreseen
SA specific paper dealing with growth rates in the objective 1 regions and the stagnation of rich regions with
medium levels of development and the study of the financial possibilities for enlarging the European Union Regional
Policy to Central and Eastern European Countries has been presented at UACES 31S` Annual conference (Bristol
2001) and has been published as a working paper at Exeter University.
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for objective 1 and allied structural interventions for the year 2006 (Objective 1
foreseen resources) in the EU-21 financial framework sed out by the Berlin European
Council.
The results achieved using these hypotheses are given in the following tables (table 1
and table 2):
The total amount of foreseen resources for the year 2006 in the Financial Framework
for structural actions in objective 1 regions, can be obtained by adding the amounts
(already foreseen) in the 2006 annuity and those that correspond to the future Member
States under the headings of Structural Operations and Pre-adhesion Aid. The result is a
total of 32.115 Meuros at 1999 prices. On adding the projection of the increase in
resources that arises as a result of GNP growth for 2007 under the assumptions given
in the financial framework (0.45% of GNP devoted to Structural Actions), in so doing
we obtain an additional figure of 919 Meuros. As a result, the total resources for
structural interventions in objective 1 regions for the year 2007 is 33.034 Meuros.
TABLE 4.13: RESOURCES FOR OBJECTIVE 1
RESOURCES FOR OBJECTIVE 1 Thousands
Meuros 1999
Objective 1 EU-15
(65.4% of 26.660 2006 An n u itvl
17.435
Structural Onerations Accedina Countries 12.080
Preaccesion Aid 2.600
Subtotal in EU 21 Financial Framework 32.115
2007 Increase. (0.45% from 2.15% GDP 919
TOTAL RESOURCES 2007 33.034
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On the needs' side, if we adopt the assumption that 75% of the assisted population will
belong to objective 1 regions in the current programming period 2000-2006, thus
allowing for the effects of statistical convergence we obtain a figure of 13.077 Meuros
for the total needs for 2007, if we use the 2006 figures for average aid per head. On
using the 2000-2006 figures for average aid per head we obtain a figure of 13.664
Meuros. ^
Moreover, if we take into account that 90% of the population of the 12 acceding
countries of Central and Eastern Europe will have a GDP per head which is lower than
75% of the EU average, needs for the year 2007 will be either 19.884 Meuros if we use
the average aid per head for the year 2006 in objective 1 regions or a slightly higher
figure of 20.777 Meuros if we use the average aid per head for 2000-2006 in objective
1 regions.
As a result of these computations on the needs'side, it can be shown that under the
assumption of the average aid per head for the year 2006 in objective 1 regions, the
projection for resources for the year 2007 in objective 1 regions under the assumptions
of the current financial framework of the EU for 2000-2006 would be sufficient both to
meet the amounts required for the enlargement and to counter balance the statistical
effect of accession in order to maintain funding for 3/4 of the objective 1 population in
the current EU 15.
If we use the average aid per head for 2000-2006 in objective 1 regions as the criteria
for aid per head in those regions where there is developmental lag, we find that the total
•
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required would be 34.441 Meuros. The latter hypothesis therefore generates a financial
gap of 1.407 Meuros.
TABLE 4.14: NEEDS FOR REGIONS LAGGING BEHIND IN 2007
AID FOR 2007 OB7 1 EU-25 (*) Thousands of
Meuros 99
Average Aid
2006
Average Aid
00-06
75% Current EU15 Obj 1 13.077 13.664
90% Population CEEAC 19.884 20.777
Total Amount Obj 1 EU-25 (*) 32.961 34.441
Difference with respect to Total Resources 73 . -1.407
(*) Cyprus and Malta are not included
The funding needs of the objective 1 regions can be compared with the amounts
devoted to other objectives (table 3): 8.379 Meuros, for objectives 2 and 3 and 2.510 for
the Cohesion Fund. The non-objective one regions that receive support however, may
be bolstered without resource to the support, which is at present dedicated to the
objective 1 regions. The amount of 1.407 Meuros may be found through an increase in
the GNP destined for structural interventions and thus European Union Regional Policy
will be fulfilled.
0
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TABLE 4.15: COMPARATIVE VALUE OBJECTIVE 1 FINANCIAL GAP
COMPARATIVE VALUE
OBJECTIVE 1 FINANCIAL GAP
Meuros 99 %
Objective 2 and 3 8.379 16.8
Cohesion Fund 2.510 56.0
0.05% over GDP 4.750 29.6
Financial gap for Objective 1
Keeping real value aid per head
1.407 100.0
These computations are not intended as a vehicle for suggesting the amounts that should
be assigned to the EU Regional Policy in the future programming period 200-2006.
Rather, these amounts must arise out of the political debate surrounding the objectives
of future regional policy in the EU. These objectives must take on board a radical
increase in the disparities in levels of development whilst assimilating the effects of a
reformulation of the criteria for objective 2(regions with structural problems) and
objective 3( human resources and employment). Further, the problems of coordinating
policies and balancing territorial development from the European Spatial Development
Perspective will have to be addressed . These objectives are far-reaching in their
outlook, and as a consequence will require a financial framework which is ambitious
enough to take advantage of the benefits derived from development and cohesion, in
order to provide the basis of enlarged, strengthened EU.
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4.8 Conclusions
In the first part of this chapter we analysed growth and the catching-up process of the
less developed regions which has been in progress since 1989. As a way of analysing
the growth process we split the period into two subperiods 1989-1993 and 1995-1999
as a means of making them to coincide with the years in which the Community Support
Frameworks have been operational. The analysis was carried out by studying the growth
rates in units of population decile and population quintile. This methodology helps us to
avoid biases that might arise from giving the same weight to two regions that have very
different levels of population. The results of this analysis shed new light on the positive
performance of the objective 1 regions, indicating that they have experienced positive
growth rates in the two subperiods and, on average, have outperformed EU 15.
For the analysis of the catching-up process we regress the gap between the per capita
income of the objective 1 regions and the average per capita income of the EU15 on a
trend variable using a panel data model with fixed effects. Estimations of the model
proposed for the time periods 1983-1988, 1989-1994, 1994-1997 and 1995-1999 show
that the catching-up process of the objective 1 regions did not take place until the
implementation of the objective 1 regional economic development policy. Moreover,
the catching-up process was faster during the first Community Support Framework.
These findings provide evidence that proves the effectiveness of EU regional policy in
fomenting the growth of the objective 1 regions.
In the final part of the chapter, we focus on the effects that the enlargement of the
European Union to incorporate the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs)
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will cause in the current objective 1 regions. The simple calculations carried out above
using the resources foreseen for the objective 1 regions, the future acceding countries
and the Cohesion Fund have shown that maintaining the concentration in the objective 1
regions and providing the average level of assistance to 90% of the population in the 10
CEEC is compatible with financial balance and the "own resources" ceiling.
This is not a reasonable political target, because there will be an increased need for a
cohesion policy in an enlarged Union and a successful policy of economic development
is one of the most dynamic and essential tools that the EU can provide for the future
CEE acceding countries. There are several potential ways of adjusting Economic and
Social Cohesion Policy in order to cope efficiently with EU enlargement. Structural
Funds and Cohesion Policy however, must remain focused on economic development
policies, allowing the objective 1 regions in the current EU-15 to continue to close the
gap that exists between themselves and the rest of the EU, thus fomenting the growth
potential of the CEECs. This implies that the less developed regions should continue to
receive support while at the same time extending this aid to the future acceding
Countries. The debate is being aired, there are not utopian solutions, but European
"dynamic" would seem to imbue optimism.
Fundamental to the successful implantation of the accession mechanisms will be the
competent, efficient management of structural funds. The weaknesses inherent in the
administrative system constrained the effects of the first Greek CSF (Georgiou, 1993,
European Commission 1996c, 1997a) while the first and perhaps even the second CSF
in Italian Mezzogiorno were similarly constrained (Leonardi 1995, European
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Commission, 1995b, 1996c, Roeger 1996, Svimez 1996b). If the CEECs are not to
follow suit they must make an effort to acquire relevant managerial capabilities.
A further crucial line of reform deals with the territorial coordination of sectorial
policies and investments in infrastructure. A Suitable policy framework must be built in
order to guarantee the spatial coherence of ineasures adopted within the guidelines of
the European Spatial Development Perspective. The main challenge for the ESDP is to
achieve its goals whilst minimizing the constraints of enlargement and maximizing the
global benefits. ^ ^
•
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5.1 Conclusions
This thesis has studied the spatial structure, regional growth and regional convergence
in the European Union from 1982 to 1999.
First, in analysing the spatial structure of the European Union, we use both the
technique of population potentials and the Gini concentration index.
Population Potentials offer a means of condensing a large quantity of information by
plotting maps of population contours which expand from the main agglomeration
areas, where the highest peaks of population potentials lie.
When applied to Europe this technique emphasizes an area in which the European
population is particularly concentrated. This area is based around the large population
centres of Manchester - London - Paris - K^ln - Dŭsseldorf - Ruhr Valley, around
which there are further concentric population potential contours of decreasing strength.
This research provides us with a clear-cut alternative to what is commonly known as the
"Blue Banana"-a large growing area which includes most of the regions of Germany,
Austria and Benelux, as well as the more developed urban regions which form part of
the UK, France and the North of Italy.
This alternative concept of the European population as a nuclear structure with
successive concentric lines of potentials, correlates quite remarkably with nighttime
light diffusion images which depict the population centered around what we define as
the "Central European Triangle" (UK, Manchester, London, Paris, Cologne,
Diisseldorf, Ruhr Valley). Around this area, successive population potential contours
take in Berlin, Prague and the North Italian axis.
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Using the Gini concentration index the main conclusions with respect to the spatial
concentration of GDP and population are: First, population and GDP are concentrated
at the "core" of the European territory. Second, the concentration of GDP in this space
is higher than the concentration of the population. Third, from a dynamic point of view
there is both a slight increase in the concentration of GDP and population in space over
time and the increase in the concentration of population is proportionally higher than the
increase in the concentration of GDP. Fourth, there is a remarkable stability over time
in the proportion of space that corresponds to 15-20% of the richest population in the
European Union. Moreover, on analysing the regional distribution of this population,
we again find the above mentioned stability. Out of the 14 regions that represent the
richest 15% of the total population in 1984 eleven remained the same in 1994.
A step forward has been taken by econometrically testing the explanatory power that
population potentials have on the levels of development. By using a logarithm
specification for the relationship between population potentials and levels of
development and estimating cross-section regressions for different time periods we
evaluate whether or not the explanatory power of population potentials holds constant
over time or whether they vary as we become more distanced from the year in which
our cross-section regression estimates began.
We have found that proximity to large consumer markets, or in other words, market
potential, was an important explanatory variable for regional income in the early
eighties, but its significance in determining regional income in the 1990's has decreased
even though it is still a very significant factor in explaining regional per head GDP.
a
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Thus, regions which are dynamic in terms of income have also emerged on the
periphery, and need not necessarily be close to rich regions. This fact might mean a
decrease in the importance of distance because of globalization processes, changes in
transport and information and communication technologies and, moreover, should lead
us to reflect on the possible effects that the "new" European Union regional policy for
objective 1 regions has exerted from the mid eighties onwards. European Union
regional policy has had an important effect in terms of boosting the growth of peripheral
regions and by extension their income levels, and the results given here provide some
fairly conclusive evidence to this end.
On analysing regional convergence, we have adopted a two-prongued approach. First,
we have retaken the traditional tools of regional scientists, tools that have been
abandoned in favour of more sophisticated macroeconomic techniques. We believe that
traditional tools remain of use and are in complete agreement with Cheshire and
Carbonaro's view that the actual pattern of dispersion of regional incomes over time "is
a valid dimension of equity with which policy, at least in the EU, is specifically
concerned" (Cheshire and Carbonaro 1995, p.109). Second, we also carry out the
traditional macroeconomic analysis of convergence by following the approach of
Barro and Sala-i-Martín.
In line with the work of other contemporary regional scientists we have chosen the
Theil index of concentration as a tool for verifying global regional convergence.
Various authors have highlighted the merits of this index for analysing spatial
distributions. These advantages include its weighting system and its "decomposability".
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The index has been used for the Population data and GDP (PPS at 1985 prices) which
has been furnished by the Eurostat-Regio database. The results of this analysis show
that income disparities between the two groups being considered, that is the objective 1
group or "poor" regions and non-objective 1 group or "rich" regions, have been
shrinking since 1987-1988 until now for all of the samples used in our study (EU12
1982-1997, EU 15 1988-1997 and EU 15 1995-1999 using the new accounting system
(ESA95)). This indicates that a process of catching-up or convergence is taking place
with respect to the income levels of the two groups being considered.
From a macroeconomic point of view, the cross-section regressions of convergence
indicate that from 1982 to 1986 there is a clear non-convergence pattern for all of the
regions, both in EU9 and EU 12. Absolute ^3 -convergence has been the norm since
1987. That is, the poor regions within these countries tend to grow faster per capita than
those that are rich. The values found for absolute ^3 -convergence in 1987-1992 are
higher in EU 15 than in EU 12 (a speed of convergence of about 2% in EU 15 and
1.77% in EU12). However, in 1993-1997 the speed of convergence reached similar
values both for the EU 12 and EU 15, the figure being about 1.9%.
Finally we analysed the growth performance of objective 1 regions in a little more
detail. In order to avoid a bias that might stem from allotting the same weight to two
regions that have very different levels of population, we have analysed regional growth
in population deciles and in population quintiles for 1989-1992 and for 1995-1999. By
this means the geographical location of individuals within the European space may be
partially ignored. On analysing 1989-1992 growth according to quintiles of population,
•
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there appears to be a clear negative correlation between the growth rates and the
population quintiles. However, when analysing growth for the same period according to
deciles of population we find that the negative relationship no longer holds true. Rather,
we observe a"U"-shaped profile in the EU-15. This pattern indicates a process in which
regional growth is becoming polarized. This model of polarized growth is known as the
so-called "twin peaks" model (Chaterij, 1993, Quah, 1996a, 1996b, 1997). It has
created what Baumol called convergence "clubs", polarized either at the highest or
lowest levels of income (Ben-David 1994, Quah, 1996a, 1996b, Fagerberg and
Verspagen, 1996).
The analysis of the period 1995-1999 differs from the period 1989-1993. The negative
relationship between average growth rates and population quintiles holds, both in the
case of quintiles and deciles. The "U" profile which characterized the .1989-1993 is no
longer present. When we assign the population deciles and quintiles to the respective
NUTS II regions, we have observed that most of the population in the first two deciles
or equivalently the population of the first quintile (deciles and quintiles of population
have been ordered by decreasing levels of growth rates) belong to objective 1 regions.
This sheds fresh light on the dynamic growth of the objective 1 regions. In order to
corroborate the positive performance of the objective 1 regions, we use a panel data
model with fixed effects. The model proxies the catching-up process of the objective 1
regions towards the European Union Per Capita GDP average in different periods of
time, i.e., before the implementation of the CSFs, and during the first and second
Delors packages (CSF I and CSF II). The results show that the catching-up process
223
Conclusions
started during the first Delors package and the speed at which the regions caught up
was higher in the first than in the second CSF. The positive effects of the CSFs on the
regions whose development is sluggish leads us to analyse the figures an amounts
assigned by the European Union regional policy for the next programming period 2000-
2006 within the framework of EU enlargement to the Central and Eastern European
Countries. This analysis conclude that, according to the figures foreseen in the financial
perspectives for the EU-15 and in the financial framework for an enlarged EU-21 set out
by the Berlin European Council in March 1999, there is enough financial leeway to
assist 90% of the CEECs population and 75% of the current objective 1 population.
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Region
Code Region
at Austria
be1 Région Bruxelles
be21 Antwerpen
be22 Limburg (B)
be23 Oost-Vlaanderen
be24 Vlaams Brabant
be25 West-Vlaanderen
be31 Brabant Wallon
be32 Hainaut
be33 Liége
be34 Luxembourg (B)
be35 Namur
de11 Stuttgart
de12 Karlsruhe
de13 Freiburg
de14 Tiibingen
de21 Oberbayern
de22 Niederbayern
de23 Oberpfalz
de24 Oberfranken
de25 Mittelfranken
de26 Unterfranken
de27 Schwaben
de5 Bremen
Region
Code Region
de6 Hamburg
de71 Darmstadt
de72 Gief3en
de73 Kassel
de91 Braunschweig
de92 Hannover
de93 Li^neburg
de94 Weser-Ems
dea1 Dŭsseldorf
dea2 Káln
dea3 Miinster
dea4 Detmold
dea5 Arnsberg
deb1 Koblenz
deb2 Trier
deb3 Rheinhessen-Pfalz
dec Saarland
def Schleswig-Holstein
dk Denmark
es11 Galicia
es12 Principado de Asturias
es13 Cantabria
es21 Pais Vasco
es22 Comunidad Foral de Navarra
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Region Region
Code Region Code Region
es23 La Rioja fr52 Bretagne
es24 Aragón fr53 Poitou-Charentes
es3 Comunidad de Madrid fr61 Aquitaine
es41 Castilla y León fr62 Midi-Pyrénées
es42 Castilla-la Mancha fr63 Limousin
es43 Extremadura fr71 Rhóne-Alpes
es51 Cataluña fr72 Auvergne
es52 Comunidad Valenciana fr81 Languedoc-Roussillon
es53 Baleares fr82 Provence-Alpes-Cóte d'Azur
es61 Andalucia fr83 Corse
es62 Murcia gr11 Anatoliki Makedonia, Thraki
es63 Ceuta y Melilla (ES) gr12 Kentriki Makedonia
es7 Canarias (ES) gr13 Dytiki Makedonia
fr1 Íle de France gr14 Thessalia
fr21 Champagne-Ardenne gr21 Ipeiros
fr22 Picardie gr22 lonia Nisia
fr23 Haute-Normandie gr23 Dytiki Ellada
fr24 Centre gr24 Sterea Ellada
fr25 Basse-Normandie gr25 Peloponnisos
fr26 Bourgogne gr3 Attiki
fr3 Nord - Pas-de-Calais gr41 Voreio Aigaio
fr41 Lorraine gr42 Notio Aigaio
fr42 Alsace gr43 Kriti
fr43 Franche-Comté ie Ireland
fr51 Pays de la Loire it11 Piemonte
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Region
Code Region
it12 Valle d'Aosta
it13 Liguria
it2 Lombardia
it31 Trentino-Alto Adige
it32 Veneto
it33 Friuli-Venezia Giulia
it4 Emilia-Romagna
it51 Toscana
it52 Umbria
it53 Marche
it6 Lazio
it71 Abruzzo
it72 Molise
it8 Campania
it91 Puglia
it92 Basilicata
it93 Calabria
ita Sicilia
itb Sardegna
lu Luxembourg
n111 Groningen
n112 Friesland
n113 Drenthe
nl2 Oost-Nederland
n131 Utrecht
n132 Noord-Holland
Region
Code Region
n133 Zuid-Holland
n134 Zeeland
n141 Noord-Brabant
n142 Limburg (NL)
pt11 Norte
pt12 Centro (P)
pt13 Lisboa e Vale do Tejo
pt14 Alentejo
pt15 Algarve
ukc1 Tees Valley and Durham
Northumberland, Tyne and
ukc2 Wear
ukd1 Cumbria
ukd2 Cheshire
ukd3 Greater Manchester
ukd4 Lancashire
ukd5 Merseyside
^.aa ► r^iuu iy ai w i^ui u i
uke1 Lincolnshire
uke2 North Yorkshire
uke3 South Yorkshire
uke4 West Yorkshire
Derbyshire and
ukf1 Nottinghamshire
Leicestershire, Rutland and
ukf2 Northants
ukf3 Lincolnshire
Herefordshire, Worcestershire
ukg1 and Warks
ukg2 Shropshire and Staffordshire
ukg3 West Midlands
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Region
Code Region
ukh1 East Anglia
ukh2 Bedfordshire, Hertfordshire
ukh3 Essex
uki London
Berkshire, Bucks and
ukj1 Oxfordshire
Surrey, East and West
ukj2 Sussex
Hampshire and Isle of
ukj3 Wight
ukj4 Kent
Gloucestershire, Wiltshire
ukk1 and North Somerset
ukk2 Dorset and Somerset
ukk3 Cornwall and Isles of Scilly
ukk4 Devon
ukl Wales
ukm Scotland
ukn Northern Ireland
t
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Region RegionRegion Region
Code Code
at11 Burgenland de22 Niederbayern
at12 Nieder^sterreich de23 Oberpfalz
at13 Wien de24 Oberfranken
at21 K^rnten de25 Mittelfranken
at22 Steiermark de26 Unterfranken
at31 Oberásterreich de27 Schwaben
at32 Salzburg de3 Berlin
at33 Tirol de4 Brandenburg
at34 Vorarlberg de5 Bremen
be1 Reg. Bruxelles de6 Hamburg
be21 Antwerpen de71 Darmstadt
be22 Limburg de72 Gief3en
be23 Oost-Vlaanderen de73 Kassel
be24 Vlaams Brabant de8 Mecklenburg-Vorpommern
be25 West-Vlaanderen de91 Braunschweig
be31 Brabant Wallon de92 Hannover
be32 Hainaut de93 Liineburg
be33 Liége de94 Weser-Ems
be34 Luxembourg dea1 Di^sseldorf
be35 Namur dea2 Káln
de11 Stuttgart dea3 Mi^nster
de12 Karlsruhe dea4 Detmold
de13 Freiburg dea5 Arnsberg
de14 Tŭbingen deb1 Koblenz
de21 Oberbayern deb2 Trier
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Region RegionRegion RegionCode Code
deb3 Rheinhessen-Pfalz es61 Andalucía
dec Saarland es62 Región de Murcia
ded1 Chemnitz es63 Ceuta y Melilla
ded2 Dresden es7 Canarias
ded3 Leipzig fi 13 It^-Suomi
dee1 Dessau fi14 Véli-Suomi
dee2 Halle fi 15 Pohjois-Suomi
dee3 Magdeburg fi1ó Uusimaa (Suuralue)
def Schleswig-Holstein fi17 Etel^-Suomi
deg Thiiringen fi2 Aland
dk Danmark fr1 Íle de France
es11 Galicia fr21 Champagne-Ardenne
es12 Principado de Asturias fr22 Picardie
es13 Cantabria fr23 Haute-Normandie
es21 Pais Vasco fr24 Centre
es22 C. Foral de Navarra fr25 Basse-Normandie
es23 La Rioja fr26 Bourgogne
es24 Aragón fr3 Nord - Pas-de-Calais
es3 Comunidad de Madrid fr41 Lorraine
es41 Castilla y León fr42 Alsace
es42 Castilla-la Mancha fr43 Franche-Comté
es43 Extremadura fr51 Pays de la Loire
es51 Cataluña fr52 Bretagne
es52 C. Valenciana fr53 Poitou-Charentes
es53 Islas Baleares fr61 Aquitaine
•
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Region RegionRegion RegionCode Code
fró2 Midi-Pyrénées ie02 Southern and Eastern
fr63 Limousin it11 Piemonte
fr71 Rhóne-Alpes it12 Valle d'Aosta
fr72 Auvergne it13 Liguria
fr81 Languedoc-Roussillon it2 Lombardia
Provence-Alpes-Cótefr82 it31 Trentino-Alto Adiged'Azur
fr83 Corse it32 Veneto
fr91 Guadeloupe it33 Friuli-Venezia Giulia
fr92 Martinique it4 Emilia-Romagna
fr93 Guyane it51 Toscana
fr94 Réunion it52 Umbria
Anatoliki Makedoniagr11 , it53 MarcheThraki
gr12 Kentriki Makedonia itó Lazio
gr13 Dytiki Makedonia it71 Abruzzo
gr14 Thessalia it72 Molise
gr21 Ipeiros it8 Campania
gr22 lonia Nisia it91 Puglia
gr23 Dytiki Ellada it92 Basilicata
gr24 Sterea Ellada it93 Calabria
gr25 Peloponnisos ita Sicilia
gr3 Attiki itb Sardegna
gr41 Voreio Aigaio lu Luxembourg (Grand-Duché)
gr42 Notio Aigaio n111 Groningen
gr43 Kriti n112 Friesland
Border Midland andie01 , n113 DrentheWestern
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Region RegionRegion Region
Code Code
Northumberland and Tyne &
n121 Overijssel ukc2 Wear
n122 Gelderland ukd1 Cumbria
n123 Flevoland ukd2 Cheshire
n131 Utrecht ukd3 Greater Manchester
n132 Noord-Holland ukd4 Lancashire
n133 Zuid-Holland ukd5 Merseyside
East Riding & North
n134 Zeeland uke1 Lincolnshire
n141 Noord-Brabant uke2 North Yorkshire
n142 Limburg uke3 South Yorkshire
pt11 Norte uke4 West Yorkshire
Derbyshire &pt12 Centro ukf1 Nottinghamshire
Leicestershire Rutland &pt13 Lisboa e Vale do Tejo ukf2 ,Northants
pt14 Alentejo ukf3 Lincolnshire
Herefordshirept15 Algarve ukg1 ,Worcestershire & Warks
pt2 Açores ukg2 Shropshire & Staffordshire
pt3 Madeira ukg3 West Midlands
se01 Stockholm ukh1 East Anglia
se02 ^stra Mellansverige ukh2 Bedfordshire, Hertfordshire
se04 Sydsverige ukh3 Essex
se06 Norra Mellansverige uki1 Inner London
se07 Mellersta Norrland uki2 Outer London
Berkshire Bucks &
se08 CSvre Norrland ukj1 ,Oxfordshire
se09 Smáland med CSarna ukj2 Surrey, East & West Sussex
se0a V^stsverige ukj3 Hampshire & Isle of Wight
ukc1 Tees Valley & Durham ukj4 Kent
•
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Region
Code Region
ukk1 Gloucestershire, Wiltshire 8^ North Somerset
ukk2 Dorset & Somerset
ukk3 Cornwall & Isles of Scilly
ukk4 Devon
ukl1 West Wales & the Valleys
ukl2 East Wales
ukm1 North Eastern Scotland
ukm2 Eastern Scotland
ukm3 South Western Scotland
ukm4 Highlands & Islands
ukn Northern Ireland
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Poor Group
i
Region
Code Region
de93 Liineburg
es11 Galicia
es12 Principado de Asturias
es13 Cantabria
es24 Aragón
es41 Castilla y León
es42 Castilla-la Mancha
es43 Extremadura
es52 C.Valenciana
es61 Andalucia
es62 Murcia
es63 Ceuta y Melilla (ES)
es7 Canarias (ES)
Anatoliki Makedonia,
gr11 Thraki
gr12 Kentriki Makedonia
gr13 Dytiki Makedonia
gr14 Thessalia
gr21 Ipeiros
gr22 lonia Nisia
Region
Code Region
gr23 Dytiki Ellada
gr24 Sterea Ellada
gr25 Peloponnisos
gr3 Attiki
gr41 Voreio Aigaio
gr42 Notio Aigaio
gr43 Kriti
ie Ireland
it72 Molise
it8 Campania
it91 Puglia
it92 Basilicata
it93 Calabria
ita Sicilia
itb Sardegna
pt11 Norte
pt12 Centro (P)
pt14 Alentejo
pt15 Algarve
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Rich Group
Region Region
Code Region Code Region
be22 Limburg (B) dea5 Arnsberg
be23 Oost-Vlaanderen deb1 Koblenz
be24 Vlaams Brabant deb2 Trier
be25 West-Vlaanderen deb3 Rheinhessen-Pfalz
be31 Brabant Wallon dec Saarland
be32 Hainaut def Schleswig-Holstein
be33 Liége dk Denmark
be34 Luxembourg (B) es21 Pais Vasco
be35 Namur es22 C. Foral de Navarra
de13 Freiburg es23 La Rioja
de14 Ti^bingen es3 C. de Madrid
de22 Niederbayern es51 Cataluña
de23 Oberpfalz es53 Baleares
^nampagne-
de24 Oberfranken fr21 Ardenne
de25 Mittelfranken fr22 Picardie
de26 Unterfranken fr24 Centre
de27 Schwaben fr25 Basse-Normandie
de72 Gief3en fr26 Bourgogne
de73 Kassel fr3 Nord - Pas-de-Galais
de91 Braunschweig fr41 Lorraine
de92 Hannover fr42 Alsace
de94 Weser-Ems fr43 Franche-Comté
dea2 Kbin fr51 Pays de la Loire
dea3 Mi^nster fr52 Bretagne
dea4 Detmold fr53 Poitou-Charentes
•
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Rich Group
Region
Code Region
Region
Code Region
fró1 Aquitaine n141 Noord-Brabant
fró2 Midi-Pyrénées n142 Limburg (NL)
fr63 Limousin pt13 Lisboa e Vale do Tejo
fr71 Rhóne-Alpes be1 Région Bruxelles
fr72 Auvergne be21 Antwerpen
fr81 Languedoc-Roussillon de11 Stuttgart
fr82 Provence-Alpes-Cóte d'A: de12 Karlsruhe
fr83 Corse de21 Oberbayern
it11 Piemonte de5 Bremen
it13 Liguria deó Hamburg
it31 Trentino-Alto Adige de71 Darmstadt
it32 Veneto dea1 Dŭsseldorf
it33 Friuli-Venezia Giulia fr1 Íle de France
it51 Toscana fr23 Haute-Normandie
it52 Umbria it12 Valle d'Aosta
it53 Marche it2 Lombardia
it6
it71
Lazio
Abruzzo
it4
n111
Emilia-Romagna
Groningen
lu
n112
Luxembourg
Friesland
n113 Drenthe
n131 Utrecht
n132 Noord-Holland
n133 Zuid-Holland
n134 Zeeland
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Poor Group
i
Region Region
Code Region Code
pt3 Madeira (PT)
Region
it92 Basilicata
pt2 Açores (PT) esó3 Ceuta y Melilla (ES)
gr21 Ipeiros ita
gr41 Voreio Aigaio ie
pt12 Centro (P)
gr23 Dytiki Ellada
es43 Extremadura
pt11 Norte
HnatonKi NiaKeaonia,
gr11 Thraki
gr14 Thessalia
gr22 lonia Nisia
es61 Andalucia
it93 Calabria
gr43 Kriti
es11 Galicia
pt14 Alentejo
gr25 Peloponnisos
gr12 Kentriki Makedonia
es42 Castilla-la Mancha
gr3 Attiki
at11 Burgenland
pt15 Algarve
gr13 Dytiki Makedonia
it8
esó2
es41
gr42
gr24
es12
it91
n123
itb
es52
es13
ukn
es7
pt13
be32
it72
fr83
it71
Sicilia
Ireland
Campania
Murcia
Castilla y León
Notio Aigaio
Sterea Ellada
Principado de Asturias
Puglia
Flevoland
Sardegna
Comunidad Valenciana
Cantabria
Northern Ireland
Canarias (ES)
Lisboa e Vale do Tejo
Hainaut
Molise
Corse
Abruzzo
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Rich Group
Region
Code Region
Region
Code Region
Cornwall and Isles of
ukk3 Scilly fr53 Poitou-Charentes
be31 Brabant Wallon fr72 Auvergne
ukd5 Merseyside deb2 Trier
de93 Liineburg n121 Overijssel
Herefordshire,
at22 Steiermark ukg1 Worcestershire and
uke3 South Yorkshire fr25 Basse-Normandie
n112 Friesland fr52 Bretagne
be35 Namur ukj4 Kent
at21 K^rnten es21 Pais Vasco
fr63 Limousin fr62 Midi-Pyrénées
fi13 It^-Suomi fr22 Picardie
be24 Vlaams Brabant fr3 Nord - Pas-de-Calais
Northumberland, Tyne
ukc2 and Wear es51 Cataluña
n113 Drenthe ukd4 Lancashire
ukk4 Devon n142 Limburg (NL)
ukf3 Lincolnshire de23 Oberpfalz
ukc1 Tees Valley and Durham de22 Niederbayern
es24 Aragón fi14 V^li-Suomi
es23 La Rioja ukk2 Dorset and Somerset
Derbyshire and
fr81 Languedoc-Roussillon ukf1 Nottinghamshire
n122 Gelderland es3 Comunidad de Madrid
at12 Niederbsterreich fi15 Pohjois-Suomi
Shropshire and
ukg2 Staffordshire es22 C. Foral de Navarra
be34 Luxembourg (B) fr41 Lorraine
ukh3 Essex deb1 Koblenz
•
•
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Rich Group
Region Region
Code Region Code
de94 Weser-Ems be23
uke4 West Yorkshire fr24
uke2 North Yorkshire se02
dea3 Mi^nster fr82
n141 Noord-Brabant se0ó
tast ruaing ana Norin
uke1 Lincolnshire at33
de72 Gief3en de73
ukd3 Greater Manchester dec
fr51 Pays de la Loire ukh2
fr43 Franche-Comté se04
be33 Liége it53
ukg3 West Midlands be22
es53 Baleares ukf2
it52 Umbria dea5
fr26 Bourgogne n131
^urrey, tast ana vvest
ukj2 Sussex de91
def Schleswig-Holstein be25
at31 Oberbsterreich dea4
hampsnire ana isie or
ukj3 Wight ukk1
ukh1 East Anglia n133
de2ó Unterfranken ukd2
de24 Oberfranken at34
fró1 Aquitaine dk
fr21 Champagne-Ardenne de27
Region
Oost-Vlaanderen
Centre
^stra Mellansverige
Provence-Alpes-Cóte
d'Azur
Norra Mellansverige
Tirol
Kassel
Saarland
^searorasnire,
Hertfordshire
Sydsverige
Marche
Limburg (B)
^eicestersnire, rcutiana
and Northants
Arnsberg
Utrecht
Braunschweig
West-Vlaanderen
Detmold
^ioucestersnire,
Wiltshire and North
Zuid-Holland
Cheshire
Vorarlberg
Denmark
Schwaben
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Rich Group
Region
Code Region
Region
Code Region
se08 ^5vre Norrland de25 Mittelfranken
n134 Zeeland de12 Karlsruhe
fr71 RhSne-Alpes be21 Antwerpen
it51 Toscana it4 Emilia-Romagna
ukd1 Cumbria it12 Valle d'Aosta
de13 Freiburg se01 Stockholm
Berkshire, Bucks and
ukj1 Oxfordshire it2 ^ Lombardia
fr23 Haute-Normandie lu Luxembourg
se07 Mellersta Norrland fi2 Aland
fr42 Alsace de11 Stuttgart
itó Lazio de5 Bremen
de92 Hannover de21 Oberbayern
deb3 Rheinhessen-Pfalz at13 Wien
n132 Noord-Holland de71 Darmstadt
rcegion ^sruxeiies-
it13 Liguria be1 capitale/Brussels
de14 Tiibingen fr1 Íle de France
dea2 Kbin deó Hamburg
it32 Veneto fi16+fi17 Uusimaa (suuralue)
se09+se0
it33 Friuli-Venezia Giulia a Smáland med tiarna
at32 Salzburg uki London
it31 Trentino-Alto Adige ukl Wales
it11 Piemonte ukm Scotland
dea1 Diisseldorf
n111 Groningen
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Poor Group
Region
Code Region
Region
Code Region
de93 Lŭneburg gr23 Dytiki Ellada
es11 Galicia gr24 Sterea Ellada
es12
Principado de
Asturias gr25 Peloponnisos
es13 Cantabria gr3 Attiki
es24 Aragón gr41 Voreio Aigaio
es41 Castilla y León gr42 Notio Aigaio
es42 Castilla-la Mancha gr43 Kriti
es43 Extremadura ie Ireland
es52
Comunidad
Valenciana it72 Molise
esó1
esó2
Andalucia
Murcia
it8
it91
Campania
Puglia
esó3 Ceuta y Melilla (ES) it92 Basilicata
es7
gr11
Canarias (ES)
Anatoliki Makedonia,
Thraki
it93
ita
Calabria
Sicilia
gr12 Kentriki Makedonia itb Sardegna
gr13 Dytiki Makedonia pt11 Norte
gr14 Thessalia pt12 Centro (P)
gr21 Ipeiros pt14 Alentejo
gr22 lonia Nisia pt15 Algarve
Annex E
The group of "rich" regions used in the computations takes in the regions that are in
annex B except this ones.
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